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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Exploring the Role of United States Legal Discourse in Creating, Sustaining, and Disrupting 
Vestiges of Slavery 
By 
Hanif M. Bey 
Kutztown University Millersville University, 2018 
Kutztown, Pennsylvania 
Directed by Dr. Juliana Svistova 
This exploratory study starts from the proposition that the use of the racialized names “negro,” 
“colored,” “black,” and “white” represent vestiges of slavery that were socially and legally 
constructed, maintained, and perpetuated to validate a superior position for descendants of 
Europe in the United States, while assigning an inferior status to descendants of Africa in the 
United States.  I further suggest that the use of these racialized names appear to resemble what 
Noonan (1976) described as a legal mask: a legal construct that veils the humanity of participants 
in the legal process. Informed by Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Post-Colonialist Theory, this 
exploratory study aimed to explore the role of law and legal discourse in creating and sustaining 
racial differences between 1705-1857 and 1986-2017, and explore counter-hegemonic narratives 
in historic and contemporary legal texts as tools for dismantling vestiges of slavery.  Utilizing the 
techniques of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this exploratory study explores and compares 
the legal discourse for the use of racial names and ways of constructing race and racial 
differences.  I discovered in the historic legal texts that legal actors often used hostile, “white 
supremacist” hegemonic legal discourse to create and maintain racial differences.  Although the 
legal discourse today is much less overt and more nuanced, I found that many contemporary 
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legal actors use their platform to disrupt racial hegemony as they attempt to remedy the mistakes 
of the past.  This exploratory study breaks new ground by demonstrating that social workers can 
engage in sophisticated transdisciplinary research and enter a more active role in deconstructing 
and eliminating barriers of structural racism.  My research has implications for social work 
research, leadership, and education. 
Key words: racialized names, racial difference, legal mask, legal discourse 
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Exploring the Role of United States Legal Discourse in Creating, Sustaining, and Disrupting 
Vestiges of Slavery 
Introduction 
Problem Statement 
Despite post-Civil Rights efforts to establish and consolidate a racial, cultural identity 
that promoted inclusion, equality, and pride, the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” 
and “black” remain pejorative terms grounded within a socio-historical context that created and 
assigned an inferior status to many descendants of Africa in the United States, while those 
classified as “white” benefit from their position of superiority.  Although considerable research 
has concentrated on the racial identity shift from negro to colored to black and now to African 
American, much of this work tends to focus on the perceptions of and attitudes toward these 
names and their shift over time.  However, missing from the scholarship is the potential legal 
significance the use of these racialized names may have on many descendants of Africa in the 
United States.  Specifically, the gap exists in relation to how the use of the racialized names 
“negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” represents vestiges of slavery that were socially and 
legally constructed, maintained, and perpetuated to validate a superior position for descendants 
of Europe in the United States, while assigning an inferior status to descendants of Africa in the 
United States. 
Correspondingly, the literature seems to suggest that the reason why these racialized 
names were affixed upon many descendants of Africa in the United States was to create a 
distinctly inferior legal status to justify their mistreatment under the law.  Therefore, I infer that 
the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” attached a non-human legal 
status to many descendant of Africa in the United States, different from a natural person. 
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Because of this distinct legal personality created by law, I opine that the use of the racialized 
names may represent legal masks (Noonan, 1976) that conceal the humanity of many 
descendants of Africa in the United States, circumscribe their identity, and perhaps construct the 
lens through which many descendants of Africa in the United States are viewed and treated in 
law today.  Furthermore, I consider the continued use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” 
“black,” and “white” as legal masks a subtle form of neocolonialism and is a human rights issue. 
Ultimately, these unreconciled remnants of slavery, racism, privilege, and power, which continue 
to plague and haunt our society, must be deconstructed, abandoned, and eliminated. 
The primary focus of this exploratory study is the role of law and legal discourse in 
constructing racial differences between 1705-1857 and 1986-2017.  The term discourse is 
applied in this work to refer to words that may be used to assert power, ideology, and control, as 
well as for resistance and disruption (Fairclough, 2010).  Those who are in control convey words 
that carry power.  Words also carry precise meaning that can influence historic, social, and 
political conditions.  As a nation of laws, legal discourse plays an important part in shaping 
social discourse because it has the power of the state to establish what is considered legitimate 
discourse (Fairclough, 2010).  Therefore, exploring legal discourse may reveal how words that 
appear ordinary to some, may construct unequal power relations and portrayals among others. 
For this reason, I am interested in how legal actors used legal discourse in creating, sustaining, 
and disrupting vestiges of slavery. 
Unlike the comprehensive works by Higginbotham (1978; 1996) that examined the role 
of the American Colonial era in creating and sanctioning chattel slavery, and the consequential 
work entitled White by Law by Haney-Lopez (2006), the focus of my work is different because I 
explore the creation, maintenance, and disruption of racial differences and hegemony in law.  For 
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the purposes of this exploratory study, I first explored the historic legal texts describing the legal 
discourse that legal actors used during 1705-1857 to create racial differences and compared them 
with selected modern legal cases.  Second, I explored the counter-hegemonic narratives that legal 
actors used to disrupt the status-quo of racial differences in the historic and modern legal texts. 
Third, I explored whether and how these legally constructed racial differences influenced legal 
treatment.  
In this introductory chapter, I explain how my interest in these racialized names 
developed; describe the institutional context of racial differences with special attention to the 
racialized names; present a definition of terms; and give a brief outline of the analytical 
frameworks on which I draw.  Last, I discovered in the historic legal texts that legal actors often 
used hostile, “white supremacist” hegemonic legal discourse to create and maintain racial 
differences and hegemony.  Although the legal discourse today is much less overt and more 
nuanced, I found that many contemporary legal actors use their platform to disrupt racial 
hegemony as they attempt to remedy the mistakes of the past. 
Race is a relatively new ideology grounded upon the unequal hierarchal ranking of 
individuals based on their physical differences, which are deeply engrained in the consciousness 
of people (Golash-Boraza, 2016; Smedley & Smedley, 2005; Winant, 2000).  My own interest in 
disrupting this unjust and immoral ideology emanated from my concern over the current 
disparate legal treatment of many descendants of Africa in the United States.  Specifically, my 
passion over finding a way to eliminate racism in the United States quickly took form when I 
became a member of the Moorish Science Temple of America (M.S.T.A.).  Through my 
exposure to the official teachings of the M.S.T.A., I discovered that the racial categories “negro,” 
“colored,” and “black” appeared to determine how individuals are treated in society.  This basic 
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understanding was illustrated in the following excerpt by Noble Drew Ali (1928), the founder of 
the M.S.T.A., 
The citizens of all free national governments according to their national 
constitution are all of one family bearing one free national name. Those 
who fail to recognize the free national name of their constitutional 
government are classified as undesirables, and are subject to all inferior 
names and abuses and mistreatments that the citizens care to bestow upon 
them (p. 1). 
Moreover, the M.S.T.A. considered the “inferior names” “negro,” “colored,” and “black” “marks 
of slavery” that were forced on enslaved descendants of Africa in the United States (Drew Ali, 
n.d.).  Therefore, it was from my experience with the M.S.T.A. that I learned that race, more 
precisely the use of racialized names, became the predominant strategy implemented by the 
colonizers to account for their usurping the place of nationality.  As a result, Noble Drew Ali 
(1928) announced: 
There is not a nation on earth today that will recognize them 
[descendants of Africa in the United States] socially, religiously, 
politically, or economically, etc., in their present condition of their 
endeavorment [sic] in which they themselves try to force upon a civilized 
world, they, will not refrain from their sinful ways of action and their 
deeds have brought [jim-crowism], segregation, and everything that 
brings harm to human beings on earth (p. 7). 
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Ultimately, it was from these declarations that I developed my preliminary interest in exploring 
the possible link between racial differences, racialized names, hegemony, and their cultural and 
legal significance. 
Informed by a substantial body of work on the racial names shift from negro to colored to 
black to African American, but also on racial disparities in legal proceedings, I sought to explore 
how these vestiges of slavery were legally constructed to create and maintain an inferior image 
of descendants of Africa in the United States, while sustaining a superior image of descendants 
of Europe in the United States.  
To help formulate my initial concepts for this exploratory study, I reviewed the pertinent 
literature on racial identity, racialized names, and racial disparities in legal proceedings.  First, 
Noonan (1976) demonstrated that some aspects of legal analysis can dehumanize individuals 
using “conceptual legal masks” (p. 21-22).  To illustrate how these legal masks functioned, he 
showed that the early slave laws of Virginia that permitted chattel slavery, reduced Africans to 
property.  According to Noonan (1976), this legal process not only masked Africans as property, 
it also suppressed the humanity of the “white” property-owners.  Ultimately, these legal masks 
had two objectives: to enforce the social order, which was the institution of slavery; and to instill 
social control.  As a result, this type of legal reasoning also masked the inferred valuation of the 
legal process: that “whites” were in control, and “blacks” were the object of control.  While the 
work of Noonan (1976) informed my exploratory study, he overlooked the use of racialized 
names as potential legal masks.  Therefore, I turned towards the consequential work of legal 
scholar Ian Haney Lopez (2006) for more insight into the potential link between law, legal 
masks, racialized names, and differential legal treatment. 
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In his comprehensive work, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (2006), 
Haney-Lopez examined several historic United States’ Supreme Court cases that ruled on who 
could be classified as a citizen of the United States.  These “prerequisite cases” were essentially 
based on the racial prerequisite of being deemed “white” by law to be considered a citizen of the 
United States.  Also, through his detailed examination of these cases, Haney-Lopez (2006) 
showed that racial categories were created, defined, and regulated in and by law.  Moreover, he 
contended that as the law and legal actors propagate these racial categories, they become socially 
and legally acceptable realities of society.  Although his work also played a crucial role in how I 
formulated my exploratory study, White by Law omitted the role that the law and legal actors had 
in producing “negro” and “black” categories.  Consequently, I focused my attention on the works 
of Pimienta-Bey (1995; 2002) for guidance on the role of law in producing racialized names. 
Nearly twenty-five years ago, Pimienta-Bey (1995) examined the racialized names 
“negro,” “colored,” and “black” applying the disciplines of history, psychology, and African 
American studies.  In this study, he explored the historical development of these racialized 
names and how they were used in law to affect the legal status of descendants of Africa in the 
United States.  Most importantly, his research helped (re)establish the historic link between 
many descendants of Africa in the United States and their Moorish ancestry.  While the works of 
Pimienta-Bey (1995; 2002) were invaluable, particularly as they helped me develop my 
understanding of how these racialized names were grounded within a socio-historical and legal 
context, his works focused on solely historical legal cases.  This dissertation is a more detailed 
study looking at various legal texts over a longer period of time, in order to show how such 
racialized color names have continued to be used in reinforcing hegemony by those identified as 
“whites.” 
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Despite post-Civil Rights efforts to secure equal justice under the law, scholars of race 
and law overwhelmingly suggest that “blacks” encounter different treatment in criminal 
processing (Miethe & Moore, 1986); in courtroom juror perceptions (Sommers & Ellsworth, 
2000); in implicit criminal association (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004; Smith, 
Levinson, & Robinson, 2015); in sentencing (ACLU, 2014); and in police charging decisions 
(Sommers & Marotta, 2015).  All this evidence culminates in what Alexander (2012) refers to as 
“the new Jim Crow,” a thorough and veiled system of racialized social control operating within 
the United States legal system.  Therefore, considering all these points, it seemed to me that here 
was a context in which my own initial findings on the role of law and legal discourse in 
constructing and maintaining racial differences through time might be of some value. 
Definition of Terms 
The following terms were used throughout this work.  The definitions were derived from 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) and Black’s Law Dictionary: Definitions 
of the terms and phrases of American and English jurisprudence, ancient and modern ninth 
edition (2009): 
1. Afro-American: a noun; also called African American: black Americans of African 
ancestry. The term Afro-American is not found in Black’s Law Dictionary. 
2. Black: an adjective; opposite to white, of the color of coal or pitch; designating or of 
any of the dark-skinned traditional inhabitants of sub-Saharan Africa, Australia, or Melanesia or 
their descendants in other parts of the world.  The racial term “black” is not found in Black’s 
Law Dictionary. 
3. Colored: an adjective; having color, of a specified color; of a group other than the 
Caucasoid; specifically, black.  According to Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), the term, in such 
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phrases as “colored persons”, “the colored race”, and “the colored men”, is used to designate 
negroes or persons of the African race, including all persons of mixed blood descended from 
negro ancestry. 
4. Descendant: Those persons who are in the blood lineage of their ancestors. 
5. Juristic person: According to Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), a nonhuman entity that is 
created by law and is legally different owning its own rights and duties. This also relates to a 
“non-person”, which Webster’s (2002) defined as someone whose personhood has been legally 
expunged. 
6. Legal personality: According to Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), the sum total of an 
individual’s legal advantages and disadvantages.  Defined as the lawful characteristics and 
qualities of an entity. 
7. Moor: a noun; a member of a Muslim people of mixed Arab and Berber descent living 
in North West Africa.  A member of a group of this people that invaded and occupied Spain in 
the 8th century. 
8. Natural person: According to Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), a human being, naturally 
born, versus a legally generated juristic person. 
9. Negro: a noun; a member of any of the indigenous, dark-skinned people of Africa, 
living chiefly south of the Sahara, or a person having some African ancestors; a black.  
According to Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), the word “negro” means a black man, one 
descended from the African race, and does not commonly include a mulatto. 
10. Race or Racial: any of the different varieties or populations of human beings 
distinguished by physical traits such as hair, eyes, skin color, body shape, etc.  Traditionally, the 
three primary divisions are Caucasoid, Negroid, and Mongoloid. 
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11. Slave: derives from the Old Slovene term Slav, which was first used for the captives 
of Slavic origin.  A human being who is owned as property by and is absolutely subject to the 
will of another; bond servant divested of all freedom and personal rights.  A person who is 
completely dominated by some influence. 
12. Status: Black’s Law Dictionary (2009) defines the status of a person as his or her 
legal position or condition.  The term is chiefly applied to persons under disability or persons 
who have some peculiar condition which prevents the general law from applying to them in the 
same way as it does to ordinary persons. 
13. White: an adjective; having the color of pure snow or milk; opposite to black; of 
controlled by, or restricted to Caucasoid; derives from notions of racial superiority. 
14. White persons: as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (2009), the term was first used 
in the United States Naturalization Act of March 26, 1790; members of the Caucasian race as 
distinct from the Negroid and Mongoloid races. 
Therefore, I suggest that although the terms “Afro-American” and “African American” 
are nouns and have significant historical and cultural relationship to the continent known as 
Africa, they do not adequately specify a national designation that is legally recognized.  But, 
neither does “white.”  Also, the racial names “black” and “colored” are simply adjectives. 
“Black” and “colored” do not suggest a nationality, and therefore should not be applied to a 
group of people.  Further, the racial name “negro” is a derogatory label that was first used by the 
Portuguese in the 15th century to characterize the physical appearance of Africans and to later 
designate them as a “non-human” entity for the purposes of enslavement (Moore, 1960). 
Throughout this dissertation, I use the term “descendants of Africa in the United States” as a 
substitute for the racialized names and terms used for this group. 
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Correspondingly, throughout this dissertation I use the term “descendants of Europe in 
the United States” as a substitute for the racialized term “white,” which denotes racial 
superiority.  Notably, my linguistic choice for the terms “descendants of Africa in the United 
States” and “descendants of Europe in the United States” is not meant to minimize or disparage 
the experiences and viewpoints of those who rather self-identify as negro, colored, black, African 
American, and white.  Additionally, I understand that simply discussing these racialized names, 
which are deeply entrenched in the social fabric of the United States, rather than deconstructing 
their roots in slavery may be potentially contentious.  However, individuals and organizations 
committed to eliminating racial inequities and dismantling the system of racism in the United 
States, should remain receptive to fully understanding the social, historical, and legal roots of the 
racialized terms “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white.”  Therefore, I hope this work offers an 
honest, scholarly dialogue on the use of outdated, inaccurate, and divisive racialized names based 
on racial differences that continue to breed worldwide discord, hatred, and violence. 
Overview of the Study 
The aims of this exploratory study were: (1) to explore the role of law and legal discourse 
in creating and sustaining racial differences through 1705-1857 and 1986-2017; (2) to compare 
historic and contemporary use of racialized names in legal discourse; (3) to explore whether and 
in what way racial differences influenced legal treatment; and (4) to explore counter-hegemonic 
narratives in historic and contemporary legal texts as tools for dismantling vestiges of slavery. 
This exploratory study was founded on several premises that I derived from the literature 
review and theoretical foundations.  First, I suspected that the use of the racialized names 
“negro,” “colored,” and “black” represented vestiges of slavery that were socially and legally 
constructed to create an enduring inferior image of descendants of Africa in the United States 
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and the use of the racialized name “white” as an enduring superior image of descendants of 
Europe in the United States.  Second, I considered that the use of the racialized names “negro,” 
“colored,” “black,” and “white” resembled what Noonan (1976) described as a legal mask that 
suppresses the humanity of many descendants of Africa and Europe in the United States.  Last, I 
also believed that these legal masks may have circumscribed the identity of, and perhaps 
constructed the lens through which, many descendants of Africa in the United States are viewed 
and treated in law today.  Therefore, informed by previous literature review and the gaps that 
overlooked the role of law and legal discourse in creating and sustaining racial differences, 
specifically using racialized names, and the theoretical foundations used in this work, I 
formulated two research questions: 1) What legal discourse did legal actors use between 1705-
1857 to create racial differences in the United States and what similarities and differences exist 
in modern times? 2) What are the counter-hegemonic narratives that sought to disrupt the racial 
hegemony and racial differences in the historic and modern legal texts? 
In my work, I relied upon two theoretical frameworks, Critical Race Theory (CRT) and 
Post-Colonialist Theory, to shed light on this complex phenomenon that intersects racism, 
slavery, racial names, human rights, and law.  While CRT substantiates the prominent role that 
the law commands in perpetuating the entrenched and unfair racial system in the United States 
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2012), Post Colonialist Theory offers a distinct perspective that views 
remnants of slavery as post-colonialist efforts to maintain historically colonized people in the 
United States oppressed within an internal colony (Allen, 1990; 2005).  More precisely, Post 
Colonialist Theory critically examines and deconstructs how several structural institutions in 
society, such as the legal, penal, and educational systems, today act as instruments for 
perpetuating oppression and domination (Allen, 2005). 
CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY 
 
21 
 
To gain insight into some of the ideological meanings behind racial differences and to 
explore the ways in which these differences were and are perpetuated in law, I utilized a Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach as I analyzed historic and contemporary legal texts for this 
study.  CDA allowed me to focus in on ways in which power and hegemony are discursively 
produced and practiced (Fairclough, 2010; van Dijk, 2004).  The application of the CDA 
techniques helped me identify textual silences (Huckin, 2002) and omitted facts from discourse 
and texts.  Informed by CDA, I also used intertextual analysis (1992) to explore the ways in 
which prior discourses are reproduced textually.  In sum, both CRT and Post-Colonialist theory 
offer a theoretic lens through which to understand and disrupt hegemonic societal structures 
through counter-hegemonic narratives (Solorzano, 1998).  
To reiterate, I discovered in the historic legal texts that legal actors often used hostile, 
“white supremacist” hegemonic legal discourse to create and maintain racial differences. 
Although the legal discourse today is much less overt and more nuanced, I found that many 
contemporary legal actors use their platform to disrupt racial hegemony as they attempt to 
remedy the mistakes of the past.  Interestingly, I uncovered that while the racialized names for 
many descendants of Africa in the United States fluctuated between 1705-1857 and 1986-2017, 
the racialized name “white” remained the fixed racial designation for all descendants of Europe 
in the United States over this same time.  Pimienta-Bey (1995) states “English history reveals 
that ‘white’ was customarily used by royalists (the aristocratic caste/class) to symbolize 
themselves,” and “was understood to designate purity as well as God-given authority” (p. 263). 
This study also suggests that “white” was deliberately used analogously for those with European 
features, as a clever psychological means of reinforcing legal and cultural superiority over those 
who were classified as “negroes” and “blacks.”  Based on the findings of this exploratory study 
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and critical social work perspective (MacKinnon, 2009), I propose that descendants of Africa 
and Europe in the United States should critically examine and explore the continuing need to 
apply these racialized names that reinforce the hegemonic status-quo that holds one race superior 
and another inferior. 
Outline of Dissertation 
I organized the dissertation as follows: Chapter I offers a background on the construction 
of racial differences in history and its constitution-in-reality.  I present how legal actors 
constructed through law, and intentionally stripped many descendants of Africa in the United 
States of their nationality and imposed the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black.”  I 
discuss the institution of slavery, the nature of “white supremacy,” and the legacy of slavery and 
permanency of white supremacy.  Subsequently, I discuss the relevance and implications of this 
work for social work. 
Chapter II presents Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Post-Colonialist Theory as the 
theoretical frameworks that I utilized to help develop research questions, analyze data, and 
understand the role of law and legal discourse in constructing, perpetuating, and disrupting 
vestiges of slavery. 
Chapter III introduces the literature review that informs this dissertation.  In this chapter, 
I introduce the cultural role of names, the studies of racial names and perceptions, and racial bias 
within a criminal justice context.  I also present the key works that spurred this dissertation and 
explain how the literature overlooked the role of law and legal actors, specifically using 
racialized names to create, maintain, and contest differential legal treatment. 
In chapter IV, I describe the research design, methodological procedures, and research 
questions that guided this exploratory study.  I discuss my application of Critical Discourse 
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Analysis (CDA) for the purposes of this work.  Additionally, I share my positionality as the 
researcher and explain ethical considerations taken to ensure that this study complies with ethical 
procedures.  Lastly, I describe my sampling procedures, data collection, and data analysis 
process. 
Chapter V presents my findings of the historic and contemporary legal texts.  I share 
intertextual narratives summarizing the similarities and differences that were found in the 
analyzed texts and explain how they connect with my research questions and objectives.  I also 
present what words or terms and facts were omitted from the legal texts that pointed to how 
racial differences were and are maintained.  Additionally, I share some of the counter-hegemonic 
narratives that emerged from the historic and contemporary legal texts.  More precisely, I 
discovered that historic legal actors used many racial descriptors to differentiate the slave from 
the slave-holder to maintain clear boundaries of power and privilege.  Also, while some 
contemporary legal actors relied on prior rulings that used racialized names and racial 
descriptors, I uncovered that the legal discourse today is much less overt and more nuanced. 
Lastly, I found that many contemporary legal actors used their platform to disrupt racial 
hegemony as they attempted to remedy our racist past and present. 
Finally, in Chapter VI, I discuss what I discovered in the historic and contemporary legal 
texts as they relate to the use of racialized names and the construction and perpetuation of race, 
racial differences, and hegemony in legal discourse.  I present the limitations of my research, its 
implications to social work research, education, leadership, and action. I also make 
recommendations for future social work research, education, and leadership.  Lastly, I share my 
contributions to the literature, such as how utilizing CRT with CDA may amplify how social 
workers study and respond to the institutional injustices of racism.  Additionally, how 
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implementing a Post-Colonialist theory, as put forward by Allen (1990; 2005), may augment 
how social workers examine the modern, more nuanced forms of racism today in the United 
States. 
In conclusion, there is no question that our country has made some positive changes, 
specifically in terms of racial differences and legal discourse, however no one can diminish or 
minimize the deleterious psychological impact these racial differences have had on many 
descendants of Africa in the United States.  In fact, recently even the executive branch of this 
government used vulgar and belligerent discourse aimed directly at vulnerable groups. 
Therefore, social workers can no longer remain silent as discourses of discrimination, 
marginalization, division, hate, and racism resurface.  For these reasons, I embarked on this 
exploratory study to create a space for future dialogue as we seek to eliminate and dismantle the 
vestiges of slavery known as the racialized names “negro,” “black,” and “white.” 
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Chapter I. Background 
In this chapter, I introduce how racial differences were created in history and its 
constitution-in-reality, which set the stage for how dominant groups manipulate ideology and 
discourse to maintain their position of power and control over marginalized groups. 
Construction of Racial Difference in History and Its Constitution in Reality 
While race is a relatively new construct (Golash-Borza, 2016; Smedley & Smedley, 
2005; Winant, 2000), the establishment of a society based on human differences did not exist in 
history until the founders of the American Republic created the distinctive races white, black, 
and free others (U. S. Census, 1790).  Historically, people were often distinguished by their 
religion, language, and ethnic group (Smedley & Smedley, 2005).  However, during the age of 
exploration and colonialism, physical features, particularly skin pigmentation, were used as a 
tool to separate and divide people into a caste system (Morning, 2011; Smedley & Smedley, 
2005).  Scholars of history agree that the only way the American founding fathers could morally 
justify the enslavement of another group of human beings, while declaring “all men free and 
equal” (Declaration of Independence, 1776), was to strip descendants of Africa in the United 
States of their names and heritage.  This systematic process that violently punished descendants 
of Africa in the United States for speaking their native languages, using their birth-names, and 
barring them from practicing their religion, also sanctioned a racial hierarchy with “whites” 
(descendants of Europe in the United States) in control.  This systematic process also classified 
“blacks” (descendants of Africa in the United States) as non-human, and the object of complete 
control, was also codified within United States legal discourse.  As a result, one of the 
underlying principles sustaining pervasive inequality in the United States today is a racist 
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ideology known as “white supremacy,” which views “whites” as superior and “blacks” as 
inherently inferior (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Cress Welsing, 1989; Wilson, 1990; 1993). 
Although the genesis of colonial exploitation and its accompanying European worldview 
of superiority began during the Enlightenment (Ife, 2012), racial ideology has its roots in early 
colonial America (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Higginbotham, 1978; 1996).  To secure the 
economic enterprise of slavery and keep intact the privileged status of the wealthy, Jefferson’s 
Notes on the State of Virginia (Jefferson, 1785) introduced the social construct known as “white 
supremacy.”  Essentially, Jefferson (1785) wrote, “blacks are inferior to the whites in the 
endowments both of body and mind.”  Accordingly, since Jefferson’s racist thesis, some scholars 
within the science (Rushton, 1995) and academic community (Herrnstein & Murray, 1996; Rowe 
& Cleveland, 1996) have labored to validate “white supremacy” in modern times.  Today, this 
racist ideology continues to have destructive effects, particularly on the lives of many 
descendants of Africa in the United States (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Cress Welsing, 1989; 
Wilson, 1990; 1993). 
Yet, this oppressive concept known as race, which separates human beings into 
hierarchical categories based on the socially constructed notion that biological and physiological 
differences exist (Golash-Borza, 2016; Richeson & Sommers, 2016; Smedley & Smedley, 2005), 
has precise implications.  Racism is a structural system based on the subordination of one or 
more groups by another who holds a superior position, usually by threat of violence and/or 
physical force (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; Wilson, 1993).  Accordingly, descendants of Europe in the 
United States self-described as “whites” (Allen, 1994; Ignatiev, 2003) seized the position of 
authority and power, while many descendants of Africa in the United States called “negro,” 
“colored,” and “black” were systematically forced into a position of inferiority.  In short, the use 
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of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black,” which served to perpetuate the racial 
hierarchy of “whites” at the top, was supported by a complex network of ideologies, institutions, 
and policies, all designed to maintain many descendants of Africa in the United States socially 
dead in-law (Brown, 2009; Cacho, 2012; Dayan, 2011; Patterson, 1985).  More precisely, 
Patterson (1985) referred to how the law ascribed a legal identity or status to the enslaved 
descendants of Africa in the United States that acknowledged, to a certain degree, their physical 
body, but as one that was dispossessed of all civil rights.  Patterson (1985) names this condition 
“social death,” which fundamentally deprived many descendants of Africa in the United States of 
their human and civil rights. 
One salient element of social death is its psychological effect. Specifically, many 
descendants of Africa in the United States were physically forced to relinquish their identities 
and accept the names denoting their inferior status within the government.  From a historical 
standpoint, this violent process that stripped many descendants of Africa in the United States of 
their names and nationality created a condition of social and cultural isolation (Brown, 2009; 
Patterson, 1985).  This condition known as natal alienation (Patterson, 1985) and social 
exclusion (Brown, 2009) prohibited many descendants of Africa in the United States access to 
their social and cultural memories, which is equivalent to denied nationality.  According to 
Brown and Brown (2010), “cultural memories refer to the discourses, texts, and artifacts that 
shape how we conceptualize and imagine a social context or a group’s experience” (p. 142). 
Therefore, this systematic, complex process to create a socially dead person in law relied not 
only on physically punishing and killing many descendants of Africa in the United States who 
attempted to access and utilize their social and cultural memories.  This systematic, complex 
process also implemented and enforced an ideology based on “white supremacy” (Bonilla-Silva, 
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1997; 2014; Cress Welsing, 1989; Wilson, 1990; 1993), with a comprehensive legal structure 
that maintained, and ensured the perpetual subordinate status of many descendants of Africa in 
the United States. 
Institution of Slavery 
Numerous scholars have asserted that the vestiges of slavery continue to afflict our 
society today (Alexander, 2010; Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011; De Gruy, 2005; Fosten, 2016; 
Lake, 1997; Noble, 2013; Wacquant, 2002).  In fact, as recent as 2008, members of the United 
States Congress recognized slavery’s long-term impact on United States Americans when 
Representative Steve Cohen, a Democratic from Tennessee put forward House Resolution (H.R.) 
194 as a step towards reconciliation and healing of the nation as a whole (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2008).  Although H.R. 194 was constructed as an official apology for the United 
States government’s participation in and support for the institution of slavery and did not receive 
sufficient legislative support, it asserted the distinct characteristics of slavery in the United 
States, one that seized Africans, sold them at auctions “like beast or goods,” and robbed them of 
their humanity.  Specifically, H.R. 194 (2008) affirmed that the insidious institution of slavery 
intentionally stripped many enslaved descendants of Africa in the United States of their names 
and heritage.  Since the antebellum period in North American history marks the point in which 
descendants of Africa in United States were essentially stripped of their nationality and forced to 
use the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black,” it merits further review. 
Essential to the development of the early union was the preservation of the single most 
important economic institution in America: slavery (Patterson, 1985).  However, faced with a 
political dilemma, the founding fathers, many of whom were attorneys (Haney-Lopez, 2006), 
developed artful ways to incorporate within the fabric of the United States the complete and total 
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denial of citizenship to many descendants of Africa in the United States (Alexander, 2010; 
Dayan, 2011; Higginbotham, 1996).  The drafters of the United States Constitution (1787), while 
claiming “all men free and equal,” carefully avoided political hypocrisy when they excluded 
from the legal discourse the words “slave,” “negro,” and “black.” Instead, to preserve this 
hierarchical system of race (Alexander, 2010) the drafters framed the “three-fifths clause” within 
the Constitution.  To illustrate, the United States Constitution (1787), Article I, Section 2 states: 
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the 
several States which may be included within this Union, according 
to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to 
the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service 
for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of 
all other persons. 
Notably, the drafters of the Constitution were deliberately cryptic when they developed this 
ambiguous legal term “other person.”  In fact, this “anomaly of law” (Dayan, 2011, p. 135) was 
never seen before in history.  Patterson (1985) described this anomaly as a legal identity or status 
that acknowledged, to a certain degree, the physical body of enslaved descendants of Africa in 
the United States, but as one that was dispossessed of all civil rights.  
To clarify, because of chattel slavery, many descendants of Africa in the United States 
were not only considered a commodity, something that can be bought, sold, and discarded like a 
piece of property, they were also now legally classified as an “other person.”  In other words, 
many descendants of Africa in the United States were transformed in law into a non-human 
entity or a juristic person (Black, 2009) and categorized and registered in law as “negro,” 
“colored,” and “black.”   This process further marginalized many descendants of Africa in the 
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United States to a position of civiliter mortuus, meaning dead in law (Dayan, 2011).  Because of 
this legally imposed inferior status, many descendants of Africa in the United States were not 
only denied basic civil and human rights, they were designated to a permanent, non-human 
classification (Pimienta-Bey, 1992; 1995; 2002).  Therefore, this systematic, complex process to 
create a socially dead person relied not only on violence, such as whipping, burning, raping, and 
murdering the enslaved African, but a legal structure that maintained and ensured the inferior 
legal status of descendants of Africa in the United States. 
Several legal scholars and researchers determined that slavery could not exist without the 
United States legal system that preserved, codified, and enacted laws to sustain and maintain 
“white” hegemony at the expense of “black” inferiority (Armstrong, 2012; Coates, 2003; Haney-
Lopez, 2006; Higginbotham, 1996; Middleton, 2007; Noonan, 1976; Patterson, 1985; Sharfstein, 
2003; Williams, 2005).  Further, research shows that slavery spawned an entire system of 
institutions, such as the legal and educational system, that advanced euro-centric supremacy, 
contributing to the permanent inferiority of many descendants of Africa in United States 
(Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Brown, 2009; Alexander, 2010).  At the root of this bifurcated legal 
structure (Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011) was a phenotypical hierarchy (Pimienta-Bey, 2002) 
with “whites” at the top and “blacks” at the bottom.  This “precept of inferiority” 
(Higginbotham, 1996, p. 10) was inscribed in the legal discourse of the Notes on the Debates of 
the Articles of Confederation (1777).  In this document, John Adams, this country’s first vice-
president and second President of the United States, affirmed that the word “white” should be 
inserted in the Notes and “that negroes are wealth and negroes are a species of property, personal 
estate” (Adams, 1776, page unspecified).  As a result, this racist declaration was supported by 
the emerging science on race as a bio-genetic construct (Golash-Borza, 2016; Morning, 2011; 
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Sharfstein, 2003) and given legitimacy in Supreme Court Chief Justice Taney’s legal opinion in 
Scott v Sandford (1857) as an undisputed fact.  Hence, racial differences appear to have been 
legally specified and cleverly encoded within this nation’s social and political reality. 
To justify converting natural persons (Black, 2009) into slaves, the law devised a “legal 
mask” (Noonan, 1976) in the form of the legal term “other persons” in the United States 
Constitution.  This precise legal term was further characterized in the racial names “negro,” 
“colored,” and “black,” which concealed the nationality of many descendants of Africa in the 
United States.  This legal action was further illustrated when the future sixth President of the 
United States John Quincy Adams debating in front of the United States Supreme Court as the 
attorney for one of the plaintiffs in the Amistad case asserted America’s cryptic role in slavery, 
when he stated: “The words slave and slavery are studiously excluded from the Constitution... 
circumlocutions are the fig-leaves under which these parts of the body politic are decently 
concealed” (Adams, 1841, page unspecified).  In other words, the framers of the United States 
Constitution, denied and suppressed from this nation’s paramount legal document its original sin: 
slavery. 
Many founding fathers engaged in what may be considered legal duplicity (Haney-Lopez, 
(2006) by omitting the words “slave” and “slavery” from the United States Constitution and 
creating a new legal term known as “other person” to describe slaves.  Therefore, it may not be 
considered a stretch to infer that the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” were 
deliberately imposed on many descendants of Africa in the United States to disguise their 
humanity and national identity.  Moreover, I suggest that these forced “legal masks” (Noonan, 
1976), specified in the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black,” appear to be 
more complex than the physical nature of slavery.  Therefore, I believe critically exploring the 
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role of law and legal discourse in constructing racial differences through time and how it may 
have constructed the lens through which many descendants of Africa in the United States are 
viewed and treated today in law, represents a social justice and human rights issue. 
Indeed, the act of deliberately suppressing by physical force and concealing the identity 
of many descendants of Africa in the United States by way of the legal system was an integral 
tool of domination and control (Osagie & Owiny, 2015).  In fact, research by Lake (1997) and 
Pimienta-Bey (1992; 1995; 2002) established that the imposed racialized names “negro,” 
“colored,” and “black” did not correspond to any historically grounded nomenclature.  That is to 
say, no pre-African enslavement era, or that such terms correspond to no historical “nation” 
which defines itself as such.  These racialized names implied something bestial, savage, and 
inherently subservient (Moore, 1960).  Moreover, this process of destroying identity and 
obliterating memories is what wa Thiong’o (1986) aptly cited as nothing more than dropping a 
“cultural bomb” (p. 15) on a people.  These references may seem controversial to some within 
the social work profession, but the unprecedented annihilation of a people’s history and legacy, 
which left many descendants of Africa in the United States with, what De Gruy (2005) called, a 
“vacant esteem” (p. 125), should spark outrage and encourage a call to action.  
To clarify, De Gruy (2005) described this “vacant esteem” as the absence of a basic sense 
of self, one that breeds negative self-perceptions, self-hatred, and what Wilson (1990) explained 
as a possible contributing factor for some of the self-destructive behaviors exhibited by many 
descendants of Africa in the United States in the service of “white” domination.  As a result, the 
systematic socio-cultural destruction of many descendants of Africa in the United States by 
forcibly imposing the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” as an 
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instrument of control (Baird, 1970) allowed descendants of Europe in the United States to benefit 
from this new-found sense of racial superiority and privilege as “white persons” (Black, 2009). 
The Nature of “White Supremacy” 
Research shows that the use of the racialized term “white” is also a relatively new racial 
designation (Allen, 1994; Ignatiev, 2003; Jordan, 2012; Skogan, 1995).  Notably, Allen (1994) 
and Jordan (2012) indicated that the use of the racial term “white” first appeared around 1680, 
shortly following Bacon’s rebellion in colonial Virginia.  According to most accounts, Bacon’s 
rebellion was a remarkable moment in colonial North American history (Allen, 1994; Jordan, 
2012).  For the first time, and probably the last time in North American history, poor farmers, 
laborers, and indentured descendants of Europe in the United States joined forces with some 
enslaved descendants of Africa in the United States to challenge the authority of Governor 
Berkeley (Allen, 1994; Jordan, 2012).  Frightened by this event, the wealthy, ruling class decided 
that amalgamating all the various descendants of Europe in the United States under the racial 
banner of “white” was in their economic and political self-interest (Allen, 1994; Jordan, 2012). 
Because of this centralization of power, descendants of Europe in the United States from all 
pedigrees and social ranks institutionalized “whiteness” by designating a socio-political 
hierarchy with “whites” in control, and “negroes” and “blacks” as the subjects of control. 
The consolidation of descendants of Europe in the United States as “whites” or “white 
persons” was clearly not based on skin pigmentation, because as both Allen (1994) and Jordan 
(2012) noted, many European groups, like Spaniards, Italians, and French, had swarthy 
complexion because of their Moorish blood.  To be sure, the deliberate formation of this new 
racialized category called “white persons” or “whites” was and remains a socio-political, 
economic enterprise of domination and colonization (Cress Welsing, 1989; Wilson, 1990; 1993). 
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This new social order required a systematic, hegemonic ideology that maintained and preserved 
“white” superiority at the expense of “black” inferiority.  This ideology that developed during 
the late seventeenth century is known as “white supremacy” (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Cress 
Welsing, 1989; Wilson, 1990; 1993).  Furthermore, I suggest that a comprehensive legal 
structure that sustained and gave legitimacy to “white supremacy” at the expense of “black” 
inferiority also requires further examination. 
The Legal Construction of the Slave 
Unlike other forms of slavery in history, such as those found in ancient Greece and Rome 
(Patterson, 1985), the brand of slavery in the United States represented an intricate, dynamic 
process sanctioned by and reinforced in law.  As noted earlier, many of the founding fathers, 
who were lawyers, like Thomas Jefferson (Forbes, 2012), constructed within the United States 
Constitution (1787) the ambiguous term “other person”1.  To reiterate, Patterson (1985) 
described the enslaved African’s legal identity as analogous to essentially being dead in law 
(Dayan, 2011).  A necessary response to the “Law of Nations” foundation for most “Western” 
European countries (Vattel, 2008).  Because of this socially imposed and legally enforced 
inferior status, many descendants of Africa in the United States were not only denied basic civil 
rights, they were denied their humanity.  In other words, when descendants of Africa in the 
United States were forced into chattel slavery, stripped of their names and heritage, and 
classified as “negro,” “colored,” and “black,” they unknowingly assumed a legal personality 
(Black, 2009) that relegated them to an inferior legal status.  I suspect this legal position or 
condition that dehumanizes many descendants of Africa in the United States may be connected 
to the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black.”  Therefore, I suggest that the 
                                                     
1 Refer to the Definition of Terms-page 16 for additional information.  
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use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” represent vestiges of slavery that 
were socially and legally constructed to create an enduring inferior image of many descendants 
of Africa in the United States and can even be seen to justify their mistreatment under the law. 
The Legacy of Slavery and Permanency of White Supremacy 
To eternalize “white supremacy” as a hegemonic ideological philosophy, descendants of 
Europe in the United States required the initiation of four crucial actions. Higginbotham (1998) 
outlined these actions as: 
First, convince the white colonists, regardless of their social or economic 
status, that they are superior to the black colonists.  Second, convince 
blacks that they are inferior to all others.  Third, enforce the inferiority of 
blacks and the superiority of whites in the most open and public manner. 
Fourth, explain the inferiority of blacks and the superiority of whites by 
reference to Christianity (p. 25-26). 
For the sake of this exploratory study and this section, I will discuss how some of these crucial 
actions, may have influenced the lens through which many descendants of Africa in the United 
States are viewed and treated today in law.  First, to convince the “white” colonists of their 
“superiority” over “blacks,” the ruling elite created a distorted account of history that 
strategically placed “whites” at the center of civilization (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995; Nobles, 
2013; Wilson, 1993; Woodson, 1933).  As a result, this type of “education,” which situates 
“whites” at the center of everything significant in the world, not only seems to instill a false 
sense of inferiority within the consciousness of many descendants of Africa in the United States 
(Nobles, 2013; Wilson, 1993; Woodson, 1933), it breeds a pathological (Wilson, 1993) 
consciousness in “whites” (Allen, 1994) and masks their humanity (Noonan, 1976).  Naturally, 
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once this ideology is embedded in society, it becomes the dominant social and political reality 
for its citizens. 
Interestingly, in the Papers of Benjamin Franklin (1751), Mr. Franklin noted that “the 
number of purely white people in the world is proportionately very small…I could wish their 
numbers were increased” (p. 234).  He expressed his growing concern over the “eventual, 
worldwide encroachment of dark-skinned people.”  In like manner, Long in his Candid 
Reflections (1772) articulated his fear of miscegenation as followed: 
The lower class of women in England are remarkably fond of the 
blacks;… by these ladies they generally have a numerous brood. 
Thus, in the course of a few generations more the English blood 
will become…contaminated with this mixture…this alloy may 
spread so extensively as even to reach the middle, and then the 
higher orders of the people, till the whole nation resembles the 
Portuguese and the Moriscos in complexion of skin and baseness 
of mind. This is a venomous and dangerous ulcer that threatens 
to spread its malignancy far and wide, until every family catches 
infection from it (p. 82). 
When taken together, the fears expressed by Franklin (1751) and Long (1772), correspond to the 
theory on “white supremacy” offered by the late Dr. Francis Cress Welsing (1989).  As a trained 
psychiatrist, Dr. Cress Welsing focused on what could motivate a group of people, in this case 
“whites” to establish themselves as the “superior” race.  According to Dr. Cress Welsing (1989), 
“whites” understood that “color always annihilates-phenotypically and genetically speaking-the 
non-color white” (p. 35).  Indeed, when Dr. Cress Welsing first offered her Theory of Color-
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Confrontation and Racism (1989) to the social science community, it was viewed as flawed and 
even considered ‘reverse racism’ (Finn, 2014).  However, her theory seems vindicated when the 
statements by Franklin (1751) and Long (1772) are combined, because they substantiated the 
concern “whites” shared over their numerical inadequacy and color inferiority.  It seems like 
these underlying fears and concerns may contribute to how many “whites” may consciously and 
unconsciously perceive “blacks” as their enemy.  Moreover, as the presumed fear of “whites” 
losing their privileged position of power to “blacks” grew, an oppositional and often violent 
relationship ensued between “blacks” and “whites. 
Although the Thirteenth Amendment formally abolished the institution of slavery in 
1865, the entrenched institution of racism morphed into a ubiquitous system.  Shortly after the 
United States Congress ratified the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, commonly known as the 
Reconstruction Amendments, former slave states passed many laws that further subordinated 
many descendants of Africa in United States.  These discriminatory laws were known as the 
‘Black Codes’ (Alexander, 2010; Armstrong, 2012; Chambers, 2013; Higginbotham, 1996). 
Notably, these oppressive codes instituted a sub-set of equally severe laws such as the convict 
laws and vagrancy laws, which essentially authorized any “white person” the legal right and duty 
to apprehend any descendant of Africa in United States perceived to be violating the law (Allen, 
1994).  Indeed, the unrestricted power that “white persons” wielded over many descendants of 
Africa in the United States during Reconstruction bears some striking similarity to the recent 
tragic death of Trayvon Martin by a “white” citizen patrolling a neighborhood (Keyes, Smyke, 
Middleton, & Black, 2015).  Although the Court noted that Trayvon was not committing any 
crime at the time of his death, the shooter simply “believed” his life was at risk and killed the 
unarmed youth (Keyes et al., 2015).  Unfortunately, too many young, unarmed descendants of 
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Africa in United States are killed because they are perceived to be a threat to many descendants 
of Europe in United States (Graham & Lowery, 2004).  For this reason, I sought to examine how 
the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” were used in the historic and 
contemporary legal texts. 
Shortly following the ‘Black Codes’, despite opposition from President Andrew Johnson, 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  The expressed purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 was federal protection and guaranteed minimum due process to former slaves.  
Furthermore, this Act of 1866 granted “full benefits of all the laws…to any persons …as are 
enjoyed by white citizens” (Civil Rights Act of 1866).  This provision represents another 
example, in which lawmakers made a clear and specific distinction between “any persons” and 
“white” citizens.  The question remains, what type of benefits were “any persons” entitled to 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866?  Were these benefits under the law the same as those 
“enjoyed by white citizens?”  Why did the writers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 exclude the 
term “former slaves”?  Accordingly, I believe that one of the residual effects of slavery, 
specifically the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” as legal 
masks, may represent an overlooked phenomenon that requires further analysis. 
Therefore, despite the efforts of Congress to establish some appearance of fair treatment, 
many descendants of Africa in the United States encountered countless acts of violence.  For 
instance, Williams (2005) noted that over thirty thousand documented accounts of lynching 
occurred in the South alone.  Unfortunately, for 100 years under Jim Crow, many descendants of 
Africa in the United States endured unprecedented violence.  For many descendants of Europe in 
the United States, the notion that descendants of Africa in United States could be transformed 
from former objects of property to citizens by the stroke of a pen was too much to fathom. 
CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY 
 
39 
 
Additionally, the research shows that many descendants of Europe in the United States, 
especially in the Southern states, publicly denounced and condemned granting civil rights to 
descendants of Africa in the United States (Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011; Fosten, 2016). 
Consumed by this pathological fear of losing their position of power (Wilson, 1990), many 
descendants of Europe in the United States resorted to violent acts of terror such as lynching, 
cross-burnings, and unprovoked murders to bar many descendants of Africa in United States 
from gaining equal access under the law (Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011). 
Consequently, from 1865-1965, Jim Crow legislation not only further disenfranchised 
many descendants of Africa in United States (Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011), it granted to many 
descendants of Europe in the United States the moral right to commit individual and collective 
acts of indiscriminate violence on many descendants of Africa in the United States (Wacquant, 
2002; Williams, 2005).  With impunity, many descendants of Europe in the United States 
resorted to a reign of terror (Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011; Fosten, 2016) because they believed 
it was their intrinsic right and duty to maintain this “inferior group of beings” (Scott v Sandford, 
1857) completely subdued and controlled. Sadly, many of those responsible for many of the 
violent acts committed against many descendants of Africa in the United States by “whites” were 
not prosecuted under the law (Alexander, 2010; Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011). 
Like no other point in history, the Civil Rights era marked a monumental time, in which 
descendants of Africa in the United States garnered international attention and widespread 
support (Clarke, 1994) to create enough pressure to force President Johnson to sign the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  Despite the country’s general support for civil rights in the 1960s, a large 
portion of the “white” population still vehemently opposed it.  During the 1920’s, Drew Ali 
spoke of the “granted privilege” which had been bestowed upon the freed descendants of Africa 
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in the United States  following the Civil War (Drew Ali, 1928).  Feeling betrayed by their 
government, this discontented group, commonly called the ‘silent majority’ (Mayer, 2002), 
turned to politicians who were willing to give voice to their concerns and fears.  While several 
outright racist politicians like Alabama Governor Wallace were considered outliers, a new breed 
of cunning politicians emerged. Starting in 1971 with President Nixon, his War on Drugs 
declaration exploited racial fears and tensions through racially coded language and policies 
(Haney-Lopez, 2014; Mayer, 2002).  During an interview in 1994, President Nixon’s domestic 
policy chief John Ehrlichman disclosed: 
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, 
had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand 
what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either 
against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the 
hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing 
both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest 
their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them 
night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about 
the drugs? Of course we did (as cited in Baum, 2016, p. 3). 
Unfortunately, these veiled, racist policies primarily targeting many descendants of 
Africa in the United States continued through Republican and Democratic administrations. 
Notably, during a 1980 campaign speech in Mississippi, then presidential-candidate Ronald 
Reagan stated: “I still believe the answer to any problem lies with the people…I believe we have 
distorted the balance of our government today by giving powers that were never intended to be 
given in the Constitution to that federal establishment” (Reagan, 1980).  As Mendelberg (2001) 
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noted, Reagan’s speech at the Neshoba County Fair in Philadelphia, Mississippi, where only 
sixteen years earlier Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner, three civil rights workers were 
murdered for promoting voting rights, was clearly an appeal to the racial sentiments of many 
“whites” who took exception to the Civil Rights Act.  Reagan’s attempt to galvanize “white” 
southern voters, while carefully exploiting racial fears and emotions about losing power to 
“blacks,” is known as the “Southern Strategy” (Mendelberg, 2001).  Conversely, politicians 
promoting economic policies designed to reduce poverty, such as public assistance and Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), were often perceived by many “whites” as providing 
handouts to undeserving, lazy “blacks” and many of these policies were used as a tool to 
disparage and categorize abusers of the system as criminals (Haney-Lopez, 2014). 
In the mid-1980’s during the Reagan Administration’s War on Drugs, the Zero Tolerance 
Policy was defined as a practice of punishing relatively minor drug possession incidents harshly 
(Skiba, 2000).  This value-based policy attempted to curb the ravaging effects that the crack-
cocaine epidemic created in the inner cities of the United States, which eventually seeped into 
suburban society.  One of the major effects of this epidemic was the rise in violent crimes, 
policies of mandatory sentencing, and incarceration to control primarily urban communities. 
Moreover, the tidal wave of violent crimes eventually crept into the school system, forcing many 
politicians and the public at-large to urge for a “get tough” policy to address the crime problem 
(Astor, 1995).  Therefore, in the late 1980’s, during a rise in juvenile violent crimes and gangs, 
the tragic and deadly Columbine shooting, and other violent school incidents, the Gun Free 
Schools Act of 1994 was signed into law (Skiba, 2000). 
Today, many descendants of Africa in the United States encounter unrelenting stop-and-
frisk, random searches, racial profiling, and police brutality at a disproportionate rate than any 
CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY 
 
42 
 
other group (APA, 2014).  This has transformed the current criminal justice system into an 
upgraded model of Jim Crow (Alexander, 2010).  As a result, far too many descendants of Africa 
in the United States are unemployed, legally prohibited from voting, unable to access public 
benefits, and barred from jury duty (NAACP, 2017).  Accordingly, crucial to this study is the 
exploration of the legal discourse and the deconstruction of the oppressive ideology known as 
“white supremacy” (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Cress Welsing, 1989; Wilson, 1990; 1993), that 
is deeply entrenched in the United States and which deserves serious attention. 
Relevance to Social Work and Education 
There is no question that structural racism permeates every aspect of society. As a social 
worker, I acknowledge that the responsibility of the social work profession is to promote and 
advocate for the well-being of our clients, this includes social problems like structural racism 
(NASW, 2008).  As my literature review will demonstrate, structural racism is a complex issue, 
grounded within a socio-historic context.  Therefore, it is incumbent that social workers 
interested in contesting oppression as they advance social justice, understand that along with the 
legal system, the United States’ educational system represents another complex network of 
institutions that advances the ideology of “white supremacy” (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Cress 
Welsing, 1989; Glocke, 2016; Traore; 2004; Wilson, 1990; 1993).  Almost eighty-five years ago, 
Woodson (1933) signaled out the school’s role in conserving racial inequity when he noted: 
The same educational process which inspires and stimulates the 
oppressor with the thought that he is everything and accomplished 
everything worthwhile, depresses and crushes at the same time the 
spark of genius in the Negro by making him feel that his race does 
not amount to much and never will measure up to the standards of 
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other peoples (p. xiii). 
At the core of the American educational system is a subtle philosophy rooted in 
maintaining and perpetuating discursive practices of euro-centric dominance (Carruthers, 1999; 
Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995; Woodson, 1933).  One significant example of how the American 
educational system preserves its euro-centric ideology is through textbooks (Brown & Brown, 
2010; Glocke, 2016).  For instance, most school textbooks used in the United States’ educational 
system willfully embrace slave history, but intentionally exclude the legacy of contributions to 
civilization by descendants of Africa (Chapman-Hilliard & Adams-Bass, 2016; Ladson-Billings 
& Tate, 1995; Woodson, 1933) and reinforce racial stereotypes (Sever & Grillo, 2015).  To 
illustrate, research by Chapman-Hilliard and Adams-Bass (2016) and El-Amin, Seider, Graves, 
Tamerat, Clark, Soutter, Johannsen, and Malhotra (2017) suggested that when the United States 
educational system obfuscates the glorious civilizations of Egypt (Clarke, 1994) and conceals the 
contributions of the Moorish empire (Pimienta-Bey, 1992), it often fosters a sense of 
psychological and educational disconnect among many students who are descendants of Africa 
in the United States and reinforces “white supremacy” among many descendants of Europe in the 
United States.  Additionally, many school textbooks also use the racialized names “negro,” 
“colored,” “black,” and “white,” thereby perpetuating these remnants of slavery and reproducing 
the inferior racial lens through which many descendants of Africa in the United States are seen. 
As a result, this system of “miseducation” (Woodson, 1933) appears to propagate through text 
and talk a false-sense of exceptionalism in many descendants of Europe in the United States, 
while sustaining an equally inaccurate sense of inferiority in many descendants of Africa in the 
United States. 
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Moreover, this distorted account of history “conceptually incarcerates” (Nobles, 2013, p. 
232) many descendants of Europe in the United States to the extent that they refuse to accept 
ideas and concepts that challenge and threaten their position of privilege in history.  This can be 
further illustrated when Congressman from Iowa, Steve King proclaimed that Western 
civilization had made the most contributions to human civilization as a whole (Bond, 2016).  
In contrast, this historical fallacy and dominant ethnocentric public discourse appears to 
instill a “fractured identity” (Nobles, 2013, p. 232) in the psyche of many descendants of Africa 
and Europe in United States.  The psychological damage inflicted on the minds of many 
descendants of Africa in United States students often produces in them low self-esteem 
(Chapman-Hilliard & Adams-Bass, 2016), which all too often leads to student-teacher conflict 
and increased school discipline (Warren, 2014).  Hence, I believe that this vicious cycle of racial 
differences is perpetuated by the United States’ educational system that is advanced by many 
“conceptually incarcerated” (Nobles, 2013, p. 232) “white” and even “black” social scientists, 
who unwittingly promote a one-sided perspective and construction of history (Akbar, 1984).  
This one-sided perspective that often is accepted as social reality and left unchallenged becomes 
what Freire (1970) coined a “culture of silence.”  Therefore, as an aspiring educator, I take it as a 
goal of this exploratory study to disrupt and hopefully uproot this ‘culture of silence’ (Freire, 
1970). 
From a critical social work perspective (MacKinnon, 2009), I propose that the racialized 
names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” embody stigma, while the use of “white” bestows 
inherent privilege, which often define how these groups respectively are perceived and treated 
today in society.  While social workers speak out against social injustice, they usually do not 
challenge the structural sources of racism (Gil, 1998; Jeyapal, 2016).  Social work practice is 
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often politically nonpartisan, and partly due to fear of reprisal, advancing these issues produces 
some reservation within the profession (Gil, 1998; Jeyapal, 2016).  To illustrate, over a decade 
ago, the NASW (2007) published a call to address structural racism.  However, since that work 
was released, the social work profession advanced hardly any novel approaches to explain and 
address the ongoing disparate legal treatment of many descendants of Africa in the United States 
(Harvey, 2004; Jeyapal, 2016).  It appears that many within the profession seem more interested 
in pursuing legislative support for licensure (Hui, 2015) and advancing international issues 
(Caragata & Sanchez, 2002) than addressing complex, lasting social and human rights problems 
and dismantling the deeply racist system of “white supremacy” in the United States. 
In summary, despite Constitutional amendments and other landmark legislative actions to 
mend historic iniquities, the question remains how then can perpetual racial disparities be 
explained?  Therefore, the core purpose of this exploratory study is to explore the role of law and 
legal discourse in constructing racial differences through time and to infer how it may have 
influenced, if at all, how descendants of Africa in the United States are viewed and treated in law 
today.  I suggest that this dissertation deserves careful consideration, and fills a gap in the 
existing research, particularly in the field of social work. 
By virtue of our core values, social workers engage in social justice and human rights 
work every day.  Therefore, considering the plight of many descendants of Africa in the United 
States, I look towards a post-modern human rights paradigm that moves beyond understanding 
reality through theoretical frameworks and offer ways to transform it.  While I recognize that the 
issues facing many descendants of Africa in the United States are vast and complicated, I posit 
that the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black,” remain an underestimated 
topic within the human rights struggle, and one that merits further analysis.  I would suggest that 
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the social work profession consider a post-modern human rights approach that advances a social 
change discourse (Barten, 2015; Ife, 2012; Mooradian, 2010), one that struggles for new 
practices to reveal the prospect of better forms of human interaction through acts of micro-
resistance, and the restructuring of social relations in a morally inclusive manner. 
Furthermore, I suggest that social workers should be concerned about exposing and 
resolving this problem which is of critical importance for individual and group psychological 
integrity, stability, and unity.  For many descendants of Africa in the United States the issue of 
racialized names represents a means of individual and collective self-determination and a 
pathway towards justice.  This ongoing struggle for identity, identification, and recognition as 
full citizens under the law represent an unfilled dream for many descendants of Africa in United 
States.  Ultimately, these unresolved remnants of slavery, racism, privilege, and power, which 
continue to plague and haunt our nation, must be abandoned, dismantled, and eliminated. 
  
CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY 
 
47 
 
Chapter II. Theoretical Framework 
The goal of this exploratory study is to examine how the use of the racialized names 
“negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” may act as legal masks, which create, sustain, and 
reinforce negative perceptions, stereotypes, and images of many descendants of Africa in the 
United States, while reinforcing and reproducing the destructive ideology of “white supremacy.” 
Specifically, this work critically examines how the law, through time, consolidated in legal 
doctrine the permanency of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” as 
remnants of slavery.  With this focus, I use two prominent theories to comprehend how the law 
may have devised a “legal mask” (Noonan, 1976), that obscured the humanity of many 
descendants of Africa and Europe in the United States. 
Considering this complex phenomenon that intersects racialized names, identity, slavery, 
and law, and paucity of research on this issue, I adopt a two-prong theoretical framework that 
incorporates Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Post-Colonialist Theory. 
Critical Race Theory 
CRT emphasizes that racism is an inherent and indispensable characteristic of U.S. 
society (Bell, 1992; Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, & Thomas, 1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). 
Above all, CRT sets race at the core of euro-centric hegemony (Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado 
& Stefancic, 2012). At the heart of this analysis is the concept of property.  As Bell (1992) noted, 
the main objective for the American government was and is the protection of property for 
“whites.” Property included land taken from Native Americans and the forced conversion of 
former inhabitants of Africa into enslaved property.  What sets CRT apart from other critical 
theories is how it isolates the law’s role in socially constructing and institutionalizing this 
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oppressive arrangement known as race. I seek to explore how the law may have created, framed, 
and constituted the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white”. 
In 1970, dynamic legal scholars formulated a method of critical analysis to expose the 
role that United States’ jurisprudence played in preserving structural racism (Crenshaw et al., 
1995).  Following the Civil Rights era, these legal scholars labored to clear up the belief that the 
United States suddenly became a racially impartial nation.  By challenging whiteness (Crenshaw 
et al., 1995) as the barometer for reality, CRT denounces the socially constructed categories of 
race (Smedley & Smedley, 2005).  More importantly, CRT considers counter-hegemonic 
discourse a crucial strategy for disrupting hegemony (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). Thus, CRT 
represents a useful tool for exploring the historic legal documents and contemporary United 
States Supreme Court cases for this dissertation. 
Additionally, CRT examines the socio-political and cultural forces that frame how 
individuals and groups experience racism (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012).  Markedly, CRT 
considers legal documents as proof of America’s collusion in upholding a racist system that 
favors one group, in this case “whites,” while discriminating against “blacks.”  CRT reveals the 
systemic nature of racism by delineating its origins within United States institutions (Crenshaw 
et al., 1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2012), while it attempts to eliminate racism at its source in 
several ways. 
First, CRT advances counter narratives as an essential method for confronting and 
eliminating “white supremacy” (Solorzano, 1998).  I apply Gramsci’s (1971) definition of 
hegemony as the social, cultural, and ideological power manipulated by dominant groups.  Also, 
counter-hegemony focuses on dismantling state mechanisms that manipulate, coerce, and 
produce hegemonic narratives (Gramsci, 1971).  To illustrate, Solorzano (1998) indicated that 
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“counter-storytelling represents a method for telling the stories of those people whose 
experiences are not often told” (p. 94).  Counter-storytelling demonstrates resistance discourse, 
one that challenges the prevailing hegemonic discourse.  Counter-storytelling also represents the 
deconstruction of hegemonic or master narratives (Tate, 1997) and demonstrates the power to 
contest dominant discourses.  This aspect of CRT signifies an excellent feature that may enhance 
my examination of legal documents for this work. 
Second, CRT opens a space for marginalized groups to label or name their own reality 
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2012) as opposed to using names imposed by the dominant group.  This 
feature of CRT appears to be beneficial for studying the historical and contemporary legal 
documents for this work.  For instance, naming one’s unique experiences within a legal context 
challenges the hegemonic legal structure in the United States (Crenshaw et al., 1995).  Also, 
naming, as a form of counter-hegemonic resistance (Gramsci, 1971) and the reconstruction of 
reality for marginalized groups, serves as a transformative healing social practice (Delgado & 
Stefancic, 2012).  This is particularly relevant when the process of making a slave created 
“psychic terror and spirit damage” (Nobles, 2013, p. 239) on many descendants of Africa in the 
United States.  Furthermore, the dissemination of resistance discourse may offset the prevailing 
racially dominant discourse that is serving as social reality in the United States. 
To summarize, Critical Race Theory (CRT) establishes race at the center of white 
supremacy in the United States.  Unlike the other theories presented, CRT identifies the legal 
system’s indispensable function in preserving, and enacting laws in the United States that sustain 
the socially constructed ideology known as race and “white supremacy.”  Moreover, CRT 
positions counter narratives as a crucial strategy for deconstructing euro-centric hegemonic 
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discourse and the deconstruction of the other, while promoting reconstructive narratives that 
reaffirms the humanity of the oppressed. 
Despite the scholarship on how slavery continues to afflict our society (Alexander, 2010; 
Burris-Kitchen & Burris, 2011; De Gruy, 2005; Haney- Lopez, 2006; Higginbotham, 1978, 
1996; Lake, 1997; Noble, 2013; Wacquant, 2002), the general public’s response is often to 
trivialize and minimize its enduring legacy.  For this reason, I also use Post Colonialist Theory 
because it places slavery within a context that seeks to challenge the status-quo of post-
colonialist structures and strategies. 
However, before I present Post Colonialist Theory, defining colonialism is in order. As it 
refers to the United States, colonization, in its traditional sense, refers to the process in which the 
invader or conqueror establishes through force, a system of self-ascribed superiority (Cesaire, 
2000; Fanon, 1961; Memmi, 1965; wa Thiong’o, 1986).  This self-ascribed superiority 
manifested when Europeans first adopted the racial label “white persons” (Black, 2009) and 
forced the dehumanizing labels “negro,” “colored,” and “black” onto many descendants of 
Africa in the United States.  This violent act established the boundaries and legitimacy of the 
master and the subordinate position of the slave. 
Post-Colonialist Theory 
Post Colonialist Theory explores issues of power, politics, culture, and religion (Fanon, 
1961; Memmi, 1965; wa Thiong’o, 1986).  The premise behind Post Colonialist Theory is the 
permanency of subordination (Cesaire, 2000; Fanon, 1961; Memmi, 1965; wa Thiong’o, 1986). 
It is at this point, that two schools of thought emerge. The first approach to Post Colonialism is 
the humanist lens, in which the colonizer assigns the concept of other to the colonized (Cesaire, 
2000; Fanon, 1961).  For the colonizer, the most prominent feature of the other was clearly their 
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physical characteristics, for example, skin pigmentation.  However, the different skin 
pigmentation of the other was not enough for the colonizer; religion and culture were also 
devalued, and the humanity of the other was disparaged.  This concept of otherness is paramount 
to understanding the use of the racialized names “negro,” “color,” and “black” and creation of 
racial differences in law. 
Post Colonialist Theory proposes that the colonizing culture deliberately distorts the 
inherent humanity of the colonized and brands the colonized with a mark of inferiority (Cesaire, 
2000; Fanon, 1961).  To paraphrase Cesaire (2000), the colonized have always been human, but 
were deformed in discourses.  In other words, the institution of slavery not only forced men and 
women into physical bondage, it devised a socially constructed ideology known as “white 
supremacy” and “black” inferiority.  This racially motivated fear or psycho-racial neuroses 
(Cress Welsing, 1995) stemmed from “white” people’s deep-seated sense of inferiority to the 
dark-skinned Africans, especially the Moors (Pimienta-Bey, 1992; 2002). 
Additionally, this dehumanizing process stripped many descendants of Africa in the 
United States of their nationality and culture through an intricate web of institutions that 
perpetuated “white supremacy” and reinforced “black” inferiority.  Consequently, one of my 
objectives for this study is to present how some historic and contemporary legal actors used their 
judicial platform to articulate counter-hegemonic discourse that called into question “white 
supremacy” versus “black inferiority.”  These counter-hegemonic examples may prove to be 
valuable for the future in terms of establishing a path towards dismantling hegemonic discourse 
and offering a counterargument. 
Post Colonialist Theory denounces dominant forms of knowledge and discourse (Cesaire, 
2000; Fanon, 1961; Memmi, 1965; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988; wa Thiong’o, 1986).  At the heart 
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of Post Colonialist Theory is the creation of intellectual spaces for the colonized to share their 
narratives of resistance and humanity (Spivak, 1988).  In fact, it is within these sacred spaces that 
the colonized struggles against oppression to condemn the cruel acts of the colonizer.  These 
sacred spaces are where Memmi (1965) advocated for national solidarity, Cesaire (2000) 
advanced his viewpoint on Negritude, Nkrumah (1970) championed Pan-Africanism, and Fanon 
(1961) called for the recreation of a “new man” beyond the confines of racist euro-centric 
psychological control to one that firmly re-establishes the African mind. 
Furthermore, while the early concepts of Post-Colonialist Theory can be credited to the 
works of Fanon (1961), Nkrumah (1970), and Cesaire (2000), I regard the efforts of Allen (1990) 
especially relevant for my study.  To illustrate, in the late 1960’s, Allen (1990) identified a new 
form of colonialism taking place within the United States designed to neutralize the 
revolutionary efforts by some “black” organizations such as the Black Panther Party.  Allen 
(1990) noted that the United States changed its tactics from racial segregation to a “coloniality of 
power” (Grosfoguel, 2003).  In other words, the United States, similar to the European nations, 
who controlled many former African colonies, used the legal system to maintain its hegemonic 
structures of domination and subordination (Allen, 1990).  For instance, Allen (1990) pointed to 
the hyper-incarceration of many descendants of Africa in the United States, police militarization 
in many urban communities, and the re-segregation of many public schools throughout the 
United States as examples of internal forms of neo-colonialism.  For these reasons, I consult 
Allen’s (1990) version of Post Colonialist Theory to help inform this study. 
As a doctoral social work student, my commitment to social justice compels me to 
advance the discourse beyond theoretical frameworks, and suggest a way to transform routine 
oppressive narratives.  Hence, to offset this process of ideological and discursive neo-
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colonialism, I embrace the concept of self-determination offered by Malcolm X (1965).  
Malcolm X was one of the first activists to identify and call out the United States as a post-
colonialist nation.  Therefore, as part of the aims and objectives to the Organization of Afro-
American Unity (OAAU), Malcolm X (1965) stressed the importance of self-determination by 
declaring that “Afro-Americans have the right to direct and control our lives, our history, and our 
future rather than to have our destinies determined by American racists and…to again become a 
free people” (page unspecified).  Consequently, I suggest that the continued use of the racialized 
names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” may pose problematic for many descendants of Africa in 
the United States in being considered a people under national and international law. 
Lastly, I believe this theoretical approach will illuminate this complex phenomenon that 
intersects racial names, identity, slavery, law, and legal discourse.  To conceptualize this 
complex phenomenon, I devised the visual in chart 1 below to help show how Critical Race 
Theory and Post-Colonialist Theory interact to help explain how the center circle in the visual 
representation intends to show the main premise that the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” 
“black,” and “white” represent vestiges of slavery that were socially and legally constructed, 
maintained, and perpetuated to validate a superior position for descendants of Europe in the 
United States, while assigning an inferior status to descendants of Africa in the United States. 
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Chart 1. 
Visual representation of theoretical frameworks.
 
The circles to the left and right of the central premise are the two theoretical frameworks 
-- CRT and Post-Colonialist Theory -- that contribute to and help understand the role the law 
played in creating racial differences through hegemonic discourse and the significance that 
counter-hegemonic narratives confer in advancing resistance and re-establishing humanity of the 
descendants of Africa in the United States. 
The use of the 
racialized names 
“negro,” “colored,” 
“black,” and 
"white" represent  
vestiges of slavery  
that were socially 
and legally 
constructed to 
validate a superior 
position for 
descendants of 
Europe in the 
United States, while 
assigning an 
inferior status to 
descendants of 
Africa in the United 
States 
Post Colonialist 
Theory
* Addresses the 
permanency of 
subordinations-the 
creation of the 
“other”.
* Denounces 
dominant forms of 
knowledge and 
discourse.
* Creates spaces for 
narratives of 
resistance and 
humanity
Critical Race 
Theory
* Racism is an 
indispensable 
characteristic of 
the United States.
* Isolates the law’s 
role in socially 
constructing & 
institutionalizing 
race.
* Advances 
counter narratives
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Furthermore, I posit that the enduring inferior image and perception of many descendants 
of Africa in the United States appears to be rooted in the maintenance of the racist ideology of 
“white supremacy.”  This oppressive ideology known as “white supremacy” is also embedded 
within the United States through the legal system.  Acknowledging and recognizing the 
instrumental role the law played and plays in socially constructing and institutionalizing race and 
racial differences in the United States, I put forward that the ideology of “white supremacy” must 
be denounced and deconstructed by advancing counter narratives of resistance that re-affirm the 
humanity of all of Africa’s descendants  within the United States. 
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Chapter III. Literature Review 
This chapter presents the literature review that informed this exploratory study. In this 
chapter, I put forward the role of names in terms of culture and how they may influence identity 
formation.  Also, I present studies of racial names and perceptions, as well as how racial names 
are observed from a legal perspective.  Also, since the core purpose of this exploratory study is 
to explore the role of law and legal discourse in constructing racial differences through time, I 
presented a section on racial names and racial bias within a legal context. 
The Cultural Role of Racial Names 
There is no question that prior to slavery in the United States, many descendants of 
Africa in the United States had clearly identifiable national names that denoted a historical 
legacy (Baird, 1970; Pimienta-Bey, 1992; 1995; 2002; Carmichael, 1969; Lake, 1997) and a 
legal identity connected by international law and treaties (Drew Ali, 1928; Pimienta-Bey, 1995; 
2002). Notably, one salient aspect of culture that was particularly unique to Africans was 
individual and group names.  For many Africans, a name went beyond an ordinary identification; 
it was an indispensable component of the spirit that fashioned the path of a person (Nefer Amen, 
1990). 
Moreover, many Africans performed elaborate naming rituals to ensure that the 
individual name of a new-born embodied the values and virtues of their ancestors (Mbiti, 1969). 
This interconnected awareness or paradigm stemmed from a central philosophical foundation 
that considered the inherent nature of human beings to be divine (Mbiti, 1969; Nefer Amen, 
1990).  For this reason, for many Africans, an individual’s name and their group name or 
nationality corresponded to an unbroken link to land, ancestors, and God.  Hence, I view the act 
of depriving many descendants of Africa in the United States of their names and nationality as 
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tantamount to what Nobles (2013) described as nothing short of “psychic terror and spirit 
damage” (p. 239).  This “spirit damage” (Nobles, 2013, p. 239) may represent a reason why 
many descendants of Africa in the United States tend to internalize racial trauma (De Gruy, 
2005) and often react destructively towards one another (Wilson, 1990). 
Names also function as indicators of one’s psychological integrity (Aksholakova, 2014; 
Allport, 1961) and self-identity (Cross, 1971; Erikson, 1964; Osagie & Owiny, 2015). Notably, 
Allport (1961) acknowledged that one of the most important defenses to self-identity is our 
name.  Names often mirror the qualities and character of an individual; it conjures certain 
images, perceptions, and sets the person apart from others (Allport, 1961).  Furthermore, the 
correct name of an individual or group is crucial for precise identification.  For instance, 
improper identification of an alleged suspect may lead to an unnecessary stop by the police, an 
erroneous arrest, and even false imprisonment. 
Additionally, names that denote negative qualities and characteristics often resemble 
racial micro-aggressions (Pierce, 1974), which instill feelings of shame, self-doubt, and 
internalized inferiority (Robinson-Wood, 2016).  Since names play a serious role in the 
psychological health of an individual or a group (Aksholakova, 2014; Allport, 1961), it is 
reasonable to infer that the use of the names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” may 
provoke negative emotions in group members and on non-group members.  Likewise, inaccurate 
names may also lead to low self-esteem, self-hatred, and resentment among group members (De 
Carlo, 2005).  Therefore, exploring how the use of names may influence cognition may shed 
light on how differential legal treatment may occur. 
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Studies of Racial Names and Perceptions 
Bogardus (1925) advanced one of the first quantitative studies on racial preference.  After 
examining the racial attitudes of 39 racial and national groups, he (1925) discovered that in terms 
of preference, “negro” consistently ranked at the bottom when compared to other racial and 
national groups.  Ten years later, Katz & Braly (1935) postulated that racial names invoked 
certain racial attitudes.  Primarily utilizing an attitude measurement tool, they queried over 100 
university undergraduates of European descent over their attitudes about the racial labels 
“black,” “negro,” and “Afro-American.”  Their research demonstrated that the racial names 
“negro” and “Afro-American” produced general stereotypes and reinforced prevailing negative 
attitudes for both terms.  Katz & Braly’s (1935) study had significant implications for future 
scholarship on race names.  Since the studies conducted by Bogardus (1925) and Katz & Braly 
(1935), the discourse on group nomenclature for the descendants of Africa in the United States 
remained relatively silent until the 1960’s. 
Williams (1966) researched the connotations of racial concepts with racial names. 
Specifically, he (1966) questioned Caucasian and Negro psychology students from separate 
universities located in the southeastern part of the United States.  Interestingly, he substantiated 
the hypothesis that color connotations are rooted in American society.  For instance, subjects 
from both races perceived the racial name “white” as good, while “black” was seen as bad. 
While prominent civil rights leader Dr. King embraced the label “negro” (Neal, 2001), 
and organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) publicly adopted “colored” as their organization’s moniker (Neal, 2001), the thorough 
work of Moore (1960) on the origin of the word “negro” sparked discussion among the grass-
root folks to examine language as an instrument of control and oppression.  Moore (1960) 
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uncovered that the Portuguese first used the word “negro” in the 15th century to characterize the 
physical appearance of Africans and to later designate them as a “non-human” entity for the 
purpose of enslavement.  As a result of Moore’s (1960) investigation on the disparaging word 
“negro,” some descendants of Africa in the United States began questioning its use as a group 
name.  At the height of the Civil Rights era, vanguards like Malcolm X and Stokley Carmichael 
proclaimed “black” and “African” to foster pride and unity among many descendants of Africa in 
the United States (Carmichael, 1969; Lake, 1997; Neal, 2001). While many descendants of 
Africa in the United States embraced the unifying message of black pride and power (Neal, 
2001; Smith 1992), for the most part, many were more concerned with their personal safety and 
inclusion into mainstream United States society as a whole (Wilkinson, 1990) and did not want 
to be associated with what was considered a militant term (Martin, 1991). 
However, approximately sixteen years after the Black Power Movement, Reverend Jesse 
Jackson and others called for the new group name “African American” (Martin, 1991; Neal, 
2001).  Driven by a quest to establish cultural integrity, Reverend Jesse Jackson believed the 
term “African American” reconnected many descendants of Africa in the United States to the 
continent of Africa (Martin, 1991).  Subsequently, two quantitative researchers examined race 
names and attitudes (Fairchild, 1985) and social perceptions on the racial names “black,” “Afro-
American,” “mixed,” “colored,” and “negro” (Jewell, 1985). Both studies affirmed that certain 
racial names elicit distinct racial attitudes, perceptions, and prejudices (Fairchild, 1985; Jewell, 
1985).  For example, the research by Fairchild (1985) revealed that white student subjects 
attributed the term “black” to someone who was lazier, louder, and ruder than someone described 
as “Afro-Americans.” 
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Interestingly, Jewell (1985) found that 73.5% of descendants of Africa in the United 
States still identified themselves as “black”, even though the term seemed to imply alienation 
and insufficient connection with the larger culture.  Also, he discovered that almost 70% of 
descendants of Africa in the United States surveyed were not exposed to black history in high 
school.  Other researchers suggest that providing adequate historical education framed from an 
African-centered perspective may alleviate the problem of navigating racial encounters in 
schools (Chapman-Hilliard & Adams-Bass, 2016; Glocke, 2016).  Additionally, creating an 
educational environment that facilitates the recognition and analysis of systems of inequality 
may stimulate academic motivation among many descendants of Africa in the United States 
students (El-Amin, Seider, Graves, Tamerat, Clark, Soutter, Johannsen, & Malhotra, 2017). 
On the subject of racial names, images, and perceptions, De Carlo (2005) randomly 
selected over 100 African American adolescents in order to investigate the relationship between 
racial names and racial identity.  De Carlo (2005) revealed that these African American 
adolescents, who were subject to higher rates of imprisonment and more aggressive, generally 
had immature identity formation.  To a certain degree, these findings appear to reflect 
Higginbotham’s (1996) concept of “precept of inferiority” and parallel Wilson’s (1990) 
reference to the internalized oppression exhibited by many adolescent descendants of Africa in 
the United States.  As I noted in the next section on racial names and racial bias within a legal 
context, the perceived psychological link between race and law, appears to have its roots in the 
antebellum era of the United States, and its residual effects seem to be impacting the present. 
Racial Names and Racial Bias within a Legal Context 
Another key point often overlooked in terms of group names is its apparent relationship 
to law. As noted earlier, name or nationality is a condition or status of belonging to a nation or 
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state (Black, 2009).  This condition or status is generally known as citizenship.  Hence, the legal 
classification of a group determines and affects what rights they possess (Barten, 2015).  In this 
regard, since citizenship implies membership within a political body (Chambers, 2013), and 
many of the framers of the United States Constitution were divided in their views of how to 
incorporate descendants of Africa in the United States into the political fold of this country, then 
it is unclear what was the lawful status of many descendants of Africa in the United States. 
Wacquant (2002) offered some insight into this matter when he stated: 
For lack of a recognizable national affiliation, they were shorn of 
ethnic honor, which implies that, rather than simply standing at the 
bottom of the rank ordering of group prestige in American society, 
they were barred from it ab initio….The negroes do not, like the 
Japanese and the Chinese have a politically organized nation and 
an accepted culture of their own outside of America to fall back 
upon. Unlike the Oriental, there attaches to the negro a historical 
memory of slavery and inferiority (p. 53). 
To put it another way, the continued use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and 
“black” reflect a “historical memory of slavery and inferiority” (Wacquant, 2002, p. 53). 
Additionally, the terms “negro,” “colored,” and “black” have no valid scientific basis (Ghee, 
1990) and their use disconnects many descendants of Africa in the United States from their rich 
socio-cultural, spiritual legacy (Lake, 1997; Pimienta-Bey, 1995; 2002).  As a result, this 
detachment from their past often places many descendants of Africa in the United States, 
especially adolescent males, at-risk for an assortment of pathological conditions (Ghee, 1990). 
For example, Wilson (1990; 1993) posited that the slave identity created by “whites” to control 
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many descendants of Africa in United States produces maladaptive attitudes in many 
descendants of Africa in the United States, such as self-destructive behaviors.   Moreover, these 
maladaptive attitudes and behaviors (Wilson, 1990; 1993) in response to “white supremacy” 
(Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014; Cress Welsing, 1989; Wilson, 1990; 1993) feed “white fear” of 
“blacks.”  Consequently, I propose that the stereotypical images, perceptions, and biases of the 
“black” criminal, which are perpetually reinforced by the media, become embedded as social 
reality and may influence how many descendants of Africa in the United States are viewed and 
treated in law today. 
Research by Hall, Phillips, and Townsend (2015) extended the notion that racial names 
influence self-perception and negative stereotyping by employing archival and experimental 
methods, to demonstrate how racial labels may have serious social consequences, such as 
positive or negative stereotyping, higher or lower competence, and perceived lower or higher 
socioeconomic status.  Their research noted that labels, in this case racial names, assigned to 
groups and used by others, influence perception and reaction towards those groups.  
Additionally, Hall and colleagues (2015) conducted a LexisNexis search on the terms ‘violent 
crime’ and ‘crime suspect’ and discovered the racial label “black” was used more frequently than 
any other racial name.  Notably, they found that while the racial label “African American” 
evoked images of someone possessing higher socioeconomic status and higher competence, it 
did not yield positive emotions in terms of criminal suspicion.  They suggested that the selection 
of racialized labels employed in a legal action, may influence a jury’s decision.  In effect, the use 
of the racialized name “black” affixed to a defendant may lead to higher conviction rates than the 
use of the term “African American,” although the APA (2009) indicated that these terms are 
utilized interchangeably. 
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There is no question that racial disparities pervade the criminal justice system in America 
(Alexander, 2010; Armstrong, 2012; Fosten, 2016; Graham & Lowery, 2004; Hutchinson, 2014; 
NAACP, 2017; National Urban League, 2016; Smith, Levinson, & Robinson, 2015; Wacquant, 
2002).  Yet, a missing link that may help explain one of the many factors that contribute to racial 
disparities in the American criminal justice system, is implicit or unconscious racial bias 
(Abrams, Bertrand, & Mullainathan, 2012; Graham & Lowery, 2004; Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, 
& Jackson, 2008; Goff, Jackson, Di Leone, Culotta, & Di Tomasso, 2014; Smith et al., 2015).  
First, the scholarly legal research by Smith and colleagues (2015) presented that individual actors 
within the criminal justice system, such as legislators, police officers, jurors, correction officers, 
clerks, and the legal professionals, all hold and exercise some form of implicit racial bias, which 
can influence their perceptions, decisions, and behaviors.  Markedly, their research revealed that 
a compelling implicit connection may exist between the racial term “black” and the concept of 
“guilty” than the racial term “white” and the concept of “guilty” (Smith et al., 2015).   This may 
have serious implications for the many descendants of Africa in the United States, and supports 
my view that the use of racialized names matter. 
Further, research shows that a disproportionate number of juvenile (age 10-17) 
descendants of Africa in the United States are incarcerated in the United States (Jones & Poe-
Yamagata, 2000; McCord, Widom, & Crowell, 2001).  To help understand racial disparities 
within the juvenile justice system, Graham and Lowery (2004) examined implicit racial 
stereotypes displayed by police officers and juvenile probation officers.  The research by Graham 
& Lowery (2004) subliminally exposed or primed these police officers and probation officers to 
the racial category “black” or to racially neutral words.  Subsequently, they presented two 
hypothetical accounts of an adolescent who engaged in a property crime or an interpersonal 
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crime. In these two hypothetical accounts, they intentionally withheld the race of the adolescent 
and the causes of the crimes.  Consequently, their research revealed that the officers exposed to 
the racial priming, displayed more negative trait measures and proposed severe penalties to the 
adolescent racially categorized as “black” than the officers in the racially neutral trial. 
Accordingly, the research by these scholars seems to suggest that once unconscious stereotypes 
are put into action, racial bias frequently plays a decisive role in the punishment of many 
descendants of Africa in the United States. 
In addition to being perceived as “black” and “guilty” (Smith et al., 2015), further 
research showed that the dehumanization faced by many descendants of Africa in United States 
is grounded within a socio-historical context.  For instance, the archival research by Goff et al., 
(2008) uncovered that the cognitive association between “blacks” and apes not only has a 
historical basis, they found many contemporary news stories contained ape-like references when 
describing “blacks” suspected of a crime.  Additionally, the ape-like references were further 
associated with “black” boys.  Further research by Goff et al., (2014) demonstrated that when 
“black” boys were cognitively perceived as “ape-like,” they were also viewed as less “childlike” 
than their “white” peers.  As a result, they suggested that these dehumanizing perceptions often 
subject many young descendants of Africa in the United States to much harsher punishment than 
young “whites.”  Hence, when these dehumanizing perceptions are coupled with discretionary 
punishment in schools, such as those documented by the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination where they found profound systematic racial inequality in 
the United States education system (Brittain & Kozlak, 2007), they often place far too many 
young, school-aged descendants of Africa in the United States onto a direct pathway to prison. 
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Wacquant (2001) attributed the over-representation of incarcerated descendants of Africa 
in the United States to the deadly symbiosis, in which the ghetto and prison converge as a device 
for caste control.  Nogera (2003) challenged this notion indicating that the relationship between 
urban environments and prisons represents a pattern of punishment and criminalization that has 
historical roots stemming from slavery.  I suggest this symbiosis appears to shape the social 
reality of many descendants of Africa in the United States.  This pattern of punishment and 
criminalization leads to far too many young descendants of Africa in the United States into the 
criminal justice system. 
To a certain extent, my study parallels some of the work commenced by Pimienta-Bey 
(1992; 1995; 2002) in that it is rooted in the official teachings of the Moorish Science Temple of 
America (M.S.T.A.) established in 1913 by Noble Drew Ali.  Also, much like Pimienta-Bey 
(1995; 2002), I too was exposed to official M.S.T.A. literature, specifically, What shall we call 
him? (Drew Ali, n.d.) and A divine warning by the Prophet for the nations (Drew Ali, 1928). 
Essentially, these two documents raised the question as to why many descendants of Africa in 
the United States were still using the racial names “negro,” “colored,” and “black,” when they 
had a historically and legally recognized name.  In fact, almost four decades before Moore 
(1960), Noble Drew Ali (1928) stated that using the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and 
“black,” “subjected them to all…mistreatment and abuses that the citizens cared to bestow upon 
them” (page unspecified). 
However, as a result of being exposed to the official teachings of the M.S.T.A., 
particularly the idea that the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” may 
have a harmful legal effect on many descendants of Africa in the United States, I elected to 
distinguish my work from the “elephantine work” of Pimienta-Bey (1992: 1995; 2002) in a 
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number of areas.  First, my work explores the role of law and legal discourse in constructing the 
racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” between 1705-1857 in British 
Colonial North America and the United States.  Notably, what makes this exploratory study 
different is that I also explore the legal discourse in United States Supreme Court legal texts from 
1986-2017 to determine how these racialized names may be utilized today and the role of law in 
perpetuating racial differences and hegemony today. 
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Chapter IV. Methodology 
In this chapter, I describe the research methodology for this dissertation and the research 
questions that evolved from my literature review, which guided this exploratory study.  I also 
discuss my application of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to explore the discourse found in 
the historic and contemporary legal texts.  Additionally, I share the ethical considerations taken 
to ensure that this exploratory study complied with ethical procedures and describe my values, 
biases, and understanding in relation to this study.  Lastly, I introduce the data sources collected 
for this exploratory study and my data analysis procedures. 
Research Questions and Goals 
To reiterate, the core purpose of this exploratory study was to explore the role of law and 
legal discourse in constructing racial differences between 1705-1857 and 1986-2017, and to 
examine the link between historic and contemporary usage of racial names in legal discourse. 
The following exploratory questions steered this exploratory study: 
1) What legal discourse did legal actors use during 1705-1857 to create racial differences 
in the United States and what similarities and differences exist in modern times? 
2) What are the counter-hegemonic narratives that sought to disrupt the status and racial 
differences in the historic and modern legal texts? 
Description of Research Design and Methodology 
To conduct this exploratory study, I embraced a research perspective that recognized that 
names, particularly the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” are 
stationed within a precise socio-historical and legal context.  Although quantitative research is 
the favored method in the academy (Staller, 2012) and helps compress numerical data in a user-
friendly manner for policy makers (Fassinger & Morrow, 2013), I believe this approach lacks 
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depth when tracing the socio-historical and legal origins of the use of the racialized names.  For 
example, Mason (2002) noted that utilizing a qualitative approach permits researchers to delve 
into a variety of social phenomena, which often incorporates the manner that social institutions, 
discourses, and social practices unfold to produce meaning. 
Qualitative methodologies generate nuanced, complex, and multi-dimensional narratives 
that may often be edited out and excluded when researchers use a quantitative approach (Mason, 
2002).  The manner in which qualitative research attempts to share the particular accounts and 
essence of the human experience (Carey, 2012) seems to resemble how effective social work 
practice respects human dignity and casts a light upon the particular needs and stories of the 
vulnerable (NASW, 2008). 
Although qualitative methods restrict researchers from making a conclusion about a 
phenomenon (Creswell, 2013) and may produce unintended subjectivity (Creswell, 2013), this 
laborious approach may advance theory formulation (Fassinger & Morrow, 2013).  For instance, 
Mason (2002) suggests that when qualitative researchers offer their analysis and discussion of 
unedited narratives and accounts of participants, they have the potential of describing how 
certain phenomenon operates within a particular context.  Also, an important factor of qualitative 
research is its non-linear approach to the research process (Carey, 2012). 
Therefore, I believe that qualitative methodology not only resembles how effective social 
workers enhance the sensitive needs and concerns of their clients, it appears to be one of the 
most appropriate approaches to explore how the social phenomena such as names, racism, 
slavery, and the legal discourse are interpreted, comprehended, created, and established 
(Creswell, 2012).  Consequently, I used a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to explore the role 
of law and legal discourse in constructing racial differences through time. 
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Ethical Considerations 
To ensure that this exploratory study complied with ethical procedures, I contacted the 
Director of Grants and Sponsored Projects at Kutztown University.  After reviewing my email 
describing my study, the Director determined that this work did not require Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) review and approval.  The data for this exploratory study are publicly accessible 
documents, and the identity of the parties selected is not a concern since many are deceased. 
Role of the Researcher and Reflexivity Statement 
It is generally understood that in qualitative research, the researcher is unquestionably an 
instrument and the prominent tool for gathering information (Creswell, 2013).  During 
qualitative research, which involves the subjective experiences and knowledge of the researcher, 
qualitative researchers should insert their stance or position within the focus of study (Bourke, 
2014).  This conscientious practice, known as positionality, which should be adopted by both 
quantitative and qualitative researchers, averts implicit insider bias (Creswell, 2013).  Since 
qualitative research is primarily an iterative process (Carey, 2012), it behooves the qualitative 
researcher to remain responsive to the research journey.  For example, a lengthy document 
selected for analysis may not yield any substantial information, which may cause an unintended 
delay in the research, and may force the researcher to modify the data selection.  For instance, I 
found several more documents from the State of Georgia that were related to race and slavery, 
however, after reading the legal texts, I soon realized that the legal texts did not fit the time 
period for my study.  I surmised that trustworthy qualitative research demands that the researcher 
behaves with integrity and remains as objective as possible.  Therefore, I aspired to conduct 
myself with sincerity, and present the data in a respectful and scientific manner. 
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The driving impetus for this exploratory study emanated from my deep commitment to 
social justice, specifically, my concern over the disparate legal treatment of many descendants of 
Africa in the United States.  As a result, in 1994, I became a member of the Moorish Science 
Temple of America (M.S.T.A).  Founded in 1913 by Noble Drew Ali, the M.S.T.A. is a national 
religious organization whose mission of uplifting fallen humanity through love, truth, peace, 
freedom, and justice resonated with my principles.  The M.S T.A. was the first Islamic 
organization in the United States, to give descendants of Africa in the United States a historical 
reason to love and embrace their Moorish identity (Drew Ali, n.d.).  The M.S.T.A provides 
members with the forum to acquire knowledge of self-identity, nationality, history, religion, and 
civics.  The M.S.T.A teaches that the systematic process of slavery stripped many descendants of 
Africa in the United States of their language, culture, and religion.  Notably, the M. S. T. A. 
teaches their members to reclaim and proclaim their nationality as Moorish Americans in order 
to be recognized within the government and be considered citizens of the United States of 
America. 
Shortly after joining, I quickly rose through the ranks to become the head of the local 
temple in Queens, New York.  However, I realized that much of the internal historical 
information disseminated by the M. S. T. A. to the public lacked corroboration, analysis, and 
cross-referencing.  One specific historical document, a 1790 petition made by four enslaved 
Moors to the South Carolina House of Representatives requesting clarification of their legal 
status, and the historic statement of Noble Drew Ali (1928), formed the basis of this exploratory 
study, and my quest to establish if a link actually existed that distinguished one group classified 
as slaves, and another seen and treated as free because of their name.  Consequently, as I brought 
my values, biases, and understanding to this project, my role was not to validate an external 
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agenda, but to explore how the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and 
“white” as possible legal masks may have practical relevance that the past may contain to 
understand the present and possibly change the future. 
Considering the extent of this exploratory study and my aspiration to present the data in a 
respectful and scientific manner, I used the following validation strategies to provide accurate 
findings.  First, I used diverse and influential legal texts (Seawright & Gerring, 2008) and varied 
theories to support the findings.  To illustrate, I examined historic legal texts during the 
antebellum era from Virginia, North and South Carolina (refer to Table 1-page 73).  
Additionally, I examined contemporary United States Supreme Court cases.  Coupled with my 
theoretical framework of Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Post-Colonialist, as well as a CDA 
approach, my hope is that this first step towards validation may have allowed me to triangulate 
the information (Creswell, 2013). 
My second validation strategy for this exploratory study was to explain from the outset 
researcher bias (Creswell, 2013).  For this reason, I presented my role as the researcher, my 
positionality, and my reflexivity statement, as I took account and guarded against my previous 
experiences and biases, which may have influenced my perspective on this exploratory study. 
Additionally, I used my committee as impartial examiners for this exploratory study to spot for 
any problems that may have emanated from this work such as, overemphasized points, vague 
descriptions, and any assumptions made by me (Creswell, 2013). 
Last, I provided thick, rich descriptions and specific details from the historical and 
contemporary legal texts.   As noted in Creswell (2013), qualitative researchers who write in a 
detailed manner, allow readers to “transfer information to other settings and determine whether 
the findings can be transferred” (p. 252).  In this way, using thick, rich descriptions and specific 
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details, the qualitative researcher may provide a certain level of credibility and plausibility to 
their study (Tracy, 2010).  I hope these validation strategies offered a worthy study that is 
rigorous, trustworthy, and provides a contribution to the existing literature. 
Data Collection and Sample 
The data samples collected for this study reflected the core purpose of this exploratory 
study: to explore the role of law, specifically the legal discourse in constructing racial differences 
through time, and to examine the link between historic and contemporary usage of racial names 
in legal discourse.  For this reason, I selected historic legal texts starting from 1705 to 1857, 
because it was in 1705 that colonial Virginia enacted this country’s first slave code. As I applied 
a purposeful sampling strategy for this study (Creswell, 2013), I focused my attention to colonial 
Virginia, South and North Carolina, and the Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) decision.  Purposeful 
sampling is often utilized in qualitative research because it yields information-rich examples that 
are relevant to the research interest (Creswell, 2013).  For this reason, I selected diverse and 
influential historic and contemporary legal texts because they may allow me to make some 
inferences related to the construction of racial differences. 
Also, I selected the year 1986 to commence the data collection for contemporary United 
States Supreme Court decisions because my literature review showed that shortly after 1985 the 
preferred racialized name for many descendants of Africa in the United States became “African 
Americans.”  As a result, I sought to explore if the United States Supreme Court adapted to the 
change in this group’s racial designation.  Also, I chose to explore the contemporary legal texts 
from 1986-2017 to ascertain how contemporary legal actors framed legal discourse around race. 
Sample selection criteria. I included in my sample the 1705 Act concerning servants 
and slaves in Virginia, because it was in Virginia that colonial governments first codified and 
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instituted this country’s first slave codes.  Additionally, I included as part of my data the United 
States Naturalization Act of 1790, because it spelled in law who was originally authorized to 
become a citizen of the United States.  Also, included is an 1806 Supreme Court decision from 
Virginia because that decision relied almost exclusively on the 1705 Act concerning servants and 
slaves in Virginia.   I also incorporated an 1838 North Carolina Supreme Court decision from 
North Carolina, because it discussed the 1705 Act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia, as 
well as who was considered a citizen of the State of North Carolina.  Lastly, I incorporated the 
majority and dissenting opinions on Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), because it is considered by 
most legal scholars and historians a consequential legal case in slavery and racial structure in the 
United States.  The sample of the historic legal texts is summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. 
Historic Legal Texts 
Date Title of Document Pages 
1705 An act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia 4 
1740 An act for the better ordering and governing negroes and other 
slaves in this province-South Carolina 
21 
1790 United States Naturalization Act of 1790 1 
1806 Hudgins v. Wright 11 
1838 State v. Manuel 25 
1857 Scott v. Sandford-Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion 41 
1857 Scott v. Sandford-Justice Curtis’ dissenting opinion 51 
1857 Scott v. Sandford-Justice McLean’s dissenting opinion 42 
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Second, I explored eight United States Supreme Court decisions from 1986-2017 for the 
potential link between historic and contemporary usage of racialized names in contemporary 
legal discourse.  For my preliminary search, I used the free online legal research engine known 
as FindLaw.com to search the racialized term “negro” in contemporary United States Supreme 
Court cases.  Although I initially included the racialized terms “colored,” “black,” and “white” to 
my search, these specifics terms included individual names, corporations, and other non-related 
cases.  Therefore, my preliminary search of the racialized term “negro” within the United States 
Supreme Court cases from 1986-2017 in FindLaw.com yielded 79 legal texts.  From this 
preliminary search, I incorporated a diverse sample of legal texts from each decade that I 
analyzed, because they may allow the reader to make plausible generalizations (Creswell, 2013) 
about the legal discourse.  From these 79 legal texts, I excluded those that appeared irrelevant to 
my research questions. 
After carefully reading approximately 2,789 pages of United States Supreme Court 
decisions from 1986-2017, I deliberately selected from the 79 contemporary legal texts, 8 diverse 
and influential legal texts.  These contemporary legal texts involved decisions related to jury 
selection, housing discrimination, equality, intimidation, and voting rights.  I also strove to 
incorporate some contemporary legal texts that did not involve racial matters, but where the 
racialized terms “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” still appeared.  These legal texts may 
explain why it was significant to use these racialized terms in some non-racial cases, which may 
enhance the rigor of my analysis. 
In table 2 below, I presented the eight contemporary United States Supreme Court legal 
texts selected for analysis.  These contemporary legal texts included both the majority and 
dissenting opinions. 
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Table 2. 
Contemporary Legal Texts 
Date Title of Document Pages 
1986 Batson v. Kentucky 38 
1987 Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji 7 
1992 United States v. Fordice 25 
2000 Reno, Attorney General v. Bossier Parish School Board 57 
2003 Virginia v. Black 34 
2006 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 18 
2013 Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General, et al. 38 
2015 Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc. 
75 
 
Data Analysis: Critical Discourse Analysis 
Data analysis is the complex process of extracting meaning out of the information to 
answer the research questions (Carey, 2012). CRT and Post-Colonialist Theory informed and 
steered my analysis of the collected data.  In this section, I present and explain CDA as the 
analytic technique used to analyze the data.  Also, I offer my analytic process that consisted of 
four phases: deductive approach, analysis of the legal texts, exploring textual omission, and 
intertextuality.  Lastly, I discuss the limitations of my research design. 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) surfaced during the early 1990’s, led by a number of 
prominent critical linguists like Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, and Ruth Wodak (Wodak, 
2001).  One of the primary objectives of CDA is to “investigate critically social inequality as it is 
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expressed, signaled, constituted, legitimized and so on by language use (or in discourse)” 
(Wodak, 2001).  Discourse is constructed by those in power, is stationed within a continuum, and 
generally considered axiomatic (Wodak, 2001).  CDA seeks to go far below the surface of 
commonly used descriptions and language that sustain power, control, and hegemony 
(Fairclough, 2010; van Dijk, 1993).  To locate the descriptions and language that sustain 
hegemony, Fairclough (2010) suggested asking the following questions as part of the CDA 
process: 1. What is the role of the ideology or dominant discourse?  2. Why do specific aspects 
of dominant discourse sustain the problem? and  3. What are some potential counter narratives to 
the dominant discourse?  Therefore, I use these questions offered by Fairclough (2010) to assist 
me with identifying critical aspects of the hegemonic as well as counter-hegemonic discourse 
found in the legal texts. 
CDA helps reveal the complex process of racism that otherwise would be challenging to 
establish (van Dijk, 1993; 2004). van Dijk (1993) postulated that a detailed examination of 
historical texts, such as those found in law, may bring to light micro and macro racist discourse 
that he defined as “a form of discriminatory social practice that is evident in text, talk, and 
communication” (p. 351).  He also noted that racist discourse takes two significant forms. First, 
racist discourse targets the ethnically different “other.”  Second, racist discourse unequivocally 
expresses the inferiority of the “other,” while explicitly expressing the superiority of the 
dominant group.  An example of racist discourse was illustrated in some of the historic legal 
texts from Virginia, South Carolina, and in Chief Justice Taney’s opinion on the Dred Scott 
decision. 
Additionally, van Dijk (2004) suggested that racist discourse details the difference of the 
“other” by portraying them as less intelligent or deviant.  As polarizing forms of racist discourse 
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(van Dijk, 2004) become reproduced within society, they become embedded in social reality.  In 
other words, “racist societies and institutions essentially produce racist discourse, and racist 
discourses reproduce the stereotypes, prejudices, and ideologies that are used to defend and 
legitimize “white” dominance” (van Dijk, 2004, p. 354).  Therefore, I considered CDA a crucial 
qualitative research tool that assisted me in identifying and exposing the ideology and discourse 
contained in some of the historic and contemporary legal texts. 
Legal discourse is considered fundamentally different from usual social discourse 
(Niemi-Kiesilainen, Honkatukia, & Ruuskanen, 2007).  Because legal discourses convey the 
power of the state, they can impact and often shape social discourses and relations (Niemi-
Kiesilainen et al., 2007).  As a result, CDA tackles legal discourse by exploring how the courts 
devise socially constructed categories like race and how dominance and inequality are replicated 
and defied.  Therefore, the central focus of CDA is examining and evaluating written documents 
and spoken words to uncover the discursive basis of power, dominance, and inequality, and how 
these sources are developed, sustained, reproduced, and transformed within precise social, 
political, legal, and historical contexts (van Dijk, 2004). 
Discourse is often formed by prior discourse, and routinely influences future discourse 
(Wodak, 2001).  Within the legal system, when legal actors rely on prior discourse to resolve 
legal matters, they apply the doctrine that is commonly known as stare decisis or legal precedent 
(Black, 2009).  However, this Latin phrase is an abbreviation for stare decisis et non quieta 
movere, meaning “to stand by decisions and not to disturb settled matters” (Black, 2009).  Given 
the court’s authority in all legal issues in our society, repeating dominant discourse can 
perpetuate, even in the subtlest manners, a legal system of discrimination and injustice.  For this 
reason, my analytic focus for this exploratory study is on the legal discourse.  While some of the 
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legal discourse found in both the historic and contemporary legal texts may contain hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic discourses, the decisions or outcomes for these legal texts may diverge 
from the discourse.  Therefore, in my findings, I will present the nature of the legal discourse, as 
well as the legal outcome. 
Lastly, discourses may also be produced to assert resistance and critique by the 
marginalized “other.”  CDA deems discourse, particularly dominant discourse, as an instrument 
for substantiating and preserving an ideology of inequitable power interactions (Wodak, 2001). 
Therefore, CDA is often regarded by some researchers as a tool for social justice because it is 
equipped to uncover the subtle forms of dominant discourse (Wodak, 2001).  Notably, CDA 
exposes how some words can gain power and create injustices if left undisturbed.  Moreover, 
when discourse is used to counteract dominant discourse, they may have a restorative impact.     
For these reasons, I considered CDA a crucial tool for analyzing the data sources for this 
exploratory study. 
Although there are many ways to do CDA (Fairclough, 2010), my analysis consisted of 
four phases, each led by methods recommended by scholars who employ critical discourse 
analysis to respond to questions of discourse, context, power, and dominance. 
Phase one: deductive approach. Once I collected the historic and contemporary legal 
texts that shaped the foundation for this exploratory study, I incorporated them into a Microsoft 
Excel table using detailed descriptive categories such as the date, title of the document, and 
length in chronological order (Creswell, 2013).  Creating this table allowed me to maintain an 
orderly, visual illustration for examining the legal texts (see Tables 1 and 2).  Maintaining this 
categorical aggregation provided an opportunity to detect any issue-connected content that may 
have surfaced (Creswell, 2013), such as legal texts not meeting my sampling criteria. 
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I used a deductive approach as each paragraph within the legal texts was carefully 
examined for any and all phrases that could fit within the following categories: racialized names, 
racial differences, legal status, hegemonic discourse, and counter-hegemonic discourse. 
Throughout this process, I transferred my initial ideas from my notebook into a memo. I 
maintained this memo during each stage of the analysis process to mark my impressions, 
reflections, and potential biases.  Memoing may capture substantive, theoretical, methodological, 
and even personal ideas that have emerged from the codes (Creswell, 2013).  For instance, after 
reviewing the legal texts, I recorded in my memo how I planned to narrow down the parameters 
of my initial framework, and wrote down in the memo what questions and ideas developed to 
help me make sense of the data that assisted with interpreting my findings. 
Phase two: analysis of legal texts. The first phase in my analysis involved reading the 
legal texts in an undiscriminating manner (Huckin, 1997).  Next, I critically read the texts with a 
more discerning eye (Huckin, 1997), utilizing the questions offered by Fairclough (2010) as a 
guide: 1. What is the role of the ideology or dominant discourse?  2. Why do specific aspects of 
dominant discourse sustain the problem?  3. What are some potential counter narratives to the 
dominant discourse? 
While I read the legal texts I made notations, observations, and remarks in the margins of 
the document.  This detailed process of recording relevant notes is called coding (Carey, 2012; 
Creswell, 2012).  Therefore, I first utilized open coding (Carey, 2012; Creswell, 2013), because 
assuming a receptive stance as I read the legal texts allowed me find additional meaning in a 
word or paragraph, which may be relevant to my research questions. 
Carey (2012) described this practice of aggregating the open codes that offer relevant 
meaning to answering the research questions as axial coding.  He noted that the axial coding 
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process may produce many categories, which the researcher will need to sort and condense into 
some form of database.  Although, Leech & Onwuegbuzie (2011) affirmed the benefits of using 
a software program such as NVivo for handling large amounts of data expeditiously and soundly, 
particularly for help with coding, I did not employ a computer software tool for this exploratory 
study, because from the initial sampled legal texts, the final sample contained approximately 600 
pages which was manageable without the use of a software. 
Phase three: exploring textual omissions and silences. Huckin (1997) suggested that an 
equally important component of discourse is textual omission or silence.  He described textual 
silence as “the omission of some piece of information that is pertinent to the topic at hand” (p. 
348).  Since the primary focus of this exploratory study involved legal discourse and how racial 
differences were created and sustained over time, considering the legal concept known as stare 
decisis or precedent is key to identifying textual omission or silence.  Therefore, I closely 
analyzed what was missing from the historic and contemporary legal texts to determine its 
relevance to my research questions.  However, to properly identify textual silence and omission 
required that I compare across legal texts, which led me to the final phase of analysis. 
Phase four: intertextuality. CDA researchers use intertextuality as a way of identifying 
potential associations and comparisons between legal texts.  Fairclough (2003) noted that 
intertextuality allows researchers to inspect how the practices of discourse relates with the larger 
social and cultural milieu.  This element of intertextuality allowed me to recognize that much of 
the historic and contemporary legal texts appeared to have been influenced by societal changes, 
such as slavery, emancipation, Jim Crow segregation, and Civil Rights legislation.  Moreover, he 
considers the process of exploring intertextuality an indispensable component of analyzing vis-à-
vis critical discourse analysis.  Therefore, I employed intertextuality to my analysis of the 
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historic and contemporary legal texts because it allowed me to explore and compare the 
relationships between these documents. 
Limitations 
While every effort was made to present a complete and thorough examination of the 
collected legal texts, there were still several limitations that must be recognized.  First and 
foremost, the sample size and analytic process were limited to CDA.  This limited the 
representation of meanings used and produced by different legal discourses.  Much more in-
depth analysis is needed that incorporates a deep exploration of the context, cross-comparison of 
discourse and history, and many more legal texts from the century’s in-between.  As a result, this 
research design does not produce a chain of causality between the legal discourse and the 
creation of racial differences through time.  Therefore, I was only able to make analytic 
connections and inferences, not claims of causality.  The practical goal is to use this analysis to 
explore the role of law and legal discourse in constructing racial differences during the 
antebellum era and continuing through modern history in the United States. 
Consequently, a comprehensive exploration of the legal discourse for its use of racialized 
names and portrayals of descendants of Africa and Europe in the United States will remain a 
subject for subsequent study.  Nevertheless, the design of this exploratory study was devised to 
shed light on the richness of the data, stimulate dialogue, provoke change, and advance the 
research on the use of racialized names as a social justice and human rights concern.  In the 
following chapter, the findings that emerged through my critical analysis of the historic and 
contemporary legal texts are presented.  
CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY 
 
82 
 
Chapter V: Findings 
I begin this chapter by presenting a table showing the racialized names found in the 
historic and contemporary legal texts I collected and analyzed in this exploratory study.  This 
table shows the ways in which some legal actors used racialized names during 1705-1857 to 
create racial differences in the United States, which answered my first research question: what 
legal discourse did legal actors use during 1705-1857 to create racial differences in the United 
States and what similarities and differences exist in modern times?  This is followed by my 
findings of the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic narratives that emerged from the historic legal 
texts.  Then, I present a table of the racialized names found in the contemporary legal texts.  This 
is followed by the presentation of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic narratives that emerged 
from the historic and contemporary legal texts.  In the final section of this chapter, I share 
intertextual narratives summarizing what similarities and differences were found in the historic 
and contemporary legal texts, and how they connected with my research questions and 
objectives.  I also present the words, terms, or facts that were omitted from the historic and 
contemporary legal texts that pointed to how racial differences were maintained.  Lastly, my 
thematic and comparative critical discourse analysis revealed instances in which the law created, 
sustained, and disrupted vestiges of slavery. 
Drawing from my literature review, I suspected that the use of the racialized names 
“negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” represented vestiges of slavery that were socially and 
legally constructed, maintained, and perpetuated to validate a superior position for descendants 
of Europe in the United States, while assigning an inferior status to descendants of Africa in the 
United States.  I found that in the historic legal texts racial differences were discursively created 
through two socially and legally distinct racial categories: “white” and “negro” and “black.” 
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Additionally, I opined that the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and 
“black” resembled what Noonan (1976) described as a legal mask that suppresses the humanity 
of many descendants of Africa in the United States.  What I discovered from the six historic legal 
texts from 1705-1857 was that a person classified as a “negro” and “black” was deemed a slave 
unless they could prove the contrary.  I identified in my intertextual analysis of the historic and 
contemporary legal texts that some historic and contemporary legal actors used hegemonic 
narratives, while others challenged hegemonic narratives by advancing counter-hegemonic 
narratives, and at times, remained silent to the dominant social realities.  Notably, through my 
analysis of the historic and contemporary legal texts, I uncovered several counter-hegemonic 
narratives that worked to disrupt the socially and legally constructed racial differences.  These 
findings helped answer my second research question: what are the counter-hegemonic narratives 
that sought to disrupt the status and racial differences in the historic and modern legal texts? 
The Use of Racialized Names in the Historic Legal Texts 
To explore the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “white” and 
the construction of racial differences during the antebellum era and today, I first analyzed six 
historic legal texts from 1705-1857 in British Colonial North America and the United States. 
Then, I analyzed eight United States Supreme Court legal texts from 1986-2017. For the findings 
that emerged from the analysis of the historic legal texts, I developed Table 3 below, which I 
arranged in chronological order of the racialized names that were found in the historic legal texts. 
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Table 3. 
Racialized Names in Historic Legal Texts 
Date Title of Document Racialized Names 
1705 An act concerning servants and 
slaves in Virginia 
Negroes, white women, Mulattos, white man 
1740 An act for the better ordering and 
governing negroes and other slaves 
in this province-South Carolina 
Negroes, mulattos, [mustizoes], white person 
1790 United States Naturalization Act of 
1790 
Free white persons; textual silence toward other 
groups, specifically no mention of descendants 
of Africa in the United States 
1806 Hudgins v. Wright Free Indian woman, blacks, negro, white, 
African, mulatto, European white people 
1838 State v. Manuel Free negroes, free persons of color, free men of 
color, white man 
1857 Scott v. Sandford-Chief Justice 
Taney’s majority opinion 
Negro, negroes of the African race, Indian race, 
white race, free negro, mulatto, white man, white 
woman, enslaved African race, black race, white 
person, free white citizens, white inhabitants 
 
1857 Scott v. Sandford-Justice Curtis’ 
dissenting opinion 
Negro of African descent, negro, Africans, free 
persons, persons of color, free colored persons, 
white male citizens, white persons, African race, 
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white race, colored persons, Mexican, North 
American Indians, white man 
1857 Scott v. Sandford-Justice McLean’s 
dissenting opinion 
Negro of African descent, persons of color, 
colored race, white men, free colored persons, 
negro, mulatto, free people of color 
 
My findings seem to suggest that from 1705-1857 the use of the racialized name “negro” 
appeared to be the preferred designation for many descendants of Africa in the United States 
because it appeared more frequent in the legal texts over other terms.  In contrast, the findings 
also seem to suggest that the use of the racialized name “white” appeared to be the main 
designation for descendants of Europe in the United States because it was used almost 
exclusively in reference to them.  The findings suggest that although the use of the racialized 
name “negro” remained relatively consistent for many descendants of Africa in the United 
States, there were some differences.  For instance, in Hudgins v. Wright and State v. Manuel, the 
racialized names “black” and “colored” were also used to designate many descendants of Africa 
in the United States.  Additionally, the adjective “free” was often used to further describe 
someone designated as “negro,” “colored,” and “black.”  Also, I found that at least once, the 
term “free” was placed in front of the racialized name “white” to describe descendants of Europe 
in the United States.  Based on my literature review, the term “free” was utilized for some 
“whites” during this era because some were indentured servants until the events after Bacon’s 
Rebellion when all descendants of Europe coalesced and changed their legal designation and 
status to “white” (Allen, 1994; Jordan, 2012). 
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Another finding that emerged from my analysis of the historic legal texts is that other 
names were also used to designate many descendants of Africa in the United States.  For 
example, the term “African,” “freemen,” and “mulatto” were also applied.  Additionally, the 
nationality “Moors” was also found in the historic legal texts.  Yet, what remained consistent is 
the use of the racialized name “white” as the sole designation for all descendants of Europe in 
the United States.  Moreover, my analysis of the historic legal texts also raised several questions 
as it relates to racial differences in the United States.  First, if the Declaration of Independence 
(1776) declared “all men free and equal,” then why distinguish men into racial categories and 
labels?  Second, what meaning did the legal actors give to these racialized names? 
I discovered that while there was some minor distinction to the racialized names such as 
“mulattos,” “[mustizoes,]” “African,” and “free person of color,” the States explored in my study 
primarily used “negro” and “black” to categorize most descendants of Africa in the United 
States.  Moreover, while the racialized names used to differentiate one group from another in the 
historic legal texts were evident in my findings, the racialized names on their own did not offer 
any significant meaning in terms of historical legacy and culture like the nationality Moors or 
Turks.  Therefore, in the next section, I explore the legal discourses that some legal actors used 
to create racial differences that relegated many descendants of Africa in the United States to an 
oppressive legal status. 
Hegemonic and Counter-Hegemonic Discourses in the Historic Legal Texts 
To fully explore and answer my first research question, specifically what legal discourse 
was used to create racial differences during 1705-1857, I share a narrative of the historic legal 
texts, which included some contextual background, the emerging hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic discourses, and a summary of the findings.   
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Before presenting these narratives, reiterating Gramsci’s (1971) definition of hegemony 
and counter-hegemony seemed appropriate.  According to him, hegemony is the social, cultural, 
and ideological power wielded by dominant groups.  For example, “whites” not only exclusively 
used this racial term as a racially distinct and superior designation for themselves, but every 
social and cultural idea that emerged from “whites” was viewed as exceptional.  While at the 
same time, “whites” stripped many descendants of Africa in the United States of their nationality 
and imposed upon them the vastly inferior social and legal designation “negro” and “black.” 
Contrastingly, counter-hegemony directs attention to challenging the prevailing and coercive 
hegemonic discourses (Gramsci, 1971).  Particularly noteworthy are the hidden counter-stories 
(Solorzano, 1998; Tate, 1997) offered by the marginalized to contest the dominant discourses. 
In this section, I present the hegemonic discourses that seemed to influence the social, 
cultural, and ideological power by and for the benefit of descendants of Europe in the United 
States, which appeared to reinforce the inferior position of many descendants of Africa in the 
United States.  Additionally, I share the counter-hegemonic discourses offered by some historic 
legal actors, which represented the discussions that questioned and sought to eliminate the 
predominant narratives and power structures.  I provide a narrative of the historic legal texts that 
consisted of state laws delineating the status and treatment of its slaves, the first Naturalization 
Act in the United States, and two state Supreme Court decisions concerning legal status.  Last, I 
explore the majority and dissenting opinions for the Scott v. Sandford (1857) United States 
Supreme Court decision for its role in creating, maintaining, and disrupting racial differences in 
law. 
An act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia-1705.  Since 1619, when the first 
enslaved Africans set foot in Jamestown, the Virginia legal system wrangled in how to specify 
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their legal status (Higginbotham, 1978).  However, by 1705, as the first established English 
colony in the 17th century, Virginia enacted the first slave statues that defined the legal condition 
of descendants of Africa in the United States.  An example of this legal condition is set forth in 
this first hegemonic transcript extract found in an Act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia 
(1705): 
Their servants, they distinguish by the names of slaves for life, 
and servants for a time.  Slaves are the negroes, and their posterity 
[children], following the condition of the mother, according to the 
Maxim, partus sequitur ventrem.  They are called slaves, in respect 
of the time of their servitude, because it is for life. 
This first hegemonic extract showed that while a servant worked for a specific period, slaves not 
only served for life, they apparently were distinguished by “the names of slaves…the negroes.” 
Additionally, their “posterity” (children) followed the condition of the mother. In other words, 
children were born into slavery because their mother was enslaved. 
In the next excerpt, the legislature in Virginia further defined the legal classification of 
slaves. For example, 
That all servants imported and brought into this country by sea or land, 
who were not Christians in their native country, (except Turks and Moors 
in amity with her majesty, and others that can make due proof of their 
being free in England, or any other Christian country, before they were 
shipped, in order to transportation hither) shall be accounted and be slaves, 
and as such be here bought and sold not withstanding a conversion to 
Christianity afterwards… 
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In this passage, slaves were considered a commodity that could be imported, and due to their 
non-Christian status were also considered slaves, unless they were “Turks and Moors in amity 
with her majesty.”   These findings revealed that racial differences were also based on religious 
superiority. Another example of hegemonic discourse found in an Act concerning servants and 
slaves in Virginia 1705 is the following passage: 
Sufficient distinction is also made between the female-servants, and slaves; 
for a white woman is rarely or never put to work in the ground, if she be 
good for anything else; and to discourage all planters from using any 
women so, their law imposes taxes upon female-servants working in the 
ground, while it suffers [allows] all other white women to be absolutely 
exempted; whereas on the other hand, it is a common thing to work a woman 
slave out of doors; not does the law make any distinction in her taxes, whether 
her work be abroad [outside] or at home. 
The contents of the findings seem to suggest that, in general, racial differences contained several 
associated layers.  First, the use of the racial name “negro” seem to clearly distinguish who the 
Act classified as a slave.  Second, “negroes” were treated as chattel property. Third, the legal 
condition of slavery was matrilineal.  Third, skin color, racial identification, and gender was 
attached to being enslaved. Fourth, the element of religion, specifically Christianity, was used to 
set apart the “negro” from “whites.”  The literature tends to support this finding because most 
enslaved descendants of Africa in the United States arrived from non-Christian countries 
(Clarke, 1994), the individual conversion to Christianity did not remove the condition of 
enslavement (Wiecek, 1977), and certain portions of the Christian bible were applied to justify 
the enslavement process (Clarke, 1994).  As a result, “whites” viewed most “blacks” as an 
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uncivilized heathen who were made into slaves for their benefit (Jefferson, 1785).  Therefore, the 
findings in an act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia (1705) signaled one of the first 
laws that constructed explicit racial differences between the “negro” slave and the “white” 
property owner. 
In contrast, I considered the excerpt related to proof of freedom counter-hegemonic 
because the Act permitted Turks, Moors, and others not to be categorized as “negro” slaves. 
While the Act’s reference as to who the “others” were was not clear from the data, the reason 
why Turks and Moors were distinguished as being free is clear.   My literature review 
demonstrated that Morocco was the first country to officially recognize the newly independent 
United States and established the 1786 Treaty of Peace and Friendship (Pimienta-Bey, 1992; 
2002).  This counter-hegemonic extract revealed that the burden of proving one’s freedom 
resided with descendants of Africa in the United States who availed themselves of this legal 
opportunity. 
Despite the minor counter-hegemonic reference, an Act concerning servants and slaves in 
Virginia 1705 had clear hegemonic consequences because it systematically constructed racial 
differences that excluded many descendants of Africa in the United States from any fundamental 
notion of humanity under the law, while securing the economic and social continuity of the slave 
industry in the United States (Higginbotham, 1978). 
An act for the better ordering and governing negroes and other slaves in this province-
South Carolina-1740.  South Carolina represented the largest British slave-holding colony 
(Wicek, 1977).  Shortly following the Stono Rebellion, South Carolina required a comprehensive 
slave code to maintain control over their property.  In this first hegemonic extract, the South 
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Carolina legislature codified the status of the enslaved descendant of Africa in the United States. 
To illustrate: 
Slavery has been introduced and allowed, and the people commonly 
called negroes, Indians, mulattoes and mustizoes, have been deemed 
absolute slaves. It shall be always presumed that every negro, Indian, 
mulatto, and mestizo, is a slave, unless the contrary can be made appear[sic]. 
That all negroes…remain forever hereafter, absolute slaves, and…to be 
chattels personal. 
This hegemonic extract suggested that those referred to as “negroes” were regarded and 
suspected to be slaves and personal property, unless they could prove the opposite.  In other 
words, this hegemonic extract appears to be creating the racial difference that negroes were 
considered the property of their owners, something that could be bought, sold, and discarded like 
a piece of furniture or livestock.  
In the next hegemonic extract, the South Carolina legal system delineated further the 
status for many descendants of Africa in the United States. For example, 
That if any slave who shall be out of the house or plantation… 
without some whiter person in company with such slave… 
it shall be lawful for any such white person to pursue, apprehend, 
and moderately correct such slave; and if any such slave shall assault 
and strike such white person, such slave may be lawfully killed. 
This hegemonic piece appeared to demonstrate how “negroes” were powerlessness over those 
classified as “white persons” and those deemed “whiter” than the slave.  Moreover, this 
hegemonic extract revealed how racial difference constructed in law not only affirmed that 
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“negroes” had no legal rights to even secure their own body, it showed how the law masked the 
humanity of descendants of Africa in the United States. 
Also, most of this act contained provisions that delineated the various orders governing 
how negroes were to be treated under the law.  For instance, slaves charged with a crime 
received “some convenient method and form of trial…determined by any two justices assigned 
to keep the peace, and any number of freeholders.”  In other words, “negroes” deemed as 
“slaves” who were charged with a crime were not tried by a jury composed of their peers, but by 
justices and freeholders or those who were all “white” and held title to real property (Black, 
2009).  In contrast, racial differences constructed in law recognized that while “whites” held the 
legal right to be judged by a jury of their peers, meaning other “whites,” those classified as 
“negroes” in law were not afforded the same rights as “whites.” 
Another example of how the 1740 South Carolina act codified how “negroes” were to be 
treated under the law was illustrated in section VIII: 
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that if any person 
shall be maimed, wounded or disabled, in pursuing, apprehending, or 
taking any slave that is runaway or charged with any criminal offense, 
or in doing any other act, matter or thing, in obedience to or in 
pursuance of the direction of this Act, he shall receive such reward 
from the public, as the General Assembly shall think fit; and if any 
such person shall be killed his heirs, executors or administrators, shall 
receive the like reward. 
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The contents of this finding exposed the hegemonic control that “whites” in South Carolina 
exercised over all “negroes.”  Another excerpt discovered in the 1740 South Carolina act 
revealed how “negroes” were treated under this law; section XXIV delineated the following: 
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that if any slave 
shall presume to strike any white person, such slave, upon trial and 
conviction before the justice or justices and freeholders, aforesaid, 
according to the directions of this Act, shall, for the first and second 
offense, such punishment as the said justice and freeholders, or such 
of them empowered to try such offense, shall in their discretion, think 
fit, not to extending to life or limb; and for the third offense, shall suffer 
death. But in case any such slave shall grievously wound, maim or bruise 
any white person, though it be only the first offense, such slave shall suffer 
death. 
These hegemonic discourses point to how South Carolina statutes legally created racial 
differences by dehumanizing and treating many descendants of Africa in the United States as 
inferior and under a completely different set of legal standards from “whites.” 
Contrastingly, the counter-hegemonic excerpts of the act illustrated the apparent legal irony that 
many descendants of Africa in the United States encountered in antebellum South Carolina. For 
instance, 
If any negro, Indian, mulatto or mestizo, shall claim his or her freedom, 
it shall and may be lawful for such negro, Indian, mulatto or mestizo, 
or any person or persons whatsoever, on his or her behalf, to apply to 
the justices of his Majesty’s court of common pleas, by petition or motion. 
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In other words, while the South Carolina antebellum legal system afforded some descendants of 
Africa the means to prove their freedom, the 1740 Act also punished those who failed to meet the 
legal burden of proof, revealing the discrepancy between the letter and the spirit of the law.  
Also, it is possible that only a relatively small number of descendants of Africa in the United 
States were aware of this provision to the law.  These reasons may explain the fact that I only 
found two South Carolina petitions submitted by descendants of Africa in the British Colonies 
and later in the United States (one in 1753 and the other in 1790), which may be an area for 
future research to explore if there are other similar existing documents.  
While the 1740 South Carolina act for the better ordering and governing negroes and 
other slaves in this province contained few instances of counter-hegemonic narratives, which 
appeared to be a measure taken by the South Carolina legislature to minimize future slave 
rebellions, it represented one of the most broad slave codes in the colonies (Higginbotham, 
1978).  Specifically, this act constructed and maintained clear racial differences in law between 
the vulnerable “negro” who appeared to be considered dead in-law and at the mercy of “whites.” 
Additionally, this act even illustrated that persons of “Indian” ancestry could still be considered 
“white” under the law because “recognized Indians” were often viewed as a “nation” (Barten, 
2015).  Moreover, the racial differences created in the 1740 South Carolina act further illustrated 
how many descendants of Africa in the United States were marginalized by law and how the law 
obscured and masked their humanity. 
United States Naturalization Act of 1790.  In 1790, the 7th Congress of the United States 
enacted the United States Naturalization Law.  The Naturalization Act reads as follows: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That any 
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Alien being a free white person, who shall have resided within 
the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the 
term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof 
on application to any common law Court of record in any one of 
the States wherein he shall have resided for the term of one year 
at least, and making proof to the satisfaction of such Court  that 
he is a person of good character, and taking the oath or affirmation 
prescribed by law to support the Constitution of the United States, 
which Oath or Affirmation such Court shall administer, and the Clerk 
of such Court shall record such Application, and the proceedings thereon; 
and thereupon such person shall be considered as a Citizen of the United 
States.  And the children of such person so naturalized, dwelling within the 
United States, being under the age of twenty one years at the time of such 
naturalization, shall also be considered as citizens of the United States. 
And the children of citizens of the United States that may be born 
beyond Sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered 
as natural born Citizens:  Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not 
descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United 
States:  Provided also, that no person heretofore proscribed by any States, 
shall be admitted a citizen as aforesaid, except by an Act of the Legislature 
of the State in which such person was proscribed. 
As noted in Black (2009) the term “white person” is defined as a member of the Caucasian race 
distinct from the Negroid and Mongoloid races.  This term “white person” represented a 
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hegemonic example of the creation of racial hierarchy in law.  In this case, whiteness (Haney-
Lopez, 2006) was legally constructed as the measure for “good character” and the legal 
precedent for citizenship in the United States.  What this finding suggests is that some American 
Indians and many descendants of Africa in the United States were excluded from attaining 
citizenship and thus constructing racial differences.   
In contrast, when it came to counter-hegemonic discourse, the United States 
Naturalization Act of 1790 demonstrated textual silence as I found no counter-hegemonic 
narratives in relation to the status of the descendants of Africa in the United States.  Also, textual 
silence was illustrated because the legal term “free white person” did not provide clear reference 
to anything phenotype-based.  However, the extensive work conducted by Haney-Lopez (2006) 
showed that citizenship in the United States was and is an evolving and fluid concept.  As a 
result of the hegemony that was legitimized through the United States Naturalization Act of 
1790, it took seventy-eight years before those descendants of Africa who had been legally 
defined as “negroes” and “blacks” in the United States, were granted citizenship (U.S. 
Constitution, Amendment XIV, 1868). 
Hudgins v. Wright-1806.  In this landmark Virginia Supreme Court case, the appellants 
(the Wrights), upon discovering that their slave-owner (Hudgins) planned to sell them further 
South, asserted that they were entitled to their freedom because they claimed maternal descent 
from a free Indian woman.  The appellee (Hudgins) contended that the Wrights descended from a 
negro woman.  In his ruling, Judge Tucker concluded that based on the Wrights’ physical 
features, they were of American Indian descent and not of African descent.  Therefore, the 
Wrights were entitled to their freedom because Hudgins could not prove the contrary. 
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In the first hegemonic extract, the appellants Attorney K. Taylor asserted that because the 
Wrights descended from a free Indian woman, they were entitled to be considered “persons 
perfectly white, and not a common case of mere blacks suing for their freedom.”  I considered 
this extract hegemonic because individuals perceived to be “white” in law appeared to benefit 
from different legal standards than those classified as non-white.  This first extract also 
suggested a discretion to interpret racial belonging that although physically the Wrights 
possessed “long black hair” and “copper color” skin, they were not “mere blacks,” but “persons 
perfectly white.”  This extract pointed to an example of how racial differences were not only 
based on physical appearance and skin color, but, being free, was associated with the use of the 
term “white.” 
In the next excerpt, Judge St. George Tucker shared the following: 
Though I profess not an intimate acquaintance with the natural history 
of the human species, I shall add a few words on the subject as connected 
with the preceding laws. 
I included this excerpt by Judge Tucker because he not only relied on legal precedent that used 
racial differences in law, he offers comments on an unfamiliar topic based on preceding laws 
referencing racial differences.  The laws, Judge Tucker alluded to are the 1679 Act, and its repeal 
in 1691, from which he drew his conclusion “that all American Indians are prima facie (on its 
face) free.”  However, Cover (1975) and Higginbotham (1978) both noted that Judge Tucker 
probed the presumption of freedom for all men, specifically towards descendants of Africa in the 
United States and opposed the lower court’s ruling that the birthright of every human being, 
except descendants of Africa in the United States, was freedom.  What this finding shows is how 
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a legal actor may unintentionally use a legal precedent that maintains racial differences.  To 
illustrate Judge Tucker’s hegemonic legal discourse, the following excerpt is offered: 
Nature has stampt upon the African and his descendants two characteristic 
marks, beside the difference of complexion, which often remain visible 
long after the characteristic distinction of color disappears or becomes 
doubtful; a flat nose and woolly head of hair…Suppose three persons, a black 
or mulatto man or woman with a flat nose and woolly head; a copper 
colored person with long [jetty] black, straight hair; and one with a fair 
complexion, brown hair, not woolly or inclining thereto, with a prominent 
Roman nose, were brought together before a Judge upon a writ of Habeas 
Corpus, on the ground of false imprisonment and detention in slavery: 
How must a Judge act in such a case?....He must discharge the white person 
and the Indian out of custody….and he must redeliver [into slavery] the black 
or mulatto person, with a flat nose and woolly hair to the person who claiming 
to hold him or her as a slave, unless the black person or mulatto could… 
produce proof of his descent, in the maternal line, from a free female ancestor. 
While Judge Tucker’s position illustrated hegemonic discourse, it appears that he based his 
ruling on the 1705 Act of Virginia.  What Judge Tucker’s decision reveals is that the Virginia 
based descendants of Africa who were known as “negroes”/”blacks,” were held to a different set 
of legal standards than Indians and “whites.”  This further explains how racial differences were 
created and maintained through law.   
Judge Roan also applied the 1705 Act of Virginia when he indicated that: 
In the case of a person visibly appearing to be a negro, the presumption 
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is, in this country, that he is a slave; but in the case of a person visibly 
appearing to be a white man…the presumption is that he is free, and it is 
necessary for his adversary to [shew] that he is a slave. 
This finding points to an example of how the legal status of being free in Virginia was linked to 
being considered “white” even though, in the case of the Wrights, their complexion was 
considered “copper-colored.”  This legal discourse points to the development of racial 
differences based on the gradation of complexion, which is supported by the work of Jordan 
(2012). 
With regard to the counter-hegemonic discourse and intertextuality of legal cases, both 
Judge Tucker and Judge Roane relied upon the 1705 Act by reiterating that “proof of descent…is 
incumbent…to freedom.”  I suggest that such “proof of descent” may easily be taken to mean 
proof of “nationhood” or “nationality.”  As seen with the “Turks” or “Moors” for example. 
Comparing the counter-hegemonic discourse found in Hudgins v. Wright to the 1705 Act 
concerning servants and slaves in Virginia showed that a legal recourse was available to those 
who could prove their freedom and it appeared that those designated as “Turks and Moors in 
amity with Great Britain” received favorable treatment under the law. However, I had 
insufficient data to explore examples of how those classified as “Turks and Moors in amity with 
Great Britain” were actually treated under the legal system in the United States and if they 
availed themselves to this legal opportunity. 
Lastly, Judge Tucker and Judge Roane, both slaveholders (Cover, 1975), used prior legal 
precedent, specifically the 1705 Act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia, to reach their 
decision on Hudgins v. Wright (1806).  The judges’ decision seems to have expanded the law’s 
reach to include their hegemonic views, because 1705 Act concerning servants and slaves in 
CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY 
 
100 
 
Virginia does not mention the physical appearance of descendants of Africa in the United States. 
Thus, while the final ruling in Hudgins v. Wright (1806) was in favor of those claiming Indian 
lineage, the legal discourse contained in this case appeared to perpetuate the prevailing 
hegemonic views towards many descendants of Africa in the United States living in Virginia: 
that persons classified as “negro” were slaves, unless they were able to provide proof of their 
freedom. 
State v. Manuel-1838.  In this North Carolina Supreme Court case, the appellant 
(Manuel), a manumitted slave was convicted of assaulting a “white man,” and fined twenty-
dollars, but did not have the money to pay the fine.  The lower court decided that the sheriff 
should hire out Manuel to anyone who would pay the outstanding fine for his services.  In the 
appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, Manuel’s attorney maintained that under state law, 
Manuel was not allowed to plead insolvency from imprisonment for the debt and should hence 
be free to locate employment in order to pay off his own debt. 
In his 18-page opinion, Judge Gaston reviewed the concept of imprisonment for debt, the 
nature of citizenship in Great Britain and the United States, and the Constitution rights and duties 
of citizens.  In his ruling, Judge Gaston determined that Manuel, as a free black, was a legal 
citizen of North Carolina entitled to all the rights and privileges afforded under the Constitution, 
including the right to declare insolvency.  Judge Gaston referenced the State Attorney General’s 
hegemonic assertion: 
that persons of color, whether born free or emancipated from slavery, 
were not originally members of that political body and never since 
have been incorporated into it. Slaves were not in legal parlance persons, 
but property. 
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It is important to note that while the “political body” referenced by the State Attorney General 
indicated the constituent members of the State of North Carolina, Judge Gaston recognized that 
“free persons of color” were citizens because, at the time the Articles of Confederation, free, 
native-born descendants of African slaves in many states-including North Carolina, were 
citizens. While this transcript contained hegemonic discourse that illustrate how racial 
differences were characterized by the State Attorney General, it allowed Judge Gaston to contest 
these views by allowing the appellant (Manuel) to declare insolvency and noting that Manuel 
was a citizen of the State of North Carolina protected under the State Constitution . 
To illustrate, Judge Gaston described that: 
The very Congress which framed our Constitution was chosen by 
freeholders. That Constitution extended the elective franchise to 
every freeman who had arrived at the age of 21, and paid a public tax, 
and it is a matter of universal notoriety that under it free persons without 
regard to color claimed and exercised the franchise until it was taken from 
free men of color a few years since by our amended Constitution. 
The content of this finding suggested that at some point “free men of color” exercised the 
elective franchise.  In other words, prior to the amended State Constitution of North Carolina, 
which Judge Gaston referenced to in the excerpt above, free men of color were considered 
freeholders, who possessed land, property, and exercised the right to vote prior to the 
Revolutionary War.  This finding appeared to challenge the established notion that all 
descendants of Africa in the United States were slaves.  Although it is not clear from the 
available data what name these “free men of color” used to identify themselves under the law, it 
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demonstrated how racial differences seemed to have taken form during the establishment of 
United States Constitution (Higginbotham, 1996). 
Scott v. Sandford (1857)-Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion.  After losing twice in 
the lower courts, the plaintiff, Dred Scott and his wife and children, brought their claim to the 
United States Supreme Court averring that they became free when their former slave-owner took 
them into Illinois and into the Territory of Louisiana north of Missouri.  The defendant, John 
F.A. Sandford, a citizen of New York and the new slave-owner for the Scotts, argued that the 
plaintiff was not a citizen of the State of Missouri, but a negro of African descent, and therefore 
did not have jurisdiction to sue in a court of the United States.  It is at this point that Chief Justice 
Roger B. Taney raised the question in his controversial majority, hegemonic opinion: 
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country 
and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community 
and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, 
and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and 
immunities, guaranteed by that instrument? 
To this question above, Judge Taney concluded, “we think they are not, and that they are not 
included, and were not intended to be included.”  This hegemonic finding points to how Judge 
Taney established and reinforced racial differences in law for those categorized as “negro.” 
In the next hegemonic excerpt, Chief Justice Taney immediately clarified at the outset of his 
opinion that the “plea applies to that class of persons only whose ancestors were negroes of the 
African race, and imported into this country and sold and held as slaves.”  In terms of 
intertextuality, this finding appeared to correspond with some of the findings previously shown 
in An act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia 1705 and An act for the better ordering and 
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governing negroes and other slaves in this province South Carolina 1740, in which the use of the 
racialized name “negro” implied slavery and a non-human status in society. 
In the third hegemonic excerpt, Chief Justice Taney further answered his own question by 
stating that he thinks, 
they are not, and that they are not included, and were not 
intended to be included, under the word “citizens” in the Constitution, 
and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that 
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. 
On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate 
and inferior class of beings who had been subjugated by the dominant race, 
and whether emancipated or not, yet  remained subject to their authority, 
and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and 
the Government might choose to grant them. 
In this next hegemonic excerpt, Chief Justice Taney applied his interpretation of history and how 
racial differences were socially and politically created to bar “negroes” from obtaining any legal 
rights that “whites” enjoyed: 
… for more than a century before been regarded as beings of 
an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race 
either in social or political relations, and so far inferior that they had 
no rights which the white man was bound to respect, and that the negro 
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. 
He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise 
and traffic whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that 
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time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race.  
I presented the above hegemonic excerpt as an example of how Justice Taney applied a 
hegemonic and racist recount of history to help him reach his hegemonic ruling in Scott v. 
Sandford (1857). 
In the next passage found in the legal text, Chief Justice Taney believed that the founding 
fathers were careful in their language as they seem to acknowledge and condone racial 
differences in law.   Justice Taney referred to the framers position to help him craft his 
hegemonic ruling when he noted: 
Yet the men who framed this declaration were great men…high in 
literary acquirements, high in their sense of honor, and incapable of 
asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting. 
They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and 
how it would be understood by others, and they knew that it would not 
in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race, 
which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilized Governments 
and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery. They spoke and acted 
according to the established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary 
language of the day, and no one misunderstood them. The unhappy black race 
were separated from the white by indelible marks, and laws long before 
established, and were never thought of or spoken of except as property, 
and when the claims of the owner or the profit of the trader were supposed 
to need protection. 
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When viewed together, the legal opinion presented by Chief Justice Taney in Scott v Sandford 
illustrated perhaps the strongest and most consequential hegemonic narratives by any legal actor 
at the time in United States history.  These findings suggest that not only did his hegemonic 
narratives construct and sustain racial differences in legal discourse and affirm the ideology of 
“white supremacy,” they seem to portend how today many descendants of Africa in the United 
States are treated under the law. 
Yet, despite the overwhelming number of hegemonic discourses articulated by Chief 
Justice Taney, he offered one counter-hegemonic narrative when he indicated that “the term free 
inhabitant, in the generality of its terms, would certainly include one of the African race who had 
been manumitted.”  This excerpt is an instance that suggests that despite Chief Justice Taney’s 
strong hegemonic opinions of “negroes,” he admitted that some were considered “free 
inhabitants,” which was tantamount to aliens with nationality.  Unfortunately, there was 
insufficient data available from these findings to explore who Judge Taney considered exactly 
“free inhabitants.” 
Scott v. Sandford (1857)-Justice Curtis’ dissenting opinion.  In the first hegemonic 
transcript extract, Justice Curtis offered his dissenting opinion in Scott v. Sandford (1857) by 
noting that delegates of the Articles of Confederation moved to amend the fourth article “by 
inserting after the word “free,” and before the word “inhabitants” the word “white,” so that the 
privileges and immunities of general citizenship would be secured only to “white persons.”  This 
finding is consistent with some of the efforts taken by the founding fathers to conceal who could 
claim citizenship, which I described in my literature review.  This finding also revealed how 
racial differences, specifically by using the racialized name “white,” were maintained through 
legal discourse.  In other words, the racialized name “white” not only became synonymous with 
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“free,” it represented someone who enjoyed and benefitted from full and protected rights under 
the law as opposed to “negroes.” In contrast, the counter-hegemonic discourse offered by Justice 
Curtis specified: 
At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, 
all free native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, 
though descended from African slaves, were not only citizens of 
those states, but such of them as had the other necessary qualifications 
possessed the franchise of electors, on equal terms with other citizens; 
and as free colored persons were then citizens of at least five States, 
and so in every sense part of the people of the United States, they were 
among those for whom and whose posterity the Constitution was ordained 
and established. 
These findings suggest that Justice Curtis in his recount of historic events considered that these 
same former “African slaves” were citizens under the United States Constitution.  Moreover, the 
counter-hegemonic narratives offered by Justice Curtis illustrated how he contested the 
hegemonic outcome in Scott v. Sandford (1857) that concluded that descendants of Africa in the 
United States were never intended to become citizens.  
Scott v. Sandford (1857)-Justice McLean’s dissenting opinion.  While referencing 
historical accounts of slavery in the British colonies, Justice McLean noted in his dissenting 
opinion that: 
Slavery was introduced into the colonies of this country by 
Great Britain at an early period of their history, and it was 
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protected and cherished, until it became incorporated into the 
colonial policy. It is immaterial whether a system of slavery 
was introduced by express law, or otherwise, if it have the 
authority of law. There is no slave State where the institution is 
not recognized and protected by statutory enactments and judicial 
decisions. Slaves are made property by the laws of the slave States, 
and as such are liable to the claims of creditors; they descend to their 
heirs, are taxed, and in the South they are a subject of commerce. 
In this hegemonic passage, Justice McLean’s legal opinion on slavery corresponded to some 
previous hegemonic findings illustrated earlier in this section.  For example, in State v Manuel 
(1838), Judge Gaston averred that “slaves were not in legal parlance persons, but property.” 
Also, Justice McLean marked how slaves in the South were treated like commerce and could be 
inherited or passed on to heirs.  As a result, the historical references offered by Justice McLean 
revealed how the hegemonic legal discourse of the past constructed and maintained racial 
differences and hierarchy in law. 
Contrastingly, the counter-hegemonic piece offered by Justice McLean, noted that: 
Our independence was a great epoch in the history of freedom; 
and while I admit the Government was not made especially for 
the colored race, yet many of them were citizens of the 
New England States, and exercised the rights of suffrage when 
the Constitution was adopted. 
I considered this piece counter-hegemonic because Justice McLean emphasized that many 
descendants of Africa living in the New England states were citizens who possessed the right to 
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vote.  This counter-hegemonic finding appeared consistent with the previous counter-hegemonic 
narrative presented by Justice Curtis that showed that while racial differences in law existed 
between “negroes” and “whites,” Justice McLean rejected the hegemonic notion that all 
descendants of Africa in the United States were presumed slaves. 
The Use of Racialized Names in Contemporary United States Supreme Court Legal Texts 
In this section, I present my findings as they relate to how some contemporary legal 
actors use racial differences today and describe their hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
narratives.  Through my analysis of eight United States Supreme Court legal texts from 1986-
2017, I identified a line of diverse racialized names and summarized them in Table 4. 
Table 4. 
Racialized Names in Contemporary Legal Texts- 1986-2017 
Date Title of Document Racialized Names 
1986 Batson v. Kentucky Negro, blacks, whites, white men, black 
persons, black jurors, black defendants, white 
persons 
1987 Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji Arabs, Caucasians, white citizens, white 
persons, black, Mongolian, negro, European 
1992 United States v. Fordice White students, black students, white persons, 
black youth, black teachers, white school, negro 
school, negroes 
2000 Reno, Attorney General v. Bossier 
Parish School Board 
Blacks, negro applicants, white applicants, 
black voter, black parent, African American 
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2003 Virginia v. Black Blacks, African American, niggers, whites, 
southern whites, negroes, freed blacks, white 
supremacy, black Americans 
2006 Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1 
white, non-white, non-white students, black, 
African American, negro, black school children 
2013 Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 
Attorney General, et al. 
African American, whites, black office holders, 
black population, white voters, aborigines, 
white district, black district 
2015 Texas Dept. of Housing and 
Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc. 
Black, black inner city, white suburban 
neighborhood, white families, Caucasian 
neighborhood 
 
First, the findings in the identified list pointed to some similarities with the historic legal 
texts in the use of certain racialized names in contemporary legal texts.  For example, the use of 
the designation “negro” and “black” appeared more frequently within the contemporary legal 
texts.  These findings are consistent with my literature review, which revealed that prior to 1985-
1986, “negro” and “black” were the common designations for many descendants of Africa in the 
United States.  This finding pointed to two potential explanations for the continued use of 
“negro” and “black” in the contemporary legal texts.  First, these racialized terms have become 
embedded within our society through repetition and custom, and second, revealing 
intertextuality, the United States Supreme Court justices relied on legal precedent that used these 
racialized terms.  Later, in the discussion chapter of this exploratory study, I offer some 
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perspective on how CRT and Post-Colonialist theory view how racial names become embedded 
and the positive and negative consequences of the doctrine on stare decisis. 
Second, another finding that emerged from my analysis of the eight contemporary legal 
texts is the consistent use of the racialized name “white” for descendants of Europe in the United 
States.  Although the term “Caucasian” was used once in the eight contemporary legal texts, it is 
reasonable to assume that the designation “white” has also become deeply embedded in our 
society and within the legal discourse.   Also, I found that while racial descriptors such as “black 
defendants,” “black jurors,” “white citizens,” and “black office holders” were also used because 
the rulings found in the legal texts were related to race, the use of racial descriptors tell us that 
race is omnipresent and even pervasive in law today.  However, relying solely on exploring what 
racialized names appeared in the eight contemporary legal texts, does not reveal how and in what 
context legal actors create, maintain, or disrupt racial differences in modern times.  As a result, 
these findings led me to the next section where I introduced the hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic discourse that emerged from the eight contemporary legal texts. 
Hegemonic and Counter-Hegemonic Discourses in the Contemporary Legal Texts 
In this section, I explore the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourse found in the 
eight contemporary United States Supreme Court legal texts from 1986-2017.  These legal texts 
consisted of United States Supreme Court decisions related to jury selection, employment, 
housing discrimination, intimidation, voting rights, and education that used racialized names. 
Batson v. Kentucky (1986).  In this case, the appellee (Batson) averred that he was 
denied equal protection under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because during the jury 
selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike the four black persons on the 
venire, which resulted in a jury composed of all whites.  As a result of the composition of the 
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jury, Mr. Batson was convicted of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods.  Upon 
hearing the facts of the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecutor’s actions violated the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.  Notably, the Court relied on two 
previous Supreme Court decisions-Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) and Swain v. Alabama 
(1965). In Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) the Court offered their counter-hegemonic narrative 
when they ruled that barring any citizen from jury service: 
Is practically a brand upon them, affixed by law; an assertion of 
their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an 
impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice 
which the law aims to secure to all others. 
Also, in Swain v. Alabama (1965), the United States Supreme Court advanced their counter -
hegemonic discourse when they decided that: 
Even if a State’s systematic striking of [Negroes] in selecting trial 
juries raises a prima facie case of discrimination under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the record here is insufficient to establish such a systematic 
striking in the county. Total exclusion of [Negroes] from venires by state 
officials creates an inference of discrimination, but this rule of proof 
cannot be applied where it is not shown that the State is responsible 
for the exclusion of [Negroes] through peremptory challenges. 
The findings in Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) and Swain v. Alabama (1965) illustrated how 
legal actors disrupted the historic view that descendants of Africa in the United States could be 
legally excluded from jury service. 
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 However, Chief Justice Rehnquist dissenting from the majority opinion, which ruled that 
it was unconstitutional to exclude “blacks” from jury service opined that: 
I cannot subscribe to the Court’s unprecedented use of the Equal 
Clause to restrict the historic scope of the peremptory challenge, which 
has been described as “a necessary part of trial by jury.” In my view, 
there is simply nothing “unequal” about the State’s using its peremptory 
challenges to strike blacks from the jury in cases involving black defendants, 
so long as such challenges are also used to exclude whites in cases 
involving white defendants, Hispanics in cases involving Hispanic 
defendants, Asians in cases involving Asian defendants, and so on. This 
case-specific use of peremptory challenges by the State does not single 
out blacks, or members of any other race for that matter, for discriminatory 
treatment. Such use of peremptories is at best upon seat-of-the-pants 
instincts, which are undoubtedly crudely stereotypical and may in many 
cases be hopelessly mistaken. But as long as they are applied across-the- 
board to jurors of all races and nationalities, I do not see-and the Court 
most certainly has not explained-how their use violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
I considered the Chief Justice’s opinion hegemonic because it is unusual that “whites” are 
excluded from jury service.  Also, the Chief Justice did not refer to any historic or modern legal 
texts in which any other races or nationalities were peremptorily challenged, except “blacks.” 
Therefore, this hegemonic narrative by Chief Justice Rehnquist shows the rather subtle and 
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crafty way that he omitted the actual legal state of affairs that “blacks” appear to be excluded 
from jury service rather than “whites.”  
In the first counter-hegemonic extract, Justice Powell rendered his majority opinion 
decision by stating: 
while we recognize, of course, that the peremptory challenge occupies 
an important position in our trial procedures, we do not agree that our 
decision today will undermine the contribution the challenge generally 
makes to the administration of justice. The reality of practice, amply 
reflected in many state-and-federal opinions, shows that the challenge 
may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to discriminate against 
black jurors. By requiring trial courts to be sensitive to the racially 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the 
mandate of equal protection and furthers the ends of justice. In my view 
of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our 
criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we 
ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race. 
This counter-hegemonic narrative illustrated how contemporary legal actors use judicial review 
to shatter centuries of racial discrimination, specifically in the exclusion from jury service. 
In another counter-hegemonic extract, Justice Marshall offered his analysis of peremptory 
challenges noting that: 
our criminal justice system requires not only freedom from any 
bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against the 
prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly 
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held. We can maintain that balance, not by permitting both prosecutor 
and defendant to engage in racial discrimination in jury selection, 
but by banning the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors and 
by allowing the States to eliminate the defendant’s peremptories as well. 
This counter-hegemonic narrative demonstrated how contemporary legal actors use their judicial 
powers to address and redress years of racial discrimination.  The findings in Batson v. Kentucky 
(1986) illustrated how some contemporary legal actors often strictly applied prior legal decisions 
that used hegemonic discourse and racialized names, while other legal actors used counter-
hegemonic discourse to achieve a counter-hegemonic outcome.  Consequently, in Batson v. 
Kentucky (1986), the final ruling contested the existing hegemonic notion that “blacks” or 
“negroes” could be systematically excluded from jury service by offering several counter-
hegemonic narratives that helped disrupt a legacy of racial injustice in jury selection. 
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji (1987). In this case, Al-Khazraji, a professor at 
Saint Francis College, filed suit against the college for denying him tenure because of his 
Arabian race.  The Supreme Court ruled that persons of Arabian ancestry were protected from 
racial discrimination under the Title 42 Section 1981 of the United States Code, in favor of 
Professor Al-Khazaji. In the first hegemonic excerpt, Justice White stated that: 
Under current racial classifications Arabs are Caucasians; 
It was not until the 20th century that dictionaries began referring 
to the Caucasian, Mongolian, and Negro races, or to race as involving 
divisions of mankind based upon different physical characteristics. 
Although, the reason for classifying Arabs as Caucasians was not clear from the data, it may be 
related to an older United States Supreme Court ruling Dow v. United States (1915), which was 
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based on the United States Naturalization Act (1790).  In Dow v. United States (1915), the 
justices essentially ruled on the “whiteness of the applicant” by noting that Syrians and Arabs 
inhabit a portion of Asia who were classified as “white persons” (Haney-Lopez, 2006).  This 
hegemonic narrative pointed to how “whites” manipulated social, geographic, and political 
power to create and sustain racial classifications and differences that are then used by some legal 
actors to perpetuate these distinctions in law. 
In contrast, in the first counter-hegemonic excerpt, Justice Brennan expressed his 
sentiments regarding racial differences by noting that separating individuals based exclusively on 
ancestry are in opposition to the doctrine of equality.  This counter-hegemonic excerpt by Justice 
Brennan illustrated how he attempted to disrupt racial differences by acknowledging that it is 
unconstitutional and violates the principles of fairness in the United States. 
The findings in Saint Francis College v. Al-Kharraji (1987) demonstrated how some 
contemporary legal actors still apply “sociopolitical” racial classifications in legal deliberations, 
while other contemporary legal actors use their judicial powers through counter-hegemonic 
discourse to dismiss these extreme views. 
United States v. Fordice (1992).  In this case, the Supreme Court determined that the 
State of Mississippi did not meet its affirmative duty under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause to eliminate its racially divided public university system.  Essentially, in favor 
of descendants of Africa in the United States, the Supreme Court ruled that Mississippi failed to 
remove its segregative admissions policies.  In the first hegemonic extract, Justice Scalia stated: 
I reject, however, the effectively unsustainable burden the Court imposes 
on Mississippi, and all States that formerly operated segregated universities, 
to demonstrate compliance with Brown I. 
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This hegemonic perspective suggests that dismantling a remnant that fostered segregation over 
thirty-eight years since Brown v. Board (1954) would somehow create a hardship on Mississippi. 
It illustrates how some legal actors have used their strict interpretation of the Constitution, in this 
instance States right, to ignore and legally contest means for redressing racial discrimination. 
Additionally, this hegemonic extract offered by Justice Scalia points to how this contemporary 
legal actor fell short of disrupting racial inequities and how his opinion contributed to 
perpetuating inequality. 
Contrastingly, in her counter-hegemonic narrative, Justice O’Connor affirmed that: 
In my view, it also follows from the State’s obligation to prove 
that it has taken all steps to eliminate policies and practices traceable 
to de jure segregation, that, if the State shows that maintenance of 
certain remnants of its prior system is essential to accomplish its 
legitimate goals, then it still must prove that it has counteracted 
and minimized the segregative impact of such policies to the extent 
possible. Only by eliminating a remnant that unnecessarily continues 
to foster segregation, or by negating insofar as possible its segregative 
impact, can the State satisfy its constitutional obligation to dismantle 
the discriminatory system that should, by now, be only a distant memory. 
In this counter-hegemonic narrative, Justice O’Connor debunked Justice Scalia’s absolution of 
Mississippi’s “constitutional obligation to dismantle” its archaic segregative educational policies 
and practices.  This finding demonstrates how one contemporary legal actor singled out a State’s, 
in this case Mississippi, unconstitutional maintenance of educational policies and practices that 
not only sustain racial difference, but were remnants of slavery and Jim Crow segregation. 
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Reno, Attorney General v. Bossier Parish School Board (2000).  In this case, the 
Attorney General Janet Reno sought redress from a District Court’s ruling that permitted Bossier 
Parish, Louisiana to pass into law changes in voting qualification, specifically redistricting, 
without first obtaining preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.  The latter section 
prohibits Bossier Parish from implementing any change in their voting qualification standards 
and practices without first receiving preclearance from the Attorney General or the District 
Court. 
For the hegemonic discourse in this case, I found Justice Scalia’s majority opinion an 
example of textual silence and omission, and a rather skillful legal technique of splitting an issue 
without discussing race and voter discrimination.  To illustrate, Justice Scalia declared that: 
It makes no sense to suggest that a voting practice “abridges” the right 
to vote without some baseline with which to compare the practice. 
In section 5 preclearance proceedings—which uniquely deal only 
and specifically with changes in voting procedures—the baseline 
is the status quo that is proposed to be changed. If the change “abridges 
the right to vote” relative to the status quo, preclearance is denied, and 
the status quo, however discriminatory it may be, remains in effect. 
In this hegemonic excerpt, Justice Scalia appeared to be aware that certain changes to the voting 
practice in Bossier Parish may continue vestiges, or as he stated, “the status quo,” of 
discriminatory voting schemes that existed prior to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.  
Therefore, I considered Justice Scalia’s textual silence and omission as it relates to calling out 
remnants of voter discrimination targeting descendants of Africa in the United States, an 
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example of hegemonic discourse because his lack of response seems like he is ignoring current 
efforts to make voting difficult for many descendants of Africa in the United States. 
In contrast, the counter-hegemonic extract presented by Justice Souter’s dissenting 
opinion recognized that: 
The legal issue here is the meaning of “abridging” in the provision of 
Section 5 that preclearance of a districting change in a covered jurisdiction 
requires a showing that the new plan does not “have the purpose…of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color…” 
In each context, it is clear that abridgement necessarily means something 
more subtle and less drastic than a complete denial of the right to cast 
a ballot, denial being separately forbidden….The behavior of Bossier Parish 
is a plain effort to deny the voting equality that the Constitution just 
as plainly guarantees. The point of Section 5 is to thwart the ingenuity 
of the School Board’s effort to stay ahead of challenges under Section 2. 
Its object is to bring the country closer to transcending a history of 
intransigence to enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment. Now, however, 
the promise of Section 5 is substantially diminished. Now executive and 
judicial officers of the United States will be forced to preclear illegal and 
unconstitutional voting schemes patently intended to perpetuate 
discrimination. The appeal to federalism is no excuse. 
In this passage, Justice Souter contested Justice Scalia’s earlier opinion in which he seemed to 
excuse Bossier Parish by deconstructing the word “abridge” and granting them the 
“preclearance” or authorization to change voting patterns.  Instead of remaining silent like 
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Justice Scalia, Justice Souter used his judicial platform to offer a counter-hegemonic narrative to 
these issues of States Right federalism and voter discrimination. 
Despite the counter-hegemonic narratives offered by four of the five Justices, the 
Supreme Court ruled that Section 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan passed 
into law with a discriminatory but non-retrogressive purpose.  In other words, under this 
Supreme Court ruling, districts may receive preclearance for changes voting measures that 
apparently continue discrimination based on racial differences. 
Virginia v. Black (2003).  In this case, three “white” men were convicted for violating 
the Commonwealth of Virginia’s cross-burning statute when they attempted to burn a cross on 
the yard of an African American family.  This Virginia statute forbids the burning of a cross with 
the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons. 
In the first hegemonic extract, Justice O’Connor stated that a review of history 
demonstrated that: 
As a factual matter it is not true that cross burners direct their 
intimidating conduct solely to racial or religious minorities; 
as the history of cross burning indicates, a burning cross is 
not always intended to intimidate. Rather, sometime the cross 
burning is a statement of ideology, a symbol of group solidarity. 
While in the second hegemonic extract, Justice Thomas added, “but the perception that a burning 
cross is a threat and a precursor of worse things to come is not limited to blacks.”  It is important 
to add to the background of this case that several months before, Mr. Black had led a Ku Klux 
Klan rally in Virginia.  Taken together, these findings suggest that despite some historical 
references that cross-burnings were used in a movie (Mississippi Burning) and in a novel (Lady 
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of the Lake), the Justices overlooked the overwhelming historical accounts that cross-burnings in 
the United States was directed almost exclusively at “blacks,” some of the Supreme Court 
Justices opined that cross-burnings may have different motives.  For this reason, I consider the 
above excerpts examples of hegemonic narratives because of the historical legacy and trauma 
cross-burnings have for many descendants of Africa in the United States. 
In the first counter-hegemonic extract, Justice Stevens stipulated that “cross burning with 
an intent to intimidate unquestionably qualifies as the kind of threat that is unprotected by the 
First Amendment.”  While in the second counter-hegemonic extract, Justice Souter noted: 
To be sure, that content often includes an essentially intimidating 
message, that the cross burner will harm the victim, most probably 
in a physical way, given the historical identification of burning crosses 
with arson, beating, and lynching. But even when the symbolic act is 
meant to terrify, a burning cross may carry a further, ideological  
message of white Protestant supremacy. The ideological message not only 
accompanies many threatening uses of the symbol, but is also expressed when a 
burning cross is not used to threaten but merely to symbolize the supremacist 
ideology and the solidarity of those who espouse it. 
This passage by Justice Souter represented a counter-hegemonic narrative in which he clearly 
pointed to the historical legacy of hate, fear, and racism that cross-burnings represented for many 
descendants of Africa in the United States.  Also, this counter-hegemonic narrative by Justice 
Souter represents one of the few instances in which a sitting United States Supreme Court Justice 
recognized the ideology known as “white supremacy.”  Additionally, these counter-hegemonic 
narratives represent one Justice’s efforts to disrupt racial intimidation based on racial differences. 
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Ultimately, in a seven-to-two decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
Virginia’s cross-burning statute infringed upon the appellant-Black’s (who burned the cross) 
First Amendment right to free speech.  Although two Justices dissented with the majority, the 
decision was hegemonic because it granted “whites” First Amendment protection to burn a cross 
on the property of virtually any descendant of Africa in the United States, so long as the act is 
not intended to intimidate.  Lastly, I believe this hegemonic ruling represented a major step 
backwards in terms of some of the historic and courageous efforts made during the Civil Rights 
movement to challenge and disrupt “white supremacist” acts of intimidation and violence 
targeting many descendants of Africa in the United States. 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2006).  In this 
case, Parents Involved in Community Schools (hereinafter Parents), a non-profit organization, 
sued the Seattle School District because they used a “racial tiebreaker” to decide which school a 
student would attend when a district became oversubscribed. In other words, the Seattle School 
District used racial factors in their admission procedures.  The United States Supreme Court 
ruled in a 4-1-4 decision that the District’s efforts to desegregate the Seattle school district was 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
CRT scholars described Chief Justice Roberts’ legal discourse in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2006) as an attempt to dismiss or negate this 
country’s racist past, which they coined “color-blind” rhetoric (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Romero, 
2015), To illustrate, Chief Justice Roberts declared that: 
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and 
could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school 
districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of 
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demonstrating that we should allow this once again [against 
White plaintiffs]-even for very different reasons. The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on 
the basis of race. 
I considered this passage nuanced because it reveals how Chief Justice Roberts while recounting 
the essence of Brown v. Board, seemed to have trivialized the legacy of racial discrimination in 
the educational system based on racial differences.  In other words, instead of allowing the 
Seattle school district to desegregate based on prior years of racial discrimination, Justice 
Roberts dismissed their efforts by stating in a rather simple way, just stop racial discrimination.  
However, in the swing vote, Justice Kennedy emphasized that: 
To be forced to live under a state mandated racial label is inconsistent 
with the dignity of individuals in our society and government 
classification that command people to march in different directions 
based on racial typologies, assigned to individuals can cause new 
divisiveness….No sense of stigma may already become the fate 
of those separated out by circumstances beyond their immediate 
control. But to this the replication must be: Even so measures other  
than differential treatment based on racial typing of individuals first  
must be exhausted. 
This quoted passage illustrated how Justice Kennedy used counter-hegemonic discourse to 
spotlight that racial labels and racial typologies are not only dehumanizing, but remain divisive, 
stigmatizing, and should be eradicated.   
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 Perhaps, in one of the strongest counter-hegemonic opinions delineated by a 
contemporary legal actor, Justice Breyer denounced what he called the “color-blind” analysis of 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1 (2006).   In his seventy-seven page dissent, Justice Breyer applied a 
thorough description of history, particularly as it relates to Brown v. Board (1954), and 
assembled “four basic considerations” to reach his counter-hegemonic perspective.   First, that 
school districts should essentially be permitted to desegregate their schools as they rectify some 
of the errors of the past. Second, how children interact in this nation, often influences racial 
matters.   In other words, Justice Breyer believed that if this country’s schools work consistently 
to bring “unity among our children,” then we may be able to improve how we deal with race.   
Third, the Seattle School District is working to make their schools racially equitable.   Last, 
Justice Breyer declared that the Court’s plurality decision that the Seattle School District’s 
desegregation attempts violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
would place this Nation and its law in jeopardy.  Justice Breyer exemplified his counter-
hegemonic narrative in the following excerpt: 
  Today, almost 50 years later, attitudes towards race in this Nation  
  have changed dramatically.   Many parents, white and black alike, 
  want their children to attend schools with children of different races. 
  Indeed, the very school districts that once spurned integration now 
  strive for it.  The long history of their efforts reveals the complexities  
  and difficulties they have faced.  And in light of those challenges, 
  they have asked us not to take from their hands the instruments they 
  have used to rid their schools of racial segregation, instruments that 
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  they believe are needed to overcome the problem of cities divided by 
  race and poverty.  The plurality would decline their modest request. 
  The plurality is wrong to do so.  The last half-century has witnessed 
  great strides toward racial equality, but we have not yet realized the 
  promise of Brown.  To invalidate the plans under review is to threaten 
  the promise of Brown.  The plurality’s position, I fear, would break 
  that promise.  This is a decision that the Court and the Nation will come  
  to regret. 
These counter-hegemonic narratives demonstrate how two legal actors can use strong discourse 
to call out racial differences and “divisiveness” that continues to plague this country.  Thus, the 
findings in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2006) 
revealed how nuanced legal discourse that contains hegemonic and counter-hegemonic narratives 
results in a hegemonic decision. 
Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General, et al. (2013).  In this case, Shelby 
County, Alabama averred that Section 5 and Section 4(b) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act was 
unconstitutional.  It is worth noting that Section 5 prevents eligible districts from authorizing 
changes to their election laws and procedure without obtaining preclearance.  While Section 4(b) 
referred to those districts that had voting tests prior to the Voting Rights Act.  These districts were 
also required under Section 4(b) to verify that the proposed changes would not adversely affect 
any citizen the right to vote on account of their race or minority status. 
 In reaching the majority decision, Chief Justice Roberts concluded his opinion by stating: 
Our decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial 
discrimination in voting found in Section 2. We issue no holding on 
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Section 5 itself, only on the coverage formula. Congress may draft 
another formula based on current conditions. Such a formula is an initial 
prerequisite to a determination that exceptional conditions still exist 
justifying such an “an extraordinary departure from the traditional course 
of relations between the States and the Federal Government.” Our country 
has changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, 
Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem 
speaks to current conditions. 
This quoted passage demonstrates another form of what CRT scholars call “color-blind” rhetoric 
(Bonilla-Silva, 2014) that acknowledges that much in “our country has changed” as it relates to 
“racial discrimination in voting,” but ignores that some States have now adopted more discreet 
tactics to discourage minority voters, specifically descendants of Africa in the United States, 
from uninterrupted access to the voting process.  The a-historic, “color-blind” approach is 
particularly disturbing when today in some Republican-controlled states voter access to polls is 
being cut, strict voter identification requirements are being implemented, and gerrymandering 
strategies to redistrict areas to their favor is rampant (ACLU, 2017).  Additionally, this form of 
“color-blind” rhetoric was further illustrated in Justice Thomas’ opinion when he noted that: 
Today, our Nation has changed. The conditions that originally 
justified Section 5 no longer characterize voting in the covered 
jurisdictions. Voter turnout and registration rates now approach parity. 
Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. 
And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels. 
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In this example, Justice Thomas, the only Justice who is a descendant of Africa in the United 
States, missed an opportunity to acknowledge that while certain things have changed, racially-
motivated tactics to suppress voting remains a serious problem in the United States (ACLU, 
2017). 
In contrast, Justice Ginsburg offered a more definite analysis in her dissenting opinion 
when she indicated that: 
In truth, the evolution of voting discrimination into more subtle second- 
generation barriers is powerful evidence that a remedy as effective as 
preclearance remains vital to protect minority voting rights and prevent 
backsliding. 
In this counter-hegemonic narrative, Justice Ginsburg clearly acknowledged that voter 
discrimination has morphed and safeguards should remain because they protect vulnerable 
citizens.  This excerpt is an example of how one contemporary legal actor addressed her concern 
over a potential return to discriminatory actions targeting minority voters if remedies are not 
taken, revealing the role of law today in disrupting racial segregation. 
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Section 4 of the Voting 
Rights Act placed an undue burden upon these voting districts and was therefore unconstitutional. 
This case was significant to many descendants of Africa in the United States because States 
identified with a history of discrimination prior to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act could now 
make changes to election procedures and redistrict without prior approval from the Justice 
Department.  As a result, the hegemonic outcome in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney 
General, et al. (2013) adversely impacts voters based on racial differences. 
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Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project 
(2015).  In this case, the respondent, The Inclusive Communities Project, alleged disparate 
measures were applied to tax credits offered to developments in minority neighborhoods, that 
these tax credits were denied to developments within Caucasian neighborhoods, leading to a 
cluster of low-income housing in minority neighborhoods, which sustained segregation in 
violation of the Fair Housing Act. 
Although the Justices used previous rulings that contained hegemonic discourse to reach 
their respective legal opinions in this matter, several of them used racial descriptors to 
distinguish one group from another.  For example, Justice Kennedy used racial descriptors like 
“white neighborhoods” versus “black neighborhoods,” and “white suburbs” versus “black inner 
cities.”  While the Justices did not use direct hegemonic narratives in their legal discourse, the 
continued use of racial descriptors and identifiers represented how some contemporary legal 
actors maintain racial distinctions in law today.  For example, for the majority opinion, Justice 
Kennedy offered the following perspective: 
Much progress remains to be made in our Nation’s continuing 
struggle against racial isolation. In striving to achieve our historic 
commitment to creating an integrated society, we must remain 
wary of policies that reduce homeowners to nothing more than 
their race. But since the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 
and against the backdrop of disparate-impact liability in nearly 
every jurisdiction, many cities have become  more diverse. 
The FHA must play an important part in avoiding the Kerner  
Commission’s grim prophecy that “our Nation is moving 
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toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal.” 
The Court acknowledges the Fair Housing Act’s continuing role in 
moving the Nation toward a more integrated society. 
In this quoted passage, Justice Kennedy advanced his counter-hegemonic narrative in a manner 
that I believe accomplished a dual role: preserving the integrity of the Fair Housing Act’s 
disparate treatment claim and taking a more active posture of impugning racial differences. 
In contrast to Justice Kennedy’s strong position on racial discrimination in housing, Justice Alito 
assumed a rather cautious tone when he indicated that: 
At last I come to the “purpose” driving the Court’s analysis: The 
desire to eliminate the “vestiges” of residential segregation by race. 
We agree that all Americans should be able to buy decent houses without 
discrimination. But this Court has no license to expand the scope of 
the FHA to beyond what Congress enacted. 
While Justice Alito’s legal discourse did not sustain nor create racial differences, it shows a 
rather tepid counter-hegemonic narrative demonstrating the rather strict approach some legal 
actors maintain as it relates to ameliorating the legacy of racial discrimination in the United 
States. 
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the Texas Department of Housing and 
Community Affairs violated the disparate impact claim under the Fair Housing Act.  This ruling 
was significant to many descendants of Africa in the United States because the disparate impact 
assertion prevents discriminatory practices in housing, particularly racial bias and masked 
discrimination tactics. 
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Intertextuality and Summary of the Findings 
 In this next section, I applied intertextuality (Fairclough, 2003) as a means of comparing 
what similarities and differences arose from the legal discourse in the historic and contemporary 
legal texts.  I used intertextuality as I explored the counter-hegemonic narratives that became 
visible in the historic and contemporary legal texts.  Also, this section includes a summary of my 
findings. 
As I explored and compared the six historic legal texts, the findings that emerged showed 
that between 1705-1857, the racialized names “negro,” “black,” and “white” were legally 
constructed to create clear racial differences.  One of the findings in the historic legal texts point 
to racial differences based on skin color such as those found in Hudgins v Wright (1806) in 
which Judge Roan noted that a person who looks like a “negro” is deemed a slave, while 
someone “white” is free.  Findings in earlier historic legal texts such as those found in an act 
concerning servants and slaves in Virginia (1705) and an act for the better ordering and 
governing negroes and other slaves in the province-South Carolina (1740) indicated that an 
enslaved person was essentially synonymous with the use of the name “negro.”  These findings 
point to how some historic legal actors discursively constructed racial differences, specifically as 
they related to many descendants of Africa in the United States, based not only on skin color, but 
also on racial designation and identity. 
Another finding that emerged from the historic and contemporary legal texts was the use 
of racial descriptors in legal matters.  The continued use of racial descriptors today may suggest 
that while society casually uses racialized names and racial descriptors, when legal actors apply 
them, racial names and descriptors are validated in law.  Although some legal actors used legal 
precedent that contained racial names and descriptors because the case related to race, their 
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continued use points to one of the ways that contemporary legal discourse still maintains racial 
distinctions in law today. 
Although the majority of historic legal actors discursively created racial differences, other 
historic legal actors constructed counter-hegemonic legal provisions that allowed some 
descendants of Africa in the United States to clarify their legal status.  Other legal actors went 
even further in their counter-hegemonic narratives to recognize that prior to and even subsequent 
to the ratification of the United States Constitution, some Africans had been considered citizens. 
These findings pointed some similarities between two historic legal texts demonstrating that at 
some point, a number of descendants of Africa in the United States were considered citizens on 
equal terms with “whites.” 
As I applied intertextuality to the historic and contemporary legal texts to explore the 
continuity and shifts in the use if racialized names, the racialized name “white” remained a 
constant legal and racial designation through the explored time for all descendants of Europe in 
the United States, while the designation for many descendants of Africa fluctuated, being 
“white” seems to bestow a superior legal position of power and privilege over all other races, and 
“black” people in particular.  
 Also, six legal actors in the six historic legal texts used very strong hegemonic narratives 
to create racial differences, such as those found in an act concerning servants and slaves in 
Virginia (1705), an act for the better ordering and governing negroes and other slaves in the 
province-South Carolina (1740), and those articulated by Chief Justice Taney in Scott v. 
Sandford (1857).  In contrast, my intertextual analysis of the eight contemporary legal texts 
revealed more diverse, complex, and nuanced discourse that related to race than those found in 
the six historic legal texts.  Like those found in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
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School District No. 1 (2006) and Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General, et al 
(2013). 
Lastly, many of the narratives found in the eight contemporary legal texts pointed to the 
Justice’s use of stare decisis or previous rulings of the past and recount of history, which 
included hegemonic narratives, many contemporary legal actors employed counter-hegemonic 
narratives to chip away at the prevailing dominant discourses that have maintained some of these 
vestiges of slavery.  I also uncovered through my intertextual, comparative analysis of legal texts 
that some historic and contemporary legal actors strove to challenge the conventional and 
dominant hegemonic discourse with counter-hegemonic narratives.  
In the following chapter, I discuss the meaning and implications of these findings in 
relation to my research questions.  Also, I explored how exactly was and is racial discrimination 
perpetuated by law, what was and is the role of law in creating, maintaining, or disrupting 
hegemony, and why are racial terms like “negro,” “black,” and “white” still used today.  I also 
share the limitations of my research, my contributions to the existing literature, and my 
recommendations for future research and action. 
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Chapter VI: Discussion, Implications, and Conclusion 
In this chapter I discuss what I discovered in the six historic and eight contemporary legal 
texts as they relate to the use of racialized names and to the construction and disruption of race 
and racial differences in legal discourse.  I arranged this chapter by first recapitulating the 
purpose and findings of my exploratory study, its relationship with previous research, the 
limitations of my research, its implications, recommendations, and conclusion.  
To restate, I proceeded to find answers to the following research questions:  (1) what 
legal discourse did legal actors use during 1705-1857  to create racial differences in the United 
States and what similarities and differences exist during 1986-2017?  and  (2) what are the 
counter-hegemonic narratives that sought to disrupt vestiges of slavery and racial differences in 
the historic and modern legal texts?  In terms of research goals, the aim of my exploratory study 
was: (1) to explore the role of law and legal discourse in constructing racial names and racial 
differences through time and to compare historic and contemporary legal discourse;  (2) to 
examine the link between historic and contemporary use of racialized names in legal discourse; 
(3) to explore how the use of racial names and racial differences influenced legal treatment; and 
(4) to explore counter-hegemonic narratives in historic and contemporary legal texts as tools for 
dismantling vestiges of slavery. 
I begin this section of the chapter by discussing the legal discourse used by legal actors in 
the six historic and eight contemporary legal texts to create racial differences in the United 
States.  I discuss my findings by substantiating them with existing literature on racial differences, 
racialized names, and their cultural and legal significance.  I discuss what differences and 
similarities emerged, any new discoveries, and how my study contributed to the existing 
CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY 
 
133 
 
research.  I also discuss how I examined my findings through my theoretical frameworks of 
Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Post-Colonialist Theory. 
Historic Legal Discourse and the Creation of Racial Differences in the United States 
Through my data analysis, I found that in the six historic legal texts from 1705-1857, 
legal actors used authoritative and racially explicit, discriminatory hegemonic discourse to 
construct and maintain racial differences.  Specifically, these hegemonic narratives used 
racialized names and racial identifiers that seemed to have produced and reproduced purposeful 
ideological precepts in law, such as the creation of a racial hierarchy, based not only on skin 
pigmentation, but also rooted in religious differences.  Ultimately, some of these ideological 
precepts appear to have influenced the legitimization of inferiority of the descendants of Africa 
in the United States.  Also, these ideological precepts shaped the concept of slave as property and 
slave-holder as property owner, which was legally sanctioned and enforced, and indeed created a 
distinct legal status for those classified as “negro,” “colored,” “black,” as opposed to “white.” 
Racial hierarchy.  One specific ideological precept that emerged from the legal 
discourse found in the six historic legal texts was a clear racial hierarchy between descendants of 
Africa and Europe in the United States with “whites” at the top and “blacks” at the bottom.  To 
illustrate, in an act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia (1705) the law-making body of 
Virginia codified into law that slaves were clearly distinguished from “whites” not only based on 
physical traits such as skin color, but also using the racialized name “negro.”  Also, this same 
Virginia act, used the racialized name “white” to not only differentiate those who were not 
slaves, but also who were in control of the slaves.  I found that this Act not only influenced many 
of the subsequent slave codes enacted into law in early colonial United States, it may have 
introduced the social construct known as “white supremacy” and “black inferiority” in law.  This 
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Virginia act is particularly significant because it represented one of the first laws concerning race 
and racial differences during the formative years of jurisprudence in the United States. 
Consequently, these findings are broadly in line with those of researchers such as 
Bonilla-Silva (1997; 2014), Morning (2011), and the work of Jefferson (1785), who noted that 
one of the main reasons why racial differences and a racial hierarchy was created and maintained 
was to ensure the economic enterprise of slavery while preserving the “white” ruling elite class 
and maintaining the “negro” and “black” slave status.  Notably, the legitimization of racial 
hierarchy rested not only upon skin color, but also on the religious and spiritual belief that 
Christianity was superior. 
Religion and Civilized/Uncivilized.  The second ideological precept that emerged from 
the six historic legal texts also had religious connotations, which helped to reinforce the 
emerging divide between “white superiority” and “black inferiority.”  To illustrate, in an act 
concerning servants and slaves in Virginia (1705), slaves who were distinguished by the name 
“negro” were also categorized as non-Christian.  I believe this religious distinction is an 
important finding because it dovetails the work of Smedley & Smedley (2005) where they noted 
that the creation of racial differences and racial hierarchy also had religious implications, which 
were all imperative for maintaining “white” hegemony over those classified primarily as “negro” 
and “black.” 
Additionally, the works of Higginbotham (1996) and Jordan (2012) pointed to another 
element which helped further this ideology of “white supremacy” and “black inferiority.”  Both 
authors indicated that the main reason Christians could morally support the enslavement of 
another human being was to view and create the image of the African as a heathen, barbarian, 
and savage.  This notion of the uncivilized African, some “thing” so inferior and animal-like, 
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required a name, a label, and a mark that would correspond with their demoted status: hence the 
use of the racialized name “negro” and “black.”  Prior to the 15th century, Europeans did not use 
those Portuguese and English terms to refer to any people who were inhabitants of Africa 
(Moore, 1960).  The racialized names “negro,” “black,” and “white,” as my findings revealed, 
appeared to have been sanctioned and codified through law during the birth of the United States.  
In other words, the creation of racial differences by legal actors in the United States seems to 
have been literally sown into the very fabric of this nation. As a result, these findings are also 
consistent with some of the key principles of CRT.  
Concept of property.  The third ideological precept that emerged from the legal 
discourse found in the six historic legal texts was the concept of property.  Specifically, the idea 
that another human being, in this case “negroes,” could be converted physically and legally into 
property, and that “whites” could do as they pleased with “their” property was sanctioned by 
law.  This became possible through the process of othering, which I described in my theoretical 
framework, that descendants of Africa were deemed inferior because of their skin color and 
religious/spiritual beliefs. Slave-holders legally transferred their property, which included slaves, 
to their children and heirs.  Consequently, these findings are consistent with the work of Harris 
(1993), a CRT scholar and lawyer, who introduced the theory of “whiteness as property.”  She 
revealed that through “white” identity, the law constructed and delineated the terms of 
“whiteness” as those whose “superior” status bestowed an unmatched amount of privilege, 
power, and legal authority over all property, including the enslaved “negro.”  Essentially, this left 
many descendants of Africa in the United States in a socially and legally tenuous position. 
Legal status.  The last ideological precept, a result of the previous three precepts that 
emerged from the legal discourse found in the six historic legal texts was a diminished legal 
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status for many descendants of Africa in the United States.  As several of the findings illustrated, 
the legal construction and maintenance of racial differences in the six historic legal texts pointed 
clearly to “white” hegemonic power and domination over all groups, especially over those 
legally categorized and classified as “negro” and “black.”  Several excerpts from my findings 
helped affirm the legally superior status of “whites” over the inferior legal status of “blacks”. 
Specifically, starting with an act concerning servants and slaves in Virginia (1705) and 
culminating in Scott v. Sandford (1857), my findings revealed that a legally inferior status was 
imposed upon many descendants of Africa in the United States.  This legally inferior status 
designated many descendants of Africa in the United States to a juristic person or an artificial 
person.  In other words, a nonhuman entity that is created by law, is legally different owning its 
own rights and duties (Black, 2009), and also relates to a “non-person” someone whose 
personhood has been legally expunged (Webster, 2002). 
Moreover, these findings parallel the works of Brown (2009); Cacho (2012); Dayan 
(2011); and Patterson (1985), in which they noted that the law ascribed a legal identity or status 
to the enslaved descendants of Africa in the United States that acknowledged, to a certain degree, 
their physical body, but, one dispossessed of all civil rights. Patterson (1985) named this 
condition “social death,” which fundamentally deprived many descendants of Africa in the 
United States of their human and civil rights. 
Contrastingly, this legally inferior status that was based on racial differences replaced the 
concept of nationality.  Many descendants of Africa in the United States who were forcibly 
stripped of their nationality and forgot their national descent names (Drew Ali, n.d; 1928; 
Pimienta-Bey, 1995; 2002) used the racialized names “negro” and “black,” which was created in 
law as a substitute by the slave-holders, who directly benefitted from the slave industry.  As my 
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literature review demonstrated, prior to the late 15th century, Europeans did not use the terms 
“negro” or “black,” to refer to any people, which included inhabitants of Africa (Moore, 1960).  
It was only after the racialization of slavery that the racial categories “white,” “negro,” and 
“black” replaced nationality.  As a result, starting with the findings in an act concerning servants 
and slaves in Virginia (1705) and ending in Scott v. Sandford (1857), descendants of Africa in 
the United States who were classified as “negro” or “black” in law were presumed to be slaves, 
the property of “white” slave-holders, and having “no rights which the white man was bound to 
respect.” For these reasons, the findings in the six historic legal texts seem to suggest that the use 
of the racial names “negro” and “black” appear to resemble legal masks (Noonan, 1976) because 
they suppressed and dehumanized many descendants of Africa in the United States within the 
legal process. 
To understand how legal discourse constructs and sustains racial differences, 
discrimination, and hegemony today, and how, if at all it, it is linked to the past, in the next 
section, I explore and discuss the findings that emerged from my analysis of the eight 
contemporary legal texts. 
Contemporary Legal Discourse and Racial Differences in the United States 
Through my data analysis of the legal discourse contained in the eight contemporary 
legal texts during 1986-2017, I discovered that legal actors, specifically United States Supreme 
Court justices, often used nuanced, discreet, and much less explicit hegemonic legal discourse in 
relation to race.  The vague, sometimes unexpressed or implied, hegemonic language revealed 
the complex role of legal actors in the modern era.  Despite the often cryptic language used in 
their hegemonic legal discourse to perpetuate racial differences and racial discrimination in 
contemporary law today, several contemporary legal actors used counter-hegemonic narratives to 
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disrupt it through their discourse.  In this section, I discuss my findings related to the way 
contemporary legal actors relied upon the legal concept of stare decisis or prior legal decisions 
and textual silence in the form of “color-blind” rhetoric to maintain and perpetuate racial 
differences and racial discrimination today.  As well, I discuss the counter-hegemonic narratives 
that emerged from the legal texts. 
Reliance on legal precedent. First, I found that four contemporary legal actors relied on 
prior legal precedent and a recount of history that often used explicit, racially discriminatory 
legal discourse to sustain and perpetuate racial differences.  To reiterate, stare decisis is an 
abbreviation of the Latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere, meaning “to stand by 
decisions and not to disturb settled matters” (Black, 2009).  Further, Cardozo (2009) emphasized: 
If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect 
the same decision.  It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate 
cases on opposite principles.  If a case was decided against me 
yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment 
today if I am plaintiff.  To decide differently would raise a feeling of 
resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, 
material and moral, of my rights.  Adherence to precedent must then be 
the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the 
even-handed administration of justice in the courts (p. 33-34). 
However, viewed through a CRT lens (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2014), the language of racism that 
often has been fixed in legally binding precedent may influence and possibly control future 
decisions of the Court.  While it is true that Batson v. Kentucky (1986), United States v. Fordice 
(1992), and Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
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Project (2015) cases involved matters pertaining to race, and two were ruled in favor of 
descendants of Africa in the United States, the legal discourse contained some hegemonic 
language from prior rulings.  To quote Williams & Smith (2010) “we know that in the flux of life 
all the facts of a case will never recur, but the legally material facts may recur and it is with these 
that the doctrine [stare decisis] is concerned” (p. 67-68).  That is to say, while the race of the 
litigants in the above mentioned contemporary legal texts was a material fact, the Justices, by 
virtue of their power under judicial review, could have replaced the use of the racialized names 
“negro” and “black,” especially after 1985, when “African American” became the more 
acceptable name for descendants of Africa in the United States. Instead, these Justices chose to 
cite the racialized names verbatim.  It is safe to say, that this rather simple act by the Justices 
would not have changed the outcome of their rulings or violated the sacred doctrine of stare 
decisis, so why continue to perpetuate racially insensitive names that allude to slavery and racial 
differences in modern law? 
Also, while the use of the racialized name “colored” appears to have naturally lost appeal 
among descendants of Africa in the United States, the use of the term “negro” persists.  Notably, 
the Journal of Blacks in Higher Education (herein after the JBHE Foundation) (1997) revealed 
that despite overwhelming opposition to the continued use of the racialized term “negro” as a 
designation for many descendants of Africa in the United States, the New York Times and the 
United States Supreme Court still use “negro” as a legal designation for this group.  Specifically, 
the JBHE Foundation (1997) discovered that even though many descendants of Africa in the 
United States preferred the term “African American” starting in 1985, the word “negro” was 
used in close to 400 U.S. Supreme Court opinions since 1821.  In fact, the JBHE Foundation 
(1997) noted that “as of January 1, 1997, Justices Antonin Scalia (now deceased), Anthony M. 
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Kennedy, and David H. Souter had never written an opinion in which they used the term African 
American” (p. 14).  Although the JBHE Foundation did not indicate if the other Justices used 
African American, it is reasonable to assume that they did use the term. 
Interestingly, the research by the JBHE Foundation (1997) did not delve into the actual 
legal discourse of many of these United States Supreme Court decisions and how these opinions 
may have contributed to the creation and maintenance of racial differences in legal discourse 
through time.  Hence, the research by the JBHE Foundation (1997) prompted my interest in 
further exploring some specific United States Supreme Court opinions starting from 1986-2017 
that still used the racialized name “negro” in reference to many descendants of Africa in the 
United States. 
Notably, the use of the term “negro” was just recently dropped from the United States 
census in 2013 (PBS.org, 2016).  Also, in 2016, former President Barack Obama signed into law 
the House Resolution (H. R.) 4238 (U.S. Congress, 2016).  This law modernized the terms used 
by the Department of Energy to categorize “minorities” (U.S. Congress, 2016).   H.R. 4238 
specifically considered the racialized term “negro” to be insensitive and antiquated.  Although 
these recent efforts should be commended, other public institutions, such as all governmental 
agencies, educational, and legal should all re-evaluate the continued use of these vestiges of 
slavery and work to abandon them entirely. 
First, van Dijk (2004) noted that racist discourse, in this case use of racialized names, 
takes on the structure of discriminatory social practice that is exhibited in “text, talk, and 
communication” (p. 351).  However, discourses, especially racist discourse, can take on a life of 
its own. In other words, as van Dijk (2004) stated: 
Racist societies and institutions produce racist discourses, and 
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racist discourses reproduce the stereotypes, prejudices and ideologies 
that are used to defend and legitimize white dominance (p. 354). 
Consequently, the language that the United States Supreme Court (as the highest and 
most powerful court in the land) uses may influence how some lower courts judges and other 
legal actors, such as police, may unintentionally, treat many descendants of Africa in the United 
States.  These unintended consequences may lead to different treatment in criminal processing 
(Miethe & Moore, 1986); in courtroom juror perceptions (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000); in 
implicit criminal association (Eberhardt et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2015); racial disparities in 
sentencing (Abrams et al., 2012; ACLU, 2014); and in police charging decisions (Sommers & 
Marotta, 2015).  Therefore, CRT scholars suggest that stare decisis may represent a potential 
threat to minority rights because even if the legal precedent did not intentionally contain a 
malicious purpose, a judge who is pressed to administer the doctrine of stare decisis may sustain, 
in an indistinct manner, a legal system of racial disparity and discrimination (Bonilla-Silva, 
2014; Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). 
Textual silences/omissions and color-blind rhetoric.  My analysis of the legal 
discourse found in the eight contemporary legal texts revealed that a few contemporary legal 
actors resorted to textual silence, omission, and “color-blind” rhetoric (Bonilla-Silva, 2014) as 
they relate to racial differences in law.  To reiterate, according to Huckin (2002), textual silence 
is the omission of some germane information for a text or discourse.  He separated textual 
silence into five groupings: speech-act, pre-suppositional, genre-based, discreet, and 
manipulative silences.  
As I explored the contemporary legal texts, I uncovered that three legal actors used 
discreet silence where they seem to avoid discussing sensitive topics such as the history of cross-
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burnings targeting descendants of Africa in the United States.  Although, these examples of 
textual silence were used by Huckin (2002) to discuss and explore the discourse on 
homelessness, they can also be used to understand the power of silence in normalizing and 
perpetuating race and racial differences in law today.  Viewed through a CRT lens, discreet 
silence minimizes the impact of structural racism and conceals “white” hegemony in law 
(Bonilla-Silva, 2014).  Consequently, when textual silences are not uncovered and deconstructed, 
they may perpetuate hegemonic legal discourse in law today. 
Additionally, Bonilla-Silva (2014, p. 26-30) described “color-blind” racism as possessing 
four frames.  The first frame involves abstract liberalism to explain racial matters.  Abstract 
liberalism entails the use of abstract ideas like equal opportunity and individualism to justify 
racial issues.  The second frame incorporates naturalization.  In other words, naturalization 
permits “whites” to rationalize racial matters by indicating they are natural circumstances.  The 
third frame covers cultural racism, which means using culture or culturally-based disputes to 
promote stereotypes.  The last frame embraces minimization of racism.  Essentially, 
minimization of racism implies that discrimination is not a primary aspect in the lives of non 
“whites” because of progress that has been made.  
My findings revealed that four Justices appeared to have used color-blind rhetoric in their 
legal discourse.  For instance, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1 (2006), I considered Chief Justice Roberts’ legal discourse an example of how an 
influential legal actor engages in color-blind rhetoric and uses their platform to minimize racism. 
In Batson v. Kentucky (1986), Justice Rehnquist’s color-blind rhetoric did not see that “whites” 
are rarely, if ever, excluded from jury selection. In Virginia v. Black (2003), both Justices 
CREATING, SUSTAINING, AND DISRUPTING VESTIGES OF SLAVERY 
 
143 
 
O’Connor and Thomas appeared to use color-blind rhetoric when they neglected to consider that 
historically descendants of Africa in the United States were the prime victims of cross-burnings. 
As a result, textual silences and “color-blind” rhetoric not only obscure centuries of 
structural racism created and maintained in law (Bonilla-Silva, 2014), but also deemphasize and 
eschew the historic dynamic of oppression and racial discrimination as “something of the past” 
(Allen, 2005).  Therefore, when contemporary legal actors engage in textual silence and “color-
blind” rhetoric, they fail to take advantage of their persuasive platform to offset centuries of 
hegemonic, racist legal discourse that perpetuates racial differences. 
In summary, the hegemonic and complex findings that emerged from my critical 
discourse analysis of the contemporary legal texts revealed several factors.  First, even though 
contemporary legal actors used previous legal rulings and recounted history that seem to 
maintain racial differences in law, they often reached a counter-hegemonic decision.  Second, 
when some contemporary legal actors remain silent by using discreet speech or adopt a “color-
blind” stance, particularly as it relates to centuries of racially-constructed and maintained legal 
inequalities, their silence and unawareness seems to obscure the impact of racism in law today. 
Last, as arbiters of law and occupiers of the highest court in the land, United States Supreme 
Court justices can play a decisive and influential role in perpetuating centuries-old racial 
distinctions and racial names when they act as reluctant, almost exclusively male, “white” legal 
actors. 
Moreover, this middle-of-the-road, ahistorical stance taken by four contemporary legal 
actors appear to subtly perpetuate a neo-colonialist form of legal control (Allen, 2005).  In a way, 
when some contemporary legal actors act indifferent, they fail to consider many of the past 
historical mistakes made by some legal actors and possibly disregard the current legal condition 
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facing many descendants of Africa in the United States.  From a Post-Colonialist theoretical 
perspective, many of the modern forms of legal control confronting many descendants of Africa 
in the United States represent post-colonialist tactics to maintain “white” dominance.  
Consequently, when some of these contemporary factors of racial differences discrimination 
within the United States legal system are coupled with the historical efforts that “de-civilized the 
colonized” and “deformed them in discourse” (Cesaire, 2000), as revealed from the findings in 
the six historic legal texts I analyzed, inferences may be made that the continued use of the 
racialized names “negro,” “black,” and “white” appear to have some consequences and remain 
vestiges of slavery that require further investigation. 
Counter-Hegemonic Narratives Used by Legal Actors 
In this section, I explore the legal discourse that emerged from the six historic legal texts 
from 1705-1857 for examples of counter-hegemonic narratives.  I discovered that three historic 
legal actors either constructed legal provisions for enslaved persons to prove their legal status, 
reproduced prior decisions that maintained and upheld these legal venues to freedom, or pushed 
back on the prevailing notion that all Africans were slaves by establishing in law that many were 
citizens. 
Counter-hegemonic narratives in historic legal discourse.  Through CDA, I uncovered 
from the six historic legal texts instances in which some legal actors carved out space for 
marginalized groups to specify their legal status.  Some of these counter-hegemonic narratives 
sought to disrupt the image and perception of the “negro,” like in an act for the better ordering 
and governing negroes and other slaves in this province (1740) and in Hudgins v. Wright (1806) 
respectively, in which legal actors acknowledged that descendants of Africa in the United States, 
by way of petition or motion produce proof of their right to freedom.  
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These counter-hegemonic legal provisions were indeed used by some formerly enslaved 
Moors in South Carolina who sought clarification of their legal status (South Carolina Council 
Journal, 1753; The State Records of South Carolina, 1790).  For example, in 1753 two prisoners 
of war were captured in battle by the Portuguese off the Barbary Coast and sold into slavery in 
South Carolina (South Carolina Council Journal, 1753).  Shortly after hearing that they would be 
sold off, these captured and enslaved Moors petitioned the authorities for clarification of their 
legal status or nationality by establishing their allegiance to the Moroccan Empire.  As a result, 
these Moors were freed and later compensated by the British Government (Pimienta-Bey, 2002). 
In another example, four formerly enslaved Moors and their wives petitioned the South 
Carolina House of Representatives (The State Records of South Carolina, 1790).  Notably, as a 
pre-emptive measure, these Moors felt compelled to clarify their legal status or nationality to 
make clear to the community at-large that if they should commit some future offense or crime, 
that they should be treated as Moorish Nationals and not as “negroes” under the “Negro Act” 
officially known as an act for the better ordering and governing negroes and other slaves in this 
province-South Carolina (1740). 
Although my research did not produce more examples of these types of petitions, they 
may offer some insight into counter-hegemonic discourse.  First, CRT acknowledges that the 
experiences and stories of marginalized, oppressed people represents a unique moment in history 
to challenge hegemonic myths of race (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012).  Moreover, from a Post-
Colonialist theoretical perspective, these counter-hegemonic spaces allowed former colonized 
people to reframe their narrowly constructed history from being captured and subdued, to 
liberated and in control of their destiny (Allen, 2005).  Additionally, the counter-hegemonic legal 
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spaces provided former colonized people the right to disrupt the legally imposed inferior status 
as non-human entities.  
In another example of counter-hegemonic narratives, some historic legal actors argued 
against the belief that all “negroes” imported into this country (An act concerning servants and 
slaves in Virginia, 1705).  To illustrate, Justices Curtis and McLean in their dissenting opinion 
asserted that when the Articles of Confederation was ratified, many descendants of Africa in the 
United States were citizens of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and 
North Carolina (Scott v. Sandford, 1857).  These two Justices noted that these free descendants 
of Africa in the United States had the right to vote (Scott v. Sandford, 1857).  The counter-
hegemonic narratives offered by Justices Curtis and McLean demonstrated how legal actors 
utilized their judicial position and platform to challenge the static paradigm that all Africans 
were slaves.  From a CRT perspective, these counter-hegemonic narratives contest the 
hegemonic discourses put forward by many historic legal actors by insisting that an alternative 
history exist (Bonilla-Silva, 2014).  Ultimately, these counter-hegemonic narratives found in the 
historic legal texts pointed to how three historic legal actors strove to disturb the construction 
and maintenance of racial differences in law. 
Counter-hegemonic narratives in contemporary legal discourse.  Through CDA of 
the eight contemporary legal texts, I found that during 1986-2017 approximately half of the legal 
actors used counter-hegemonic narratives as they sought to interrupt the unbroken line of historic 
hegemonic discourse that exists in law today.  While no contemporary legal actor directly 
contested the historic legally constructed images of the “superior white person” and “inferior 
black person,” many United States Supreme Court justices used their judicial role to call out and 
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oppose racial discrimination in matters related to jury due process, employment, education, and 
access to housing. 
CRT recognizes that when legal actors contest racism at its source, in this case the law, 
by using counter-hegemonic narratives they work towards equality under the law for all 
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2012).  Informed by CRT, these findings correspond with how counter-
hegemonic narratives reconstruct reality by arguing against persistent racial discrimination and 
its lasting effects (Bonilla-Silva, 2014). 
In summary, these historic and contemporary counter-hegemonic narratives illustrate how 
some legal actors put forward unconventional and often controversial accounts that contest the 
prevailing hegemonic discourse.  Additionally, these findings, particularly the contemporary 
counter-hegemonic narratives, were a surprise to me because they showed that legal actors using 
their powerful and influential position can resist the historic impulse to continue the status-quo of 
preserving racial differences and racial discrimination.  In the next sections of the chapter, I 
share the limitations of my research, its implications to social work and contributions to the 
literature, and my recommendations and conclusion. 
Limitations 
My research contained several limitations that are important to share. First, to reiterate, 
the sample size and analytic process were limited to CDA and much more in-depth analysis is 
needed that incorporates a deeper exploration of the context, cross-comparison of discourse and 
history, and many more texts from the centuries in-between.  It is also important to disclose that 
post-DSW, I plan to build on and expand extensively from this exploratory study.  As a result, 
my findings should not be taken as conclusive evidence that all legal actors used their platform to 
create and maintain racial differences and racial discrimination in law. 
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Second, I consider it a limitation that my exploratory study did not include the counter-
hegemonic stories of historically oppressed people, such as those found in the petitions made in 
1753 and later in 1790 by several Moors in South Carolina.  I did not find more legal petitions 
like these during the limited time-frame to complete this study, nor was I able to verify if these 
petitions had any impact under the law.  Therefore, this limitation represents an area of future 
research to determine to what extent, if any, did these counter-hegemonic narratives, in the form 
of legal petitions, played a role in influencing the legal discourse and treatment of the 
descendants of Africa in the United States. 
Last, I should make clear that I am not an attorney nor am I trained in law.  This is an 
important limitation to disclose because the focus of my exploratory study was restricted to 
exploring and analyzing legal texts from a CDA and critical social work perspective.  Therefore, 
my lack of legal knowledge and familiarity with the nuances of legal discourse and function of 
law and jurisprudence potentially represents a gap in my analysis.  While my exploratory study 
contained several limitations, specifically the small sample size of fourteen legal texts and a 
limited historic period,  I believe useful inferences may be made on the role of law and legal 
discourse in creating, perpetuating, as well as disrupting racial differences and injustices in law. 
Implications for Social Work 
My exploratory study intentionally focuses on the historic and contemporary role of law 
in constructing, maintaining, and perpetuating racial differences from a social justice paradigm. 
The Council of Social Work Education (CSWE) outlined in the Educational Policy and 
Accreditation Standards (EPAS) that: 
Social work’s purpose is actualized through its quest for social 
and economic justice, the prevention of conditions that limit 
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human rights, the elimination of poverty, and the enhancement 
of the quality of life for all persons (2008, p. 1). 
However, social justice necessitates the critical analysis of ideologies and discourses that support 
structures and systems of inequity.  Therefore, my exploratory study appears to support the need 
for exploring further how exactly was and is racial discrimination perpetuated by law, and more 
importantly, exploring ways to disrupt and dismantle these racist discourses (van Dijk, 2004) as a 
matter of social and racial justice.  Moreover, the findings of my exploratory study represents a 
potentially ripe area for research and activism for social workers to engage in tilting the scale 
towards equal justice under the law for all. 
In addition, my study corresponds with a critical social work paradigm that seeks ways to 
disrupt the status-quo in a manner that advances a society without racial discrimination, 
oppression, and hegemony (MacKinnon, 2009).  From a macro social work perspective, my 
study showed that racialized names “white,” particularly in the historic legal texts, explicitly and 
implicitly meant someone who is “superior.”  While the use of the term “negro” or “black” when 
applied to a person explicitly and implicitly meant someone who is “inferior” and “uncivilized.” 
Hegemonic discourse that is seemingly maintained and reinforced in law, represent more than 
just words, may influence how other institutions like law enforcement treat descendants of Africa 
in the United States.  From a Post-Colonialist standpoint, racist discourse, specifically in the 
form of racialized names, supports and reinforces the dominant power colonists have over the 
colonized (Allen, 2005; van Dijk, 2004).  Therefore, my exploratory study supports the need for 
exploring ways to challenge the remaining vestiges of hegemonic discursive practices 
perpetuated in law today by identifying, amplifying, and developing more counter-hegemonic 
discourse and practices that disrupt and dismantle these remnants of slavery. 
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I believe my research contributed to existing literature by demonstrating that combining 
CRT with a CDA approach may enhance how social workers analyze the relationship between 
race and power.  Also, utilizing CRT with CDA may amplify how social workers study and 
respond to the institutional injustices of racism.  In addition to employing CRT as a theoretical 
framework to issues related to race, racism, and power, I further suggest that implementing a 
Post-Colonialist theory, as put forward by Allen (1990; 2005), may augment how social workers 
examine the modern, more nuanced forms of racism today in the United States.  
Lastly, the deep-rooted problem of racism, racial discrimination, and the ideology of 
“white supremacy” in our society has significant implications for the social work profession.  For 
instance, from a macro social work perspective, the continued use of racial differences and 
racialized names in law are likely to result in adverse legal outcomes for many descendants of 
Africa in the United States, but they will almost certainly reinforce “white privilege” in law. 
Therefore, I would advocate that social workers should learn the nuances of racialized names, so 
they can be sensitive to what racial names to use with their clients. 
Similarly, from a macro social work perspective, the continued use of racial differences 
and racialized names in law appears to perpetuate structural racism and maintain institutionalized 
barriers within the legal system.  While social workers strive to eliminate hurdles to justice, they 
may not be equipped to identify, deconstruct, and effectively challenge these complex and 
entrenched societal problems (Gil, 1998; Ife, 2012; Kolivoski, Weaver, & Constance-Huggins, 
2014; MacKinnon, 2009).  Therefore, if the social work profession expects to disrupt the 
destructive effects of racial injustice and the status quo of “white supremacy,” we should 
consider a critical analysis and transformation of our social work educational curriculum.   
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I suggest an example of what this transformation to our social work education curriculum may 
look like in the recommendation section of this chapter. 
In summary, even though some important changes have been made since the Civil Rights 
movement, many descendants of Africa in the United States still appear to not enjoy equal and 
fair treatment under the law.  As a result, social workers should be aware that as legal actors have 
sought to correct the wrongs that still exist, they may be able to work with judges to amplify 
counter-hegemony. 
Contributions to the Research 
In addition to providing some direction for future research, my exploratory study 
contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, I believe the use of Critical Race Theory 
(CRT) and Post-Colonialist Theory combined with a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
approach to the exploration of the role of law in creating, maintaining, and disrupting racial 
differences in the historic and contemporary legal texts incorporates vast potential for future 
research in this field of study.  While several scholars have already demonstrated the value of 
CRT to the study of law and legal discourse (Bell, 1992; Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado & 
Stefancic, 2012) and education (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995), there is a paucity of the 
application of CDA in social work (Rossiter, 2005).  Therefore, social workers who engage in 
studies that examine power, particularly as it relates to racism, may find CDA useful because, 
from a social justice perspective, it may reveal how to critically analyze the relationship between 
discourse, race, and power and find ways to deconstruct them. 
Second, the use of Post-Colonialist theory proved to be very insightful, especially Allen’s 
(1990; 2005) contribution, because it acknowledged and articulated the current situation of 
historically colonized people in the United States: descendants of Africa in the United States. 
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Additionally, using a Post-Colonialist stance, allowed me to move past the false narrative that we 
live in a post-racial society.  I believe that this research may bolster the literature on how the 
legal actors who sanctioned legal decisions systematically dehumanized many descendants of 
Africa in the United States (Coates, 2003: Higginbotham, 1996) and how many of the founding 
fathers not only legally constructed race, particularly “white” (Haney-Lopez, 2006), but also 
“negro” and “black.”  
Additionally, this exploratory study advances Noonan’s concept of legal masks (1976) to 
include and consider that not just slavery dehumanized many descendants of Africa in the United 
States, but that the use of the racialized names “negro,” “colored,” and “black” maintained the 
process of dehumanization by virtue of their explicit meaning in law and for their implicit 
cognitive effect in jury deliberations (Smith et al., 2015; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). 
Social Work and Law 
I believe this dissertation breaks new ground by demonstrating that social workers can 
engage in sophisticated transdisciplinary research (Kemp & Nurius, 2015), normally restricted to 
attorneys who often specialize in human rights (Ife, 2016).  I believe this exploratory study may 
encourage social workers to assume a more active role in deconstructing hegemonic discourses 
that create and maintain structural racism in our society, specifically in law and legal discourse. 
Therefore, this study suggests that exploring historical and contemporary legal texts can be a 
legitimate topic for research in social work (Fisher & Dybicz, 1999), which may help to expand 
social workers’ role in matters pertaining to law and social justice. 
When social workers engage in work that intersects with law, it may enhance our 
profession’s credibility within the social science community, because our clients and the 
community at-large may see us as more than advocates, but as actors willing and able to work 
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towards social justice.  For instance, social workers may be able to collaborate with judges who 
are also striving to contest hegemony and racial differences in law. 
While the literature is replete with research on racial identity, perception of and attitudes 
toward the racialized names, I explored the role of law and legal discourse in constructing racial 
differences between 1705-1857 and 1986-2017, specifically using the racialized names “negro,” 
“colored,” “black,” and “white.”  Although other researchers explored the use of racialized 
names “white” (Haney-Lopez, 2006)“negro,” “colored,” and “black” in law from a historical 
viewpoint (Pimienta-Bey, 1995; 2002), my exploratory study compared six historic and eight 
contemporary legal texts for its use in constructing and maintaining racial differences through 
1705-1857 and 1986-2017.  Additionally, my study uncovered ways in which some legal actors 
used counter-hegemonic narratives to disrupt the prevailing hegemonic discourse in law and 
begin to repair the errors of the past. 
Recommendations for Social Work Research, Education, Leadership, and Action 
In this section, I submit my recommendations as they relate to social work research, 
social work education, and social work leadership and action. 
Social work research.  As I previously indicated, one limitation of my study was the 
narrow time-frame and geographic regions of the analyzed documents for this exploratory study. 
The fact that my findings only provide a glimpse into how racial differences and racial 
discrimination were created, maintained, perpetuated, and disrupted in a small data sample is not 
enough to offer any definite conclusions into this complex role of law and legal actors. 
Therefore, to gain a more thorough perspective of how the law influences racial differences and 
treatment, I recommend that it is necessary to significantly expand the data sample to include the 
thirteen original colonies, as well as the centuries not included in this study.  Additionally, my 
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findings revealed that many of the legal texts were produced by law-makers and often endorsed 
by executive officials in government.  Thus, a recommendation for future research would be to 
include exploring the role of the other branches of government in constructing, sustaining, and 
disrupting racial differences and discrimination. 
Second, as I disclosed previously in the limitation section of this chapter, my lack of legal 
expertise may have unintentionally overlooked specific legal details that only a trained legal 
professional would detect and explain.  These analytic gaps in my exploratory study represent a 
unique opportunity to develop and engage in transdisciplinary collaborative efforts.  Therefore, I 
recommend that future research into this area of study should include social workers, attorneys, 
and historians, committed to eliminating racial differences and restoring social justice in society, 
to explore further the intersection of racism, law, and social justice. 
Third, I recommend that future research should explore the counter-hegemonic narratives 
of historically oppressed descendants of Africa in the United States, especially as it relates to 
how racial differences and racial discrimination are perpetuated in law.  While my small data 
sample incorporated the counter-hegemonic discourse of historic and contemporary legal actors, 
providing the direct counter-stories of the oppressed and marginalized may help shed light on 
how they were emotionally, cognitively, and physically affected by legally constructed racism. 
Therefore, I would also suggest that scholars interview descendants of Africa in the United 
States as well, to obtain their perspectives on the nexus between law and racial differences and 
discrimination, particularly in light of the findings in the contemporary legal texts. 
Social work education.  Despite being advocates for social and racial justice, social 
workers may find themselves unprepared to properly identify and effectively challenge structural 
racism and the disparities that adversely impact the lives of many of our clients.  As a doctoral 
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student and social work educator, I recognize that social workers are not prepared through their 
college education to critically analyze, deconstruct, and systematically address these complex 
and entrenched societal problems.  In a way, this lack of knowledge may cause social workers to 
feel frustrated in helping clients understand and cope with structural barriers to inequality. 
Therefore, the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) should consider implementing a 
course to educators and students on critical social work in society that specifically focus on 
oppression and racism (Tishman & Clarendon, 2018).  I envision that this course would be 
offered at the Baccalaureate, Master’s, and Doctorate levels of social work education.  This 
course would introduce students to CRT, Post-Colonialist theory, CDA, Gramsci’s concepts of 
hegemony (1971), and embraces international social work perspectives because some 
international social workers like Jim Ife (2012) have worked with the legal community to disrupt 
hegemonic practices in Australia.  Additionally, this course should encourage social work 
students to engage in transdisciplinary research and learn how to collaborate with other 
disciplines such as health, psychiatry, law and politics, and history to understand how to analyze 
and solve complex social problems such as racism that impacts virtually every aspect of life. 
Social work leadership and action.  Lastly, social workers cannot remain silent or 
neutral while some legal actors seek to disrupt hegemony and racial differences in law today. 
Therefore, for future action I recommend that social workers collaborate with local and national 
organizations to help educate descendants of Africa and Europe in the United States on the 
historic and legal meanings of the racialized names “negro,” “black,” and “white.”  Ultimately, 
the goal of this proposed recommendation is to call for social work leaders, scholars, and 
educators at-large to consider the significant role the can play in the elimination of the use of 
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these racialized names and replacing them with more historically and legally accurate names that 
promote equality. 
In addition, social work leaders should collaborate with historians and scholars like Dr. 
Jose Pimienta-Bey in order to learn more about the Moors because of their historic contributions, 
and consider using Moorish American because of its legal relevance in the United States and 
internationally (Drew Ali, n.d.; 1928; Pimienta-Bey, 1992; 1995; 2002; South Carolina Council 
Journal, 1753; The State Records of South Carolina, 1790).  Finally, I recommend that social 
workers who are descendants of Europe in the United States and concerned about how racial 
differences are maintained in law today, should denounce the continued use of the name “white” 
(Haney-Lopez, 2002) because these first steps may demonstrate an awareness of and willingness 
to take action in addressing the centuries of “white” privilege attached to the name “white”.  
Conclusion 
 Today, there is no question that our country has made some positive changes, specifically 
in terms of racial differences and legal discourse.  My exploratory study revealed that the harsh 
and racially discriminatory legal language from the past has been replaced with more subtle, 
nuanced, and complex legal discourse.  Also, I discovered that many United States Supreme 
Court justices used their judicial platform to present counter-hegemonic narratives as they sought 
to disrupt centuries-old discriminatory legal discourse and practices.  As scholars committed to 
social and racial justice, social workers should applaud and support their courageous efforts by 
taking action to work with others in this struggle equality and justice.  Unfortunately, I found 
through my analysis of cases that some legal actors today also adopt neutral, color-blind, and 
even silent position as it relates to racial matters.  Therefore, social science scholars and social 
workers committed to social justice for all cannot remain silent as discourses of racial differences 
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still linger in our institutions.  It is possible that the continued use racial differences and silence 
may be one of the reasons that our nation continues to be divided along racial lines. 
In conclusion, I was pleased to find that many historic and contemporary legal actors 
have used their influential platform to contest the prevailing hegemonic and racist legal discourse 
that created and sustained racial differences and racial inequality in the United States.  The 
counter-hegemonic narratives delivered by contemporary legal actors illustrated the nexus 
between law and social justice.  However, clearly more needs to be done to rectify the centuries 
of racial injustice in the United States.  Finally, I remain optimistic when I saw concerned, 
conscious descendants of Africa and Europe in the United States unite to remove Civil War-
Confederate statutes from public spaces because their counter-hegemonic efforts may have 
opened a future space for a civil dialogue and discourse on how to eliminate and dismantle the 
vestiges of slavery and racial differences that are deeply engrained into the fabric of the United 
States. 
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